Explores current debates around religious extremism as a means to understand and re-think the connections between terrorism, insurgency and state failure. Using case studies of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, she develops a better understanding of the underlying causes and conditions necessary for terrorism and insurgency to occur.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, inaugurated a new global era of counterterrorism policy and activity, led by the United States. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century analyzes the most significant dimensions of combating terrorism, including considerations of strategic and tactical issues (hard power, soft power, and counterintelligence); the need to thwart sources and facilitators (weak governments, ill-conceived foreign policy, and trafficking in drugs, guns, and humans); and the incorporation of lessons learned thus far from combating terrorism around the globe. Since the dawn of the new millennium, combating terrorism has become a primary focus of security professionals throughout the world. The attacks of September 11, 2001, inaugurated a new global era of counterterrorism policy and activity, led by the United States, while many countries—from Algeria and Spain to Sri Lanka and Indonesia—have redoubled their efforts to combat their own indigenous terrorism threats. In the Unites States, the counterterrorism goals identified in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006) can only be achieved through significant multinational cooperation. These goals are to advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideologies of terrorism; to prevent attacks by terrorist networks; to deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; to deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and to lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success. At this point in the development of the global counterterrorism efforts, it is particularly important to pause for reflection on a number of critical questions. What do we know about effectively countering terrorism? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counterterrorism campaigns? What do we need to learn in order to do this better? Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses these and related questions, contributing to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the terrorist threat and how it can be defeated. Volume 1: Strategic and Tactical Considerations examines issues of hard power, soft power, and intelligence/counterintelligence. Volume 2: Sources and Facilitators covers state failure, border controls, democracy promotion, networks and trade and trafficking, and societal issues. Volume 3: Lessons Learned from Combating Terrorism and Insurgency includes case studies of counterterrorism operations (e.g., the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and the capture of key terrorist suspects like Ramzi Youssef and Khalid Sheikh Mohamad); and case studies of long-term efforts to combat terrorism (e.g., the Basques in Spain, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Israel's struggle against Palestinian terror organizations, Peru and Sendero Luminoso, and Japan and Aum Shinrikyo).

This document sets out the United Kingdom's strategy, known as CONTEST, for countering the threat from international terrorism. The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom (UK) and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. This is a revised and more detailed version of the strategy contained in "The national security strategy of the United Kingdom" (Cm. 7291, 2008, ISBN 9780101729123). The first part sets the context with a brief history of the changing threat to the United Kingdom and to UK interests overseas from international terrorism, examines the present threat, the factors which are shaping it and the assumptions about how it may develop. The second part sets out the principles which will govern the strategy, including a commitment to human rights and the rule of law, recognition of the need to address the causes as well as the symptoms of terrorism and the need to co-operate with other countries. The four main streams of the CONTEST strategy are: (1) pursue - to stop terrorist attacks; (2) prevent - to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; (3) protect - to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack; (4) prepare - where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact. The third part of the document outlines who will deliver the strategy and how its impact will be measured. The document concludes with a section explaining the importance of communications as a part of the counter-terrorism strategy.

This book examines the various strategies, including Global Counterinsurgency (GCOIN), which have been put forward as alternatives to the Global War On Terror (GWOT), concluding that while a consensus can be found on the key elements of a grand strategy, based on failures in the GWOT, it is far from clear if any GCOIN strategy could work.

Ten years after the 9/11 attacks this book reassesses the effectiveness of the "War on Terror", considers how al-Qaeda and other jihadist movements are faring, explores the impact of wider developments in the Islamic world such as the Arab Spring, and discusses whether all this suggests that a new approach to containing international, especially jihadist, terrorism is needed. Among the book’s many richly argued conclusions are that the "War on Terror" and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have brutalised the United States; that the jihadist threat is not one, but rather a wide range of separate, unconnected struggles; and that al-Qaeda’s ideology contains the seeds of its own destruction, in that although many Muslims are content to see the United States worsted, they do not approve of al-Qaeda’s violence and are not taken in by the jihadists’ empty promises of utopia.

Handbook of Terrorist and Insurgent Groups: A Global Survey of Threats, Tactics, and Characteristics examines the most current and significant terrorist and insurgent groups around the world. The purpose is to create a descriptive mosaic of what is a pointedly global security challenge. The volume brings together conceptual approaches to terrorism, insurgency, and cyberterrorism with substantive and empirical analyses of individual groups, organisations, and networks. By doing so, not only does the coverage highlight the past, present, and future orientations of the most prominent groups, but it also examines and illustrates their key characteristics and how they operate, including key leaders and ideologues. Highlighting specific, individual groups, the chapters collectively present a robust and comprehensive outlook on the current geography of terrorism and insurgency groups operating in the world today. This comprehensive volume brings the collective expertise and knowledge of more than 50 academics, intelligence and security officials, and professionals together, all of whom are considered subject experts in their respective areas of research and practice. The volume is based on both desk-based and fieldwork conducted by experts in these areas, incorporating analyses of secondary literature but also the use of primary data including first-hand interviews on the various groups’ regions of operation, their tactics, and how their ideologies motivate their actions.

This book examines the different ways in which the laws governing the use of force and the conduct of warfare have become subject to intense scrutiny and contestation since the initiation of the war on terror. Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of security challenges has changed radically and this change has been recognised by the UN, governments and academics around the world. The 911 attacks and the subsequent launch of the 'war on terror' added a new dimension to this debate on the nature and utility of international law due to the demands from some quarters for a change in the laws governing self-defence and humanitarian intervention. This book analyses the nature of these debates and focuses on key issues that have led to the unprecedented contemporary questioning of both the utility and composition of international law on the use of force as well as the practicability of using force, including handling of ‘prisoners’ and ‘security risks’. It also identifies the sources of division and addresses the capacities of security policy and international law to adapt to the changed international environment. This book will of much interest to students of international law, war and conflict studies, and IR and Security Studies in general.

David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, a ground-breaking theorist whose ideas "are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the west" (Washington Post). Indeed, his vision of modern warfare powerfully influenced the United States' decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the Surge," now recognized as a dramatic success. In Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen brings together his most salient writings on this vitally important topic. Here is a picture of modern warfare by someone who has had his boots on the ground in some of today's worst trouble spots-including Iraq and Afghanistan-and who has been studying counterinsurgency since 1985. Filled with down-to-earth, common-sense insights, this book is the definitive account of counterinsurgency, indispensable for all those interested in making sense of our world in an age of terror.

Almost two decades after the events of 9/11, this Handbook offers a comprehensive insight into the evolution and development of terrorism and insurgency since then. Gathering contributions from a broad range of perspectives, it both identifies new technological developments in terrorism and insurgency, and addresses the distinct state responses to the threat of political, or religiously motivated violence; not only in the Middle East and Europe, but also in Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and North and South America.

The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency—a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results. Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization.