Constitutional democracy is not just any old form of democracy. It has a peculiar logic and is premised upon some exacting criteria and principles including good laws and institutions predicated on specific fundamental core values and principles. But it is, when fully ingrained in the public sensibility, a sort of civic serum necessary to inoculate free citizens against the ravages of anti-democratic populism, authoritarianism, racism, nativism, discrimination, xenophobia, corruption, self-dealing, and much worse. The need for civic inoculation of that sort is urgent today, globally. The essays in this volume probe the sources and malaise now confronting Constitutional Democracy. However, they go muchfurther. Many of the essays are, indeed, road-maps for a realistic and cultivated response to our present condition. The clues for a rehabilitated democracy are found here analytically but also prescriptively.

Is the world facing a serious threat to the protection of constitutional democracy? There is a genuine debate about the meaning of the various political events that have, for many scholars and observers, generated a feeling of deep foreboding about our collective futures all over the world. Do these events represent simply the normal ebb and flow of political possibilities, or do they instead portend a more permanent move away from constitutional democracy that had been thought triumphant after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989? Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? addresses these questions head-on: Are the forces weakening constitutional democracy around the world general or nation-specific? Why have some major democracies seemingly not experienced these problems? How can we as scholars and citizens think clearly about the ideas of "constitutional crisis" or "constitutional degeneration"? What are the impacts of forces such as globalization, immigration, income inequality, populism, nationalism, religious sectarianism? Bringing together leading scholars to engage critically with the crises facing constitutional democracies in the 21st century, these essays diagnose the causes of the present afflictions in regimes, regions, and across the globe, believing at this stage that diagnosis is of central importance - as Abraham Lincoln said in his "House Divided" speech, "If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could then better judge what to do, and how to do it."

Constitutionalism under Stress reflects on comparative constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe through the work of eminent constitutional scholar Wojciech Sadurski. The book examines the current decline of liberal democracies and populist challenges to the rule of law in the region - events that Sadurski predicted early on in his writings about Jörg Haider affair in Austria and the introduction of Article 7 TEU by the Amsterdam Treaty. Sadurski's work has chronicled the transition from concern for the most basic of human rights under authoritarian rule to the challenges of democratic governance. The compelling rights discourse of an earlier period gave way to claims of abuse of majoritarian prerogatives as the hopes of liberal democracy encountered the power of illiberalism. The theoretical responses offered for the preservation of liberal democracy, in light of the current turbulence regarding the rule of law in the region, produces a far reaching and effective reference tool on matters of constitutional capture and illiberal democracy.

We can’t afford to be complacent any more: “A formidable book . . . extremely rich in historical examples, case studies, and quantitative data.” —International Journal of Constitutional Law Democracies are in danger. Around the world, a wave of populist leaders threatens to erode the core structures of democratic self-rule. In the United States, the tenure of Donald Trump marks a decisive turning point for many. What kind of president intimidates jurors, calls the news media the “enemy of the American people,” and seeks foreign assistance investigating domestic political rivals? Many think the Constitution will safeguard us from lasting damage. But is that assumption justified? Drawing on an array of other countries’ experiences, Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq show how constitutional rules can both hinder and hasten the decline of democratic institutions. The checks and balances of the federal government, a robust civil society and media, and individual rights—such as those enshrined in the First Amendment—often fail as bulwarks against democratic decline. The sobering reality, they contend, is that the US Constitution’s design makes democratic erosion more, not less, likely. Its structural rigidity has had unforeseen consequence—leaving the presidency weakly regulated and empowering the Supreme Court to conjure up doctrines that ultimately facilitate rather than inhibit rights violations. Even the bright spots in the Constitution—the First Amendment, for example—may have perverse consequences in the hands of a deft communicator who can degrade the public sphere by wielding hateful language banned in many other democracies. We—and the rest of the world—can do better, and the authors conclude by laying out practical steps for how laws and constitutional design can play a more positive role in managing the risk. “This book makes a huge contribution to our understanding of how democracies erode and what institutional reforms would make it harder for authoritarian populists to entrench their power.” —Yascha Mounk, author of The People vs. Democracy “Whereas other recent books on the crisis of American democracy focus on what has gone wrong, Ginsburg and Huq provide us with clear-eyed proposals—including some bold constitutional reforms—for how to fix it.” —Steven Levitsky, New York Times–bestselling coauthor of How Democracies Die

This book takes a wide-ranging approach to tackle the complex question of the current state of constitutional democracy in the EU. It brings together a broad set of academics and practitioners with legal and political perspectives to focus on both topical and perennial issues concerning constitutional democracy (including safeguarding the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights) in theory and practice, primarily at EU level but also with due regard to national and global developments. This approach underlines that rather than a single problématique to be analysed and resolved, we are presently facing a kaleidoscopic spectrum of related challenges that influence each other in elusive, multifaceted ways. Critical Reflections on Constitutional Democracy in the European Union offers a rich analysis of the issues as well as concrete policy recommendations, which will appeal to scholars and practitioners, students and interested citizens alike. It provides a meaningful contribution to the array of existing scholarship and debate by proposing original elements of analysis, challenging often-made assumptions, destabilising settled understandings and proposing fundamental reforms. Overall, the collection injects a set of fresh critical perspectives on this fundamental issue that is as contemporary as it is eternal.

Legitimation by Constitution is the phrase, coined by distinguished authors Frank Michelman and Alessandro Ferrara, for a key idea in Rawlsian political liberalism of a reliance on a dualist form of democracy-a subjection of ground-level lawmaking to the constraints of a higher-law constitution that most citizens could find acceptable as a framework for their politics-as a response to the problem of maintaining a liberally just, stable, and oppression-free democratic government in conditions of pluralist visionary conflict. Legitimation by Constitution recalls, collects, and combines a series of exchanges over the years between Michelman and Ferrara, inspired by Rawls' encapsulation of this conception in his proposed liberal principle of legitimacy. From a shared standpoint of sympathetic identification with the political-liberal statement of the problem, for which legitimation by constitution is proposed as a solution, these exchanges consider the perceived difficulties arguably standing in the way of this proposal's fulfillment on terms consistent with political liberalism's defining ideas about political justification. The authors discuss the mysteries of a democratic constituent power; the tensions between government-by-the-people and government-by-consent; the challenges posed to concretization by judicial authorities of national constitutional law; and the magnification of these tensions and challenges under the lenses of ambition towards transnational legal ordering. These discussions engage with other leading contemporary theorists of liberal-democratic constitutionalism including Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, and Jürgen Habermas.

Constitutional democracy is both a structure of governance and a way of providing an ideological perspective on governance. The 1950 Constitution of India established constitutional democracy in India and the narrative of the rise and consolidation of constitutional democracy in India cannot be understood without comprehending the politico-ideological processes that consolidated simultaneously both colonialism and constitutional liberalism. This book examines the processes leading to constitutionalizing India and challenges the conventional idea that the Constitution of India is a borrowed doctrine. A careful study of the processes reveals that the 1950 Constitution was the culmination of an ideational battle that had begun with the consolidation of the British Enlightenment philosophy in the early days of British paramountcy in India. The book therefore argues that constitutionalizing endeavour in India had a clear imprint of ideas which had its root in this philosophy. The study reveals a striking continuity of the same kind of ideological sentiments when the nationalists devised their own constitutionalizing design, visible in the 1928 Motilal Nehru report and which reappeared in the 1945 Sapru Committee report. Deviating from the conventional study of constitutional evolution of a polity, which is generally legalistic, this book explores the processes since the beginning of colonial rule in India which led to the conceptualization of constitutional democracy in a milieu engaging with arguments formulated by James and JS Mill. A detailed analysis of the roots of constitutional and political liberalism in India, this book sheds light on the material surrounding India’s constitutional development. It will be of interest to scholars in the field of Indian Political Theory, South Asian Politics and History.

Since 2010 the European Union has been plagued by crises of democracy and the rule of law, which have been spreading from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), catching many by surprise. This book argues that the professed success of the 2004 big bang enlargement mirrored the Potemkin villages erected in the new Member States on their accession to Europe. Slovenia is a prime example. Since its independence and throughout the accession process, Slovenia has been portrayed as the poster child of the 'New Europe'. This book claims that the widely shared narrative of the Slovenian EU dream is a myth. In many ways, Slovenia has fared even worse than its contemporary, constitutionally-backsliding, CEE counterparts. The book's discussion of the depth and breadth of the democratic crises in Slovenia should contribute to a critical intellectual awakening and better comprehension of the real causes of the present crises across the other CEE Member States, which threaten the viability of the EU and Council of Europe projects. It is only on the basis of this improved understanding that the crises can be appropriately addressed at national, transnational and supranational levels.

Section 33 – what is commonly referred to as the notwithstanding clause (NWC) – was written into the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to allow Parliament and the provinces to provisionally override certain Charter rights. The Notwithstanding Clause and the Canadian Charter examines the NWC from all angles and perspectives, considering who should have the last word on matters of rights and justice – the legislatures or the unelected judiciary – and what balance liberal democracy requires. In the case of Quebec, the use of the clause has been justified as necessary to preserve the province’s culture and promote its identity as a nation. Yet Quebec’s pre-emptive and sweeping invocation of the clause also challenges the scope of judicial review and citizens’ recourse to it, and it tests the assumption that a dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature is always preferable in instances in which the legislative branch decides to suspend the operation of certain Charter rights and freedoms. By virtue of its contested purposes, interpretations, operation, and applications, the NWC represents and, to an extent, defines both the character and the very real vulnerabilities of liberal constitutionalism in Canada. The significance, effects, and legitimacy of the NWC have been vigorously debated within scholarship and among politicians and activists since the patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982. In The Notwithstanding Clause and the Canadian Charter leading scholars, jurists, and policy experts elucidate and prescribe reforms to the application of this consequential clause about which so much is written, and around which there is relatively little consensus.

In recent years, liberal constitutionalism has come under sharp attack. Globalization has caused huge disparities in wealth, identity-based alienation triggered by mass migration, and accompanying erosions of democracy. Liberal populists have also adapted the framework of liberal institutionalism, masking their aim to subvert its core values. These developments bring the links between justice and the constitution to the fore, particularly concerning distributive justice in its three dimensions of redistribution, recognition, and representation. A Pluralist Theory of Constitutional Justice provides a systematic account of the central role of distributive justice in the normative legitimation of liberal constitutions. The requirements of distributive justice are highly contested, and constitutions are susceptible to influencing those they govern. By drawing on Rawls' insight that distributive justice calls for "constitutional essentials", Rosenfeld advances the thesis that liberal constitutions must incorporate certain "justice essentials". This book is divided into three sections. Part one examines the current legal, economic, political and ideological developments that pose challenges to the normative viability of liberal constitutionalism. Part two offers a rereading of philosophical and jurisprudential literature that sheds crucial light on the relationship between constitution and justice. Finally, part three makes a case for using a thoroughly pluralistic approach in the quest for a constitution's justice essentials.