Committee Serial No. 3. Includes following court cases and documents related to charges of monopoly against petroleum companies. a. U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Standard Oil Co. of California, Texas Co., Gulf Oil Corp. Answer of Defendant Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (p. 839-902). b. U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Standard Oil Co. of California, Texas Co., Gulf Oil Corp., Sept. 1, 1953, compilation of documents submitted by Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Includes documents relating to Iraq Petroleum Co. and New East Development Corp. (p. 903-1054); documents related to Arabian American Oil Co., and Trans-Arabian Pipeline Co. (p. 1055-1228); and documents related to Socony's purchase contracts with Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and Middle East Pipelines, Ltd. (p. 1229-1521). c. Includes text of agreement between Iran and the National Iranian Oil Co. and the Gulf Oil Co., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, Standard Oil Co. of California, Texas Co., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, and Compagnie Francaise Petroles (p. 1563-1651). Reviews the current administration of antitrust and anti-monopoly laws.

In the field of antitrust, the freedoms to contract and compete can and do contradict. Profit-maximizing companies desire perfectly competitive input markets to minimize their costs, but want monopolistic markets for their outputs to maximize their profits. Consequently, they have strong incentives to undermine competition in their output markets. In a world without antitrust laws, many companies would thus eliminate competition by using their freedom to contract, either by entering into legally enforceable agreements which fix prices or divide up markets, or by merging and acquiring rivals to gain market control. Therefore, guaranteeing and safeguarding companies' abilities to compete comes at the cost of restricting their freedoms to contract. The states role in this task is a delicate one though: government intervention itself necessarily limits the economic freedom of individuals and firms, and limiting the freedom of contract has potentially detrimental effects on economic activity as well. Hence, antitrust policy must find the right balance between the two freedoms of competition and contract, allowing competition to flourish while upholding the contractual freedoms necessary for a functioning market. The policies in the U.S. and Europe used to protect competition with per se rules, setting clear boundaries for the freedom to contract where it interfered with the freedom to compete. Over the past decades, improvements in economic analysis provided measurable dimensions for 'competition' through measures like efficiency and welfare. With these new and complex economic tools, the aim of an antitrust policy moved away from an 'indirect' mechanism which provided and enforced a strict framework of negative per se rules within which the competitive process was allowed to happen. The current policies directly aim at promoting welfare by attempting to 'balance' the welfare effects of individual business practices, permitting contracts or mergers with benign effects and prohibiting contracts with detrimental effects on welfare in potentially every case. These economic insights have promoted a better understanding of the competitive process and contributed to improved antitrust rules. However, in the actual enforcement of antitrust laws, recent developments caused by the influence of economic analysis have had a detrimental impact on antitrust policy in both the U.S. and the EU. First, it increased the discretion of competition authorities, lowering legal certainty for companies and increasing the potential for wrong decisions. Second, it gave companies incentives to waste resources on rent seeking activities by using economic analyses to demonstrate efficiencies in complicated and timely investigations and litigation. And third, the predominant use of economic analysis has massively increased the costs of enforcement. This thesis is the first one to depict these negative effects caused by recent developments and shows that a policy with clear limitations through proposed per se rules would be superior for it would eliminate the illustrated negative effects.

In light of criticism in recent years of the European Community's competition law, Amsterdam lawyer Wesseling tries to clarify the current challenges to the policy by examining the origins of the competition law system. He begins by tracing the policy's development from the European Economic Community, established in 1958, and the European Union of today. Then he addresses the pertinent objectives, the institutional framework, the division of jurisdiction between the Community and the Member States, the decentralized enforcement of Community law, and other issues. His conclusions differ considerably from the Commission's recent white paper. Distributed in the US by ISBS. c. Book News Inc.

Does America have a monopoly problem? Is there a growing trend of concentration in many markets? Is there evidence for correlation between concentration and inequality? Do monopoly and market power beget political power? These are questions as old as the republic. From the founding fathers, through the progressive era, and perhaps climaxing during the New Deal, American politicians, pundits, public intellectuals, and reformers have been pondering and sometimes obsessing over the role monopoly power plays in economics and politics.

Every October the Fordham Corporate Law Institute brings together leading figures from governmental organizations, leading international law firms and corporations and academia to examine and analyze the most important issues in international antitrust and trade policy of the United States, the EU and the world. This work is the most definitive and comprehensive annual analysis of international antitrust law and policy available anywhere. Each annual edition sets out to explore and analyze the areas of antitrust/competition law that have had the most impact in that year. Recent "hot topics" include antitrust enforcement in Asia, Latin America: competition enforcement in the areas of telecommunications, media and information technology. None of the chapters are merely descriptive, all raise questions of policy or discuss new developments and assess their significance and impact on antitrust and trade policy. All chapters, if necessary, are revised and updated before publication. As a result, the reader receives up-to-date practical tips and important analyses of difficult policy issues. The Annuals are an indispensable guide through the sea of international antitrust law. The Fordham Corporate Law Proceedings are acknowledged as simply the most definitive US/EC annual analyses of antitrust/competition law.