The Russian government's campaigns of disinformation--political, social, religious, or otherwise--have found a comfortable home on social media. This report presents strategies to counter Russian social media influence.

Russia employs a sophisticated social media campaign against former Soviet states that includes news tweets, nonattributed comments on web pages, troll and bot social media accounts, and fake hashtag and Twitter campaigns. Nowhere is this threat more tangible than in Ukraine. Researchers analyzed social media data and conducted interviews with regional and security experts to understand the critical ingredients to countering this campaign.

Researchers analyzed Russian social media data and conducted interviews with regional and security experts to understand the critical ingredients to countering Russia's propaganda campaign against former Soviet states.

This book examines the ways in which Russia and Belarus use disinformation, "weaponised" historical narratives, and the politics of memory for domestic and foreign policy purposes, utilising these factors to justify aggressive foreign policy in defensive terms and, domestically, for legitimating local ruling elites, consolidating the states’ propaganda machines, and mobilising both societies around national power centres. Besides analysing Russian and Belarusian disinformation, geopolitical narratives, and policies, the book also assesses the effectiveness of these measures and discusses how the West can counteract the geopolitical narratives disseminated by Russia and Belarus that attempt to undermine Western democracies and weaken the resilience of its societies.

The Russian regime's struggle for internal control drives multifaceted actions in cyberspace that do not stop at national borders. Cybercrime, technical hacking, and disinformation are complementary tools to preserve national power internally while projecting effects onto myriad neighbors and rivals. Russian activity in the cyber domain is infamous in the United States and other Western countries. Weaponizing Cyberspace explores the Russian proclivity, particularly in the 21st century, for using cyberspace as an environment in which to launch technical attacks and disinformation campaigns that sow chaos and distraction in ways that provide short-term advantage to autocrats in the Kremlin. Arguing that Russia's goal is to divide people, Sambaluk explains that Russia's modus operandi in disinformation campaigning is specifically to find and exploit existing sore spots in other countries. In the U.S., this often means inflaming political tensions among people on the far left and far right. Russia's actions have taken different forms, including the sophisticated surveillance and sabotage of critical infrastructure, the ransoming of data by criminal groups, and a welter of often mutually contradictory disinformation messages that pollute online discourse within and beyond Russia. Whether deployed to contribute to hybrid war or to psychological fracture and disillusionment in targeted societies, the threat is real and must be understood and effectively addressed.

This enlightening book examines the use of online influence operations by foreign actors, and the extent to which these violate international law. It looks at key recent examples such as the 2016 UK EU Referendum, the 2016 American Presidential Election, and the 2017 French Presidential Election. The book analyses the core elements of interventions and sovereignty, and the extent to which these elements were violated in the three central case studies.

This book examines the shape, sources and dangers of information warfare (IW) as it pertains to military, diplomatic and civilian stakeholders. Cyber warfare and information warfare are different beasts. Both concern information, but where the former does so exclusively in its digitized and operationalized form, the latter does so in a much broader sense: with IW, information itself is the weapon. The present work aims to help scholars, analysts and policymakers understand IW within the context of cyber conflict. Specifically, the chapters in the volume address the shape of influence campaigns waged across digital infrastructure and in the psychology of democratic populations in recent years by belligerent state actors, from the Russian Federation to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In marshalling evidence on the shape and evolution of IW as a broad-scoped phenomenon aimed at societies writ large, the authors in this book present timely empirical investigations into the global landscape of influence operations, legal and strategic analyses of their role in international politics, and insightful examinations of the potential for democratic process to overcome pervasive foreign manipulation. This book will be of much interest to students of cybersecurity, national security, strategic studies, defence studies and International Relations in general.

The U.S. no longer has a free marketplace of ideas. Instead, the marketplace is saturated with covert foreign-backed disinformation. And despite the ethical obligations to act, successive administrations have done nothing. Additionally, the decline in trust has left the door open for populism and illiberalism to enter. Some believe the very fabric of American liberalism is at stake. So what are the ethical responsibilities of the executive branch to counter covert campaigns such as the one coming from Russian-backed disinformation circulating within the US? Why has the government failed to act? So far, the practical challenges are daunting if the executive branch addresses the threat to the homeland. The process to limit this problem is wrought with profound political implications. By its very nature, social media-based disinformation is inextricably linked with existing complex societal cleavages, the First Amendment, and politics. But the failure to do anything is a serious abdication of the government’s ethical responsibilities. This raises the question of where the line is for government intervention. This work provides answers.

This two-volume set constitutes the proceedings of the 19th IFIP WG 6.11 Conference on e-Business, e-Services, and e-Society, I3E 2020, held in Skukuza, South Africa, in April 2020.* The total of 80 full and 7 short papers presented in these volumes were carefully reviewed and selected from 191 submissions. The papers are organized in the following topical sections: Part I: block chain; fourth industrial revolution; eBusiness; business processes; big data and machine learning; and ICT and education Part II: eGovernment; eHealth; security; social media; knowledge and knowledge management; ICT and gender equality and development; information systems for governance; and user experience and usability *Due to the global COVID-19 pandemic and the consequential worldwide imposed travel restrictions and lockdown, the I3E 2020 conference event scheduled to take place in Skukuza, South Africa, was unfortunately cancelled.

Intelligence challenges in the digital age : Cloaks, daggers, and tweets -- The education crisis : How fictional spies are shaping public opinion and intelligence policy -- American intelligence history at a glance-from fake bakeries to armed drones -- Intelligence basics : Knowns and unknowns -- Why analysis is so hard : The seven deadly biases -- Counterintelligence : To catch a spy -- Covert action - "a hard business of agonizing choices" -- Congressional oversight : Eyes on spies -- Intelligence isn't just for governments anymore : Nuclear sleuthing in a Google earth world -- Decoding cyber threats.