Northeast Utilities Company adopted an ambitious new competitive strategy in the mid-1980s, seeking to become the low-cost supplier in New England electric power markets bracing for deregulation. Given its high-cost nuclear facilities, doing so required a corporate turnaround. For a decade Northeast faced increasing public and employee resistance to cost cutting at its nuclear plants. Though management achieved many of its goals, curtailing outlays on nuclear operations meant high risk that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would close the plants because of frequent, prolonged outages. This is just what happened in 1996. Did management's deliberate cost-containment strategy take nuclear operations to an inevitable regulatory shutdown, and if so, why? Was it the pursuit of executive compensation tied to cost containment that caused undue risk of regulatory shutdown? Paul MacAvoy and Jean Rosenthal describe ten years of corporate performance preceding the shutdown, detailing aggressive executive decisions, mounting regulatory actions in response to increasingly severe operational failures, and--at the same time--overall improvement in corporate earnings, stock prices, and executive pay packages. They relate the complexities of managing declining nuclear plant operations under ever more pressing budgetary targets. Their discussion of the increasing risk of outages raises the issue of the tradeoff of profit and conservative management of hazard operations. All the more timely in light of the massive 2003 East Coast blackout, Corporate Profit and Nuclear Safety represents a powerful and cautionary commentary on industrial practices that goes to the heart of effective corporate governance.

Atomic Age America looks at the broad influence of atomic energy¿focusing particularly on nuclear weapons and nuclear power¿on the lives of Americans within a world context. The text examines the social, political, diplomatic, environmental, and technical impacts of atomic energy on the 20th and 21st centuries, with a look back to the origins of atomic theory.

This book discusses management decision-making under accident conditions as a vehicle to confirm the importance of clear decision-making guided by a systems approach on how an organization functions related to the role of managers, operators, and the operation of the plant. The book shows how to effectively assess the reliability of an organization particularly those organizations responsible for critical infrastructure. The authors have used Stafford Beer’s cybernetic model as a basis to model the behavior and reliability of such organizations. A series of case studies are used to draw conclusions not only how training, experience, and education can improve the strategy and response of management to reduce the probability of an economic or social disaster, but also draw attention to the fact that managers need to be made aware of the consequences of their decisions. Poor management decisions made under stress conditions can lead to the collapse of an organization together with its underlying business, possibly linked to a social disaster with loss of life. Some technology-ignorant management decisions even under non-stress conditions can lead to dangerous situations, which can increase the economic burden placed on an organization. This book describes such situations in order to promote improvement in organizational preparedness by training, experience, and education to reduce safety and economic risks. This book offers: • Case studies of accidents that have affected different HROs (high-risk organizations) and others, due to poor decision-making by management • Training methods (advocated by Admiral Hyman Rickover, adopted by military bodies and others) to prepare staff to make critical decisions under difficult conditions and examine their applicability to training managers of high-risk facilities • Documentation on how making decisions in difficult situations have psychological constraints related to the degree of preparedness and the tools available to aid the decision maker(s) • Studies on the key actions taken before, during, and after accidents and how these management decisions can affect accident propagation, and how one could improve management decision-making by the use of training in decision-making and an understanding of Ross Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety. • Simulation techniques to improve training of front-line operators and management • Consideration of cost and investment evaluations and how they can distort the selection of tactics and measures that ensure successful operations and avoidance of accidents

An in-depth and balanced economic analysis of the costs, hazards, regulation and politics of nuclear power.

This book describes and assesses an emerging threat to states’ territorial control and sovereignty: the hostile control of companies that carry out privatized aspects of sovereign authority. The threat arises from the massive worldwide shift of state activities to the private sector since the late 1970s in conjunction with two other modern trends – the globalization of business and the liberalization of international capital flows. The work introduces three new concepts: firstly, the rise of companies that handle privatized activities, and the associated advent of "post-government companies" that make such activities their core business. Control of them may reside with individual investors, other companies or investment funds, or it may reside with other states through state-owned enterprises or sovereign wealth funds. Secondly, "imperfect privatizations:" when a state privatizes an activity to another state’s public sector. The book identifies cases where this is happening. It also elaborates on how ownership and influence of companies that perform privatized functions may not be transparent, and can pass to inherently hostile actors, including criminal or terrorist organizations. Thirdly, "belligerent companies," whose conduct is hostile to those of states where they are active. The book concludes by assessing the adequacy of existing legal and regulatory regimes and how relevant norms may evolve.

With the end of the Cold War, Russia's submarines were no longer needed to deter or fight Western navies and were very expensive to operate and maintain. Older submarines were taken out of service in large numbers, but without firm plans and infrastructure in place to remove and adequately care for their nuclear components, problems soon developed over the disposition of spent fuel assemblies. Problems arose also of course between Russia and the international community as to the best way to respond to the challenge. This book looks at those problems, first discussing Russia's economy, its environment, and the Russian Navy, and then covering in detail the spent fuel of Russian submarines and related nuclear problems. The engagement of the international community on the issue is then addressed. A theoretical analysis is offered on how Russia's fellow nations can help remedy a troubling environmental problem in a difficult country.

Despite the devastation caused by the magnitude 9.0 earthquake and 60-foot tsunami that struck Japan in 2011, some 96% of those living and working in the most disaster-stricken region of Tohoku made it through. Smaller earthquakes and tsunamis have killed far more people in nearby China and India. What accounts for the exceptionally high survival rate? And why is it that some towns and cities in the Tohoku region have built back more quickly than others? Black Wave illuminates two critical factors that had a direct influence on why survival rates varied so much across the Tohoku region following the 3/11 disasters and why the rebuilding process has also not moved in lockstep across the region. Individuals and communities with stronger networks and better governance, Daniel P. Aldrich shows, had higher survival rates and accelerated recoveries. Less-connected communities with fewer such ties faced harder recovery processes and lower survival rates. Beyond the individual and neighborhood levels of survival and recovery, the rebuilding process has varied greatly, as some towns and cities have sought to work independently on rebuilding plans, ignoring recommendations from the national government and moving quickly to institute their own visions, while others have followed the guidelines offered by Tokyo-based bureaucrats for economic development and rebuilding.