An authoritative analysis of Iran's defense doctrine and security policies set within the context of security and political relations in the Middle East.

Today, almost a generation has passed since the Iran–Iraq war and the memory of it is set to diminish with each passing generation. The following questions emerge. Can we say that the gradual disappearance of war’s memory means that, increasingly, Iranians will see the Iran–Iraq war solely as an historical event? How can we defend or reject this idea? Today, with which elements and values should we look at the Iran–Iraq war memorials and ceremonies? To what extent will war museums and materials culture be influenced by these new values? In the period during and immediately after the Iran–Iraq war (1980-88), national bereavement and commemoration of martyrs was neither apparent in common state policy nor a social need. Even at the turn of the 21st century, anyone walking through Iranian cities, many of which had been the main scene of the bloody massacre and direct targets of the Iraqi Republican Guard, will have found traces of the terrible, almost unimaginable, human losses. However, today’s Iranians can see modern war memorials and monuments in many parts of the urban and rural landscape. Yet, at the same time, the changing landscape has separated Iranians from such remnants of the violence. It can be argued that many people, in their wish to look forward to a more hopeful future, do not wish to be reminded of this period in Iranian history. This book was originally published as a special issue of Visual Anthropology.

Religion, nationalism, ethnicity, economics, and geopolitics all are important in explaining Iran's goals and tactics in its relationship with the outside world, as are the agendas of key security institutions and the ambitions of their leaders. This report assesses Iran's security policy in light of these factors. It examines broad drivers of Iran's security policy, describes important security institutions, explores decisionmaking, and reviews Iran's relations with key countries. The authors conclude that Iraq is widely recognized as the leading threat to Iran's Islamic regime and Afghanistan is seen as an emerging threat. In contrast, Iran has solid, if not necessarily warm, relations with Syria and established working ties to Pakistan and Russia. Iran's policies toward its neighbors are increasingly prudent: It is trying to calm regional tension and end its isolation, although its policies toward Israel and the United States are often an exception to this policy. Iran's security forces, particularly the regular military, are often voices of restraint, preferring shows of force to overactive confrontations. Finally, Iran's security forces generally respect and follow the wishes of Iran's civilian leadership; conducting rogue operations is rare to nonexistent.

This book on the economics of defence industry assesses a series of historical and contemporary case studies that consistently demonstrate the need for governments to recognise, and thereafter factor, the financial needs of a narrow industrial sector that is capital intensive, technologically advanced and that requires a highly skilled labour force. Since the end of the cold war, Western governments have systematically reduced financial support to their domestic defence industry and have seemingly ignored planning and funding industrial mobilisation. In all cases, government policy has been to encourage industries to consolidate capacity to become financially viable in a sector that has seen diminished demand. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused Western governments to reassess their previous assumptions. Efforts to increase industrial capacity have been met with the iron laws of economics whereby businesses need to show return on investments. The chapters in this volume posit that efforts to rationalise industrial capacity and innovation to meet short-term financial efficiencies, inevitably results in limited, expensive, and long delays in increased production in times of international crisis. This book serves as an essential guide for academics, researchers and students interested in defence economics, industrial economics, international relations, and industrial policy. The chapters in this book were originally published in various issues of Defense & Security Analysis.

Over the past quarter century, four consecutive American presidents—two Democrat, two Republican—have spent more time, diplomatic capital, and military resources on Iraq than any other country in the world. Much as the Vietnam syndrome cast a long shadow over American security policy in the decades after the end of the Vietnam War, Iraq provides the commanding narrative for this generation of American leaders. In this book, former Deputy Secretary of State P. J. Crowley, one of America’s most insightful national security commentators, unpacks the legacy of American triumphs and failures in Iraq . He argues that presidents have fallen victim to the Iraq Syndrome—the disconnect between politics, policy, strategy, and narrative—that has hampered America’s foreign policy in the Middle East and hotspots throughout the world. In order to maintain America’s global leadership role, Crowley argues that the next president must realign American’s national security politics, policies, strategies, and narrative for the long term.

The effects of US secondary sanctions are broad and are often designed to cripple the target country’s economy and currency. Some states have sought to circumvent these sanctions by setting up a special purpose vehicle to facilitate trade and financial transactions with the sanctioned country on humanitarian grounds. Although the nature of these special purpose vehicles is new and experimental, they are little understood, not least how they operate and function in international law. This volume addresses this gap by identifying and examining some of the legal issues that a special purpose vehicle such as the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) generates. The collection brings together leading legal academics, sanctions practitioners and policy experts to provide an assessment of the special purpose vehicle in the context of secondary sanctions in international law. It will be of interest to researchers and academics in International law, Security law, Economic law and Comparative law.

In policy pronouncements over the last two administrations, the protection of the American homeland was regularly identified as the first priority of U.S. missile defense efforts. Homeland missile defense today is provided by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program and other elements of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System. The limited defenses fielded today have advanced considerably since limited defensive operations began in late 2004, but nevertheless they remain too limited and too modest relative to emerging threats. The Missile Defense Agency’s path to improve the system may require additional effort to stay ahead of even limited missile threats. This report explains how the current system works, as well as current and potential plans to modernize the system, and the authors offer recommendations for future evolution of the system.