This book explores the role of deception, delay, and self-deception in the dynamics of organized conflict, taking a formal approach that hews closely to the asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories. The resulting probability models can, with some effort—and some confidence—be converted to statistical tools for the analysis of real-time observational and ‘experimental’ data on institutionalized confrontation across both traditional and emerging ‘Clausewitz Landscapes’.

From the ‘punctuated equilibrium' of Eldrege and Gould, through Lewontin's ‘triple helix' and the various visions and revisions of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) of Laland and others, both data and theory have demanded an opening-up of the 1950's Evolutionary Synthesis that so firmly wedded evolutionary theory to the mathematics of gene frequency analysis. It can, however, be argued that a single deep and comprehensive mathematical theory may simply not be possible for the almost infinite varieties of evolutionary process active at and across the full range of scales of biological, social, institutional, and cultural phenomena. Indeed, the case history of 'meme theory' should have raised a red flag that narrow gene-centered models of evolutionary process may indeed have serious limitations. What is attempted here is less grand, but still broader than a gene-centered analysis. Following the instruction of Maturana and Varela that all living systems are cognitive, in a certain sense, and that living as a process is a process of cognition, the asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories that bound all cognition provide a basis for constructing an only modestly deep but wider-ranging series of probability models that might be converted into useful statistical tools for the analysis of observational and experimental data related to evolutionary process. The line of argument in this series of interrelated essays proves to be surprisingly direct.

In-depth counterintelligence tactics to fight cyber-espionage "A comprehensive and unparalleled overview of the topic by experts in the field."--Slashdot Expose, pursue, and prosecute the perpetrators of advanced persistent threats (APTs) using the tested security techniques and real-world case studies featured in this one-of-a-kind guide. Reverse Deception: Organized Cyber Threat Counter-Exploitation shows how to assess your network’s vulnerabilities, zero in on targets, and effectively block intruders. Discover how to set up digital traps, misdirect and divert attackers, configure honeypots, mitigate encrypted crimeware, and identify malicious software groups. The expert authors provide full coverage of legal and ethical issues, operational vetting, and security team management. Establish the goals and scope of your reverse deception campaign Identify, analyze, and block APTs Engage and catch nefarious individuals and their organizations Assemble cyber-profiles, incident analyses, and intelligence reports Uncover, eliminate, and autopsy crimeware, trojans, and botnets Work with intrusion detection, anti-virus, and digital forensics tools Employ stealth honeynet, honeypot, and sandbox technologies Communicate and collaborate with legal teams and law enforcement

Among the operations known as Plan Bodyguard, the deception devised to cover the Allies’ Normandy landing, was the little known but critical Plan Zeppelin, the largest and most complex of the Bodyguard plans. Zeppelin, in conjunction with the Mediterranean Strategy, succeeded in pinning down sixty German divisions from southern France to the Balkans in time for D-Day. This was the work of “A” Force, Britain’s only military organization tasked with carrying out both strategic and tactical deception in World War II. Whitney T. Bendeck’s Diversion and Deception finds “A” Force at its finest hour, as the war shifted from North Africa to Europe. Focusing on the years 1943 to 1945, Bendeck describes how “A” Force, under the leadership of Dudley Clarke, orchestrated both strategic and tactical deception plans to create notional threats across the southern perimeter of Europe, with the chief objective of keeping the Germans pinned down across the Mediterranean. Her work offers a close and clarifying look at “A” Force’s structure and command, operations and methods, and successes and failures and, consequently, its undeniable contribution to the Allies’ victory in World War II. By shining a light on the often overlooked Mediterranean theater and its direct connection to European plans and operations, Diversion and Deception also provides a deeper understanding of Allied grand strategy in the war. Combining military and deception histories—so often viewed in isolation—this book provides context for the deceptions and adds a layer of knowledge regarding the planning of military operations. The result is a more complete and nuanced view of Allied operations than is to be found in most histories of World War II.

The Law of Armed Conflict provides a complete operational scenario and introduction to the operational organization of United States forces. The focus remains on United States law perspective, balanced with exposure to areas where the interpretation of its allied forces diverge. Jus ad bellum and jus in bello issues are addressed at length. The casebook comes to students with stunning authority. All of the authors are active or retired United States Army officers with more than 140 years of collective military operational experience among them. Several have experience in both legal and operational assignments as well. They deliver a comprehensive coverage of all aspects of the law of armed conflict, explaining the difference between law and policy in regulation of military operations.

America's thirty million young adults are fascinated by ancient secrets, martial arts, war and using strategy to outwith their opponents.

Now published with a new preface explaining why The Great Deception is of the utmost importance today as it was when it was first published, this book suggests that the United States of Europe and its edict of 'ever closer union' have been based on a colossal confidence trick. The Great Deception tells for the first time the inside story of the most audacious political project of modern times: the plan to unite Europe under a single 'supranational' government. From the 1920s, when the blueprint for the European Union was first conceived by a British civil servant, this meticulously documented account takes the story right up to the moves to give Europe a political constitution, already planned 60 years ago to be the 'crowning dream' of the whole project. The book shows how the gradual assembling of a European government has amounted to a 'slow motion coup d'etat', based on a strategy of deliberate deception, into which Britain's leaders, Macmillan and Heath, were consciously drawn. Drawing on a wealth of new evidence, scarcely an episode of the story does not emerge in startling new light, from the real reasons why de Gaulle kept Britain out in the 1960s to the fall of Mrs Thatcher. The book chillingly shows how Britain's politicians, not least Tony Blair, were consistently outplayed in a game the rules of which they never understood. But it ends by asking whether, from the euro to enlargement, the 'project' has now overreached itself, as a gamble doomed to fail. Since their collaboration began in 1992, Christopher Booker, a Sunday Telegraph columnist, and Richard North, who worked for four years in Brussels and Strasbourg as a senior researcher, have won a unique reputation for their expertise on Britain's relationship to the European Union. Their previous publications included The Mad Officials (1994) and The Castle of Lies (1996). But they regard The Great Deception as the book they had been waiting to write for ten years. Christopher Booker's preface now adds up-to-date detail for the current era as Britain heads inexorably towards a possible 'Brexit'.

Field Manuals serve as the primary means of promulgating military doctrine, tactics and techniques for all parts of the Army. They make available in condensed form, a ready reference in the field to the approved principles, doctrines, and methods that govern the training and employment of the various arms, together with such reference data and regulations that are needed for mobilization, training, and field service.

Turkish Intelligence and the Cold War examines the hitherto unexplored history of secret intelligence cooperation between three asymmetric partners – specifically the UK, US and Turkey – from the end of the Second World War until the Turkey's first military coup d'état on 27 May 1960. The book shows that our understanding of the Cold War as a binary rivalry between the two blocs is too simple an approach and obscures important characteristics of intelligence cooperation among allies. Egemen Bezci shows that a pragmatic approach offers states new opportunities to protect national interests, by conducting ''intelligence diplomacy' to influence crucial areas such as nuclear weapons and to exploit cooperation in support of their own strategic imperatives. This study not only reveals previously-unexplored origins of secret intelligence cooperation between Turkey and West, but also contributes to wider academic debates on the nature of the Cold War by highlighting the potential agency of weaker states in the Western Alliance.