The modern US Army as we know it was largely created in the years between the two world wars. Prior to World War I, officers in leadership positions were increasingly convinced that building a new army could not take place as a series of random developments but was an enterprise that had to be guided by a distinct military policy that enjoyed the support of the nation. In 1920, Congress accepted that idea and embodied it in the National Defense Act. In doing so it also accepted army leadership’s idea of entrusting America’s security to a unique force, the Citizen Army, and tasked the nation’s Regular Army with developing and training that force. Creating the Modern Army details the efforts of the Regular Army to do so in the face of austerity budgets and public apathy while simultaneously responding to the challenges posed by the new and revolutionary mechanization of warfare. In this book Woolley focuses on the development of what he sees as the four major features of the modernized army that emerged due to these efforts. These included the creation of the civilian components of the new army: the Citizen’s Military Training Camps, the Officer Reserve Corps, the National Guard, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps; the development of the four major combat branches as the structural basis for organizing the army as well as creating the means to educate new officers and soldiers about their craft and to socialize them into an army culture; the creation of a rationalized and progressive system of professional military education; and the initial mechanization of the combat branches. Woolley also points out how the development of the army in this period was heavily influenced by policies and actions of the president and Congress. The US Army that fought World War II was clearly a citizen army whose leadership was largely trained within the framework of the institutions of the army created by the National Defense Act. The way that army fought the war may have been less decisive and more costly in terms of lives and money than it should have been. But that army won the war and therefore validated the citizen army as the US way of war.

This collection of essays, by a distinguished group of specialists, offers a new and exciting interpretation of Riza Shah's Iran. A period of key importance, the years between 1921-1941 have, until now, remained relatively neglected. Recently, however, there has been a marked revival of interest in the history of these two decades and this collection brings together some of the best of this recent new scholarship. Illustrating the diversity and complexity of interpretations to which contemporary scholarship has given rise, the collection looks at both the high politics of the new state and at 'history from below', examining some of the fierce controversies which have arisen surrounding such issues as the gender politics of the new regime, the nature of its nationalism, and its treatment of minorities.

The book is a precious reference book for development economics or the political economy of development in Asia or anywhere else. Unlike other books, first, it deals with all the East Asian countries, including Japan and other Asian countries. Second, it offers some empirical research findings based on surveys conducted by the author's group. Research on developing countries has been limited by individual scholars' observations, particularly about the value-related issues like politics or religions. Thirdly, the book digs into the nation-building problems which are often neglected by economists. It bridges the politics, sociology and economics in East Asian countries and is an important reference book for graduate students.

"The modern US Army as we know it was largely created in the years between the two world wars. After World War I, officers in leadership positions were increasingly convinced that building a new army could not take place as a series of random developments, but was an enterprise that had to be guided by a distinct military policy that enjoyed the support of the nation. William J. Woolley argues that the key to the modernization of the army in this period was the National Defense Act of 1920, which provided a blueprint for desired change and demonstrates that the transformation of the army was due to four elements: the creation of the civilian components of the new army (the Citizen's Military Training Camps (CMTC), the Officer Reserve Corps (ORC), the National Guard, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)); the development of the branches as the structural basis for organizing the army as well as creating the means to educate new officers and soldiers about their craft and to socialize them into an army culture; the creation of a rationalized and progressive system of professional military education; and the initial mechanization of the combat branches"--

Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the Germans signed the Versailles Treaty, theoretically agreeing to limit their war powers. The Allies envisioned the future German army as a lightly armed border guard and international security force. The Germans had other plans.

Angrist considers why Turkey - alone of all the modern states that emerged from the Ottoman Empire - was the only Middle Eastern country to evolve lasting competitive political institutions, writing across the regional divides that have isolated Turkish, Arab, and Persian studies from each other.