This Annual Report of the Department of Defense (DOD) Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) provides information in response to several reporting requirements. First, this report is provided in accordance with 50 U.S. Code Section 1523. (The complete reporting requirement is detailed at Annex L) This report is intended to assess: (1) the overall readiness of the Armed Forces to fight in a chemical biological (CB) warfare environment and steps taken and planned to be taken to improve such readiness; and, (2) requirements for the chemical and biological warfare defense program, including requirements for training, detection, and protective equipment, for medical prophylaxis, and for treatment of casualties resulting from use of chemical and biological weapons. The CBDP provides an integrated collection of chemical and biological defense systems to U.S. forces. The overall readiness of U.S. forces is dependent on many factors. One key factor is the availability of equipment. Chapter 2 summarizes equipment requirements and the status of research, development, test and evaluation (RDT & E) and acquisition efforts across all capability areas. Chapter 3 details the logistics status of CB defense systems. The overall logistical readiness status of the Department's CB defense equipment has improved slightly. Several factors have had an adverse effect on the overall DOD readiness and sustainment status: increased demands by the Services for some CB defense equipment; the increased overall Service requirements in order to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; the reorganization and the approved strength increase of the Army; and equipment modernization efforts in all of the Services. Another key factor in overall readiness is the education, training, and exercises conducted by U.S. forces to remain prepared for chemical and biological threats. Education, training, and exercises are detailed in Chapter.

This Annual Report of the Department of Defense (DoD) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Program, or CBRNDP, provides information in response to several reporting requirements. First, this report is provided in accordance with 50 USC 1523. (The complete reporting requirement is detailed at annex K.) This report is intended to assess: (1) the overall readiness of the Armed Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare environment and steps taken and planned to be taken to improve such readiness; and, (2) requirements for the chemical and biological warfare defense program, including requirements for training, detection, and protective equipment, for medical prophylaxis, and for treatment of casualties resulting from use of chemical and biological weapons. This report supplements the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program FY05 President's budget, February 2004, which has been submitted to Congress.

In December 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the Counterproliferation Initiative, a response to President Clinton's assertion that if we do not stem the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure. This timely book brings together contributions from a wide range of experts to help readers understand how far the nation has come since then—and what still needs to happen. Insightful essays examine: arms control treaty programs; export control regimes; interdiction; diplomatic/economic/political persuasion and sanctions; deterrence; counterforce; active and passive defense; and consequence management. Many positive changes have occurred since 1993. Regime changes in Iraq and South Africa have removed some WMD proliferation threats. Saddam Hussein has been overthrown, and a new Iraq is beginning to emerge. South Africa's clandestine WMD program has apparently ended. Libya announced it has given up its efforts to have active WMD programs. The Taliban and al Qaeda have been routed in Afghanistan, probably delaying efforts to develop or buy WMD. Yet, states continue to develop and export WMD and/or their delivery systems. As many as 30 states are still believed to have either a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons program. Some have all three. India and Pakistan have acknowledged programs. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientist who directed the Pakistani A-bomb program, has admitted selling nuclear weapons designs, and nuclear enrichment equipment to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. His colleagues have held discussions with al Qaeda representatives. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, number two in the al Qaeda chain of command, claims that the terrorist organization has several suitcase A-bombs from the Former Soviet Union. It appears clear to many that Iran has a desire to develop nuclear weapons. Syria still has a chemical weapons program. North Korea's WMD profile has escalated. As Avoiding the Abyss so convincingly demonstrates, much has been accomplished since the Counterproliferation Initiative was launched-but much work still lies ahead. It is an important story for every American.