This dictionary provides a comprehensive and ready guide to the key concepts, issues, persons, and technologies related to the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan and other South Asian states. This will serve as a useful reference especially as the nuclear issue continues to be an important domestic and international policy concern.

This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability. Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the prevailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the interactions with the United States and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more serious crises and military conflicts. Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.

This collection of seminal articles illustrates the reasons for the spiraling nuclear race in the Asian subcontinent and introduces the principal debates in the field. Authors discuss whether the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the South Asian powers has raised the likelihood of a nuclear war in the subcontinent or reduced the chance of a conventional war breaking out. They examine whether a small nuclear arsenal or a nuclear triad, as declared by India, is suitable for bringing stability to the region, as well as the risk of an accidental nuclear conflagration. The first section charts the evolution of nuclear programmes on the basis of realpolitik, and the second section analyses nuclear policies on the basis of religious and cultural ethos. A few essays turn the spotlight on the role of external powers in accelerating, decelerating and mediating the ongoing nuclear tension between India and Pakistan.

The nuclear test explosions in India and Pakistan in 1998, followed by the outbreak of hostilities over Kashmir in 1999, marked a frightening new turn in the ancient, bitter enmity between the two nations. Although the tension was eclipsed by the events of 9/11 and the subsequent American attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, it has not disappeared, as evidenced by the 2001 attack in the Indian Parliament by Islamic fundamentalists out of Kashmir. By 2002, these two nuclear-armed neighbors seemed to be once again on the brink of war. This book outlines the strategic structure of the rivalry and the dynamic forces driving it, and investigates various possible solutions. The expert contributors focus on the India-Pakistan rivalry, but also consider the China factor in South Asia's nuclear security dilemma. Although essentially political-strategic in its approach, the book includes coverage of opposing military arsenals and the impact of local terrorism on the delicate balance of power.

This important and topical book examines the triangular relationship of China, India and Pakistan through the prism of nuclear deterrence. The author highlights the interplay and role of strategic culture, nuclear weaponisation and deployment, command and control, arms control, non-state actors and foreign policy issues which affect relations between the three countries. With two main purposes—a conceptual investigation into the notion of deterrence, and a study of the theory and practice of limited war—this book: - addresses the strategic, political and military dimensions of the role of nuclear weapons through examples of the only cases of nuclear weapon states having gone into armed conflict—the Cuban missile crisis, the Ussuri river clashes, and the Kargil conflict. - discusses the various pressures exerted on decision makers in the context of the notions of deterrence, the rational deterrence model, and a limited war under a nuclear umbrella. - evaluates all three countries with regard to their strategic culture, the role of nuclear weapons in their military strategy, the nature of public opinion and political rhetoric, responses to the various arms control treaties, and foreign policy choices. Based on a variety of sources, including interviews with key individuals in various sector, this is the first book-length study of the triangular relationship between China, India and Pakistan.

South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region’s nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analysing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia’s nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia’s nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasise the stabilising effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors.

This edited volume explores competing perspectives on the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on the South Asian security environment. The spread of nuclear weapons is one of the world’s foremost security concerns. The effect of nuclear weapons on the behaviour of newly nuclear states, and the potential for future international crises, are of particular concern. As a region of burgeoning economic and political importance, South Asia offers a crucial test of proliferation’s effects on the crisis behaviour of newly nuclear states. This volume creates a dialogue between scholars who believe that nuclear weapons have stabilized the subcontinent, and those who believe that nuclear weapons have made South Asia more conflict prone. It does so by pairing competing analyses of four major regional crises: the 1987 "Brasstacks" crisis, the Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1990, the 1999 Kargil war, which occurred after the nuclear tests; and the 2001–2 Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. In addition, the volume explores the implications of the South Asian nuclear experience for potential new nuclear states such as North Korea and Iran.

Argues that, while nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles cast a shadow over Indo-Pakistani relations, they do not create strategic stability. He asserts that the development of command and control mechanisms would enhance stability, but that diplomatic steps focused on missiles must also be considered. Improved command and control and diplomatic engagement will provide some insurance that nuclear weapons are not used in any future conflict.