This anthology argues that facing the diverse threats in the 'new world disorder' requires a new look and new approaches. The requirement is to establish that contemporary deterrence demands replacing the old 'nuclear theology' with new policy and strategy to deal with the myriad state, non-state, and trans-national nuclear and non-nuclear menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away.

Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers, smaller nuclear powers, and nonstate actors.

Changes in the 21st century security environment require new analytic approaches to support strategic deterrence. Because current adversaries may be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons differently than were Cold War adversaries, the Air Force needs an analytic process and tools that can help determine those Air Force capabilities that will successfully deter or defeat these new nuclear-armed adversaries and assure U.S. allies. While some analytic tools are available, a coherent approach for their use in developing strategy and policy appears to be lacking. Without a coherent analytic approach that addresses the nuances of today's security environment, Air Force views of its strategic deterrence needs may not be understood or accepted by the appropriate decision makers. A coherent approach will support Air Force decisions about its strategic force priorities and needs, deter actual or potential adversaries, and assure U.S. allies. In this context, the Air Force in 2012 requested that the Air Force Studies Board of the National Research Council undertake a workshop to bring together national experts to discuss current challenges relating strategic deterrence and potential new tools and methods that the Air Force might leverage in its strategic deterrence mission. The workshop consisted of two 3-day sessions held in Washington, DC on September 26-28, 2012 and January 29-31, 2013 and was attended by a very diverse set of participants with expertise in strategic deterrence and a range of analytic tools of potential interest to the Air Force. U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Capabilities in the 21st Century Security Environment summarizes this workshop.

The MoD's financial settlement in the next Comprehensive Spending Review must be made in the light of the need to retain a credible deterrent capacity in the country's Armed Forces. The Committee welcomes the emphasis that the Government places on the importance of cyber defence and the commitment of resources to a new cyber strike capability. But the difficulty in identifying actors in a cyber attack makes the ability to deter that much harder. Similar questions arise in deterrence against the asymmetrical threat of terrorism as it is difficult to identify interests and groups against which a response can be legitimately targeted. The Committee is calling on the MoD to set out how it can make clear that both cyber and terrorist attack will elicit an appropriate and determined response. Looking at the nuclear deterrent, the Committee points out that the UK's ability to effect a nuclear response is not credible in dealing with all threats, and so strong conventional deterrence is also required. And given the importance of communication to the concept of deterrence, investment in diplomatic and intelligence assets must be integral to the UK's security apparatus. The Committee concludes that it would be naive to assume that a decision not to invest in the nuclear deterrent would release substantial funds for investment in other forms of security. The Committee believes that the decision on the retention of the nuclear deterrent, should be made on its own merits.

The National Institute for Public Policy’s new book, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence, is the first of its kind. Dr. Keith Payne, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and an unparalleled bipartisan group of senior civilian and military experts critically examine eight basic assumptions of Minimum Deterrence against available evidence. In general, Minimum Deterrence does not fare well under the careful scrutiny. Proponents of a "Minimum Deterrent" US nuclear force posture believe that anywhere from a handful to a few hundred nuclear weapons are adequate to deter reliably and predictably any enemy from attacking the United States now and in the future. Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, their thinking goes, no foreign leader would dare challenge US capabilities. The benefits, advocates claim, of reducing US nuclear weapons to the "minimum" level needed are: better relations with Russia and China, reinforcement of the arms control and Nonproliferation Treaty, billions of defense dollars in savings, and greater international stability on the way to "nuclear zero." As political pressure builds to pursue this vision of minimum US deterrence, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence stands as the seminal study to address the many claims of great benefit using available evidence. This book was published as a special issue of Comparative Strategy.

This collection of papers rigorously examines the current place of deterrence in international security relations, delivering the best of contemporary thinking. This is a special issue of the leading journal Contemporary Security Policy. It shows how and why nuclear deterrence was the central organizing mechanism for international security relations in the second half of the twentieth century. It has been replaced by a new global security environment in which the central role of deterrence, both nuclear and otherwise, appears to have diminished. The Cold War has been succeeded by a new state of play. This book will be of interest to students of military and naval history and security studies.

The moment in the sun for special operations sometimes appears to have passed, seemingly eclipsed by preparations for potential conflict under the guise of "great power" competition, combined with failure in Afghanistan. Yet the war in Ukraine serves as a reminder that special operations play an even greater role today?before, during and presumably after conflict. The challenge remains dealing with current irregular and hybrid threats, at the same time as preparing for an uncertain future, as threats and technologies evolve at a dizzying pace. Focusing too much on the future of conventional warfare creates a void in national security discussions related to special operations. This book seeks to fill that gap, drawing on the expertise of scholars and practitioners in the field, from the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the United States, to answer what, if anything, special operations can or should seek to do, and how. The contributors explore such topics as proxies, non-state special forces, capabilities, innovation and transformation, artificial intelligence, and special operations in space and cyberspace. These chapters are united by their analysis that special operations will have future strategic and operational value, for allies and adversaries alike, provided that difficult choices are made in the present.

This work provides a comprehensive examination of the current state and future prospects for nuclear disarmament at the turn of the century. The work juxtaposes a sober review of progress made during the last decade with a proactive agenda of proposals for new disarmament initiatives in the next decade. Taken together, the contributions to this volume suggest that, contrary to current conventional wisdom, the increasing global cache of nuclear weapons and the waning progress on nuclear disarmament of recent years need not become the defining features of the post-Cold War era. Rather, by examining the new conditions that have emerged at the dawn of the of the 21st century through both national and issue-based perspectives, this work reveals how the likelihood of continuing uncertainty and change in world affairs creates opportunities, as well as the need, for renewed progress toward significant nuclear disarmament.

Issues in Global Security Research and Practice: 2011 Edition is a ScholarlyEditions™ eBook that delivers timely, authoritative, and comprehensive information about Global Security Research and Practice. The editors have built Issues in Global Security Research and Practice: 2011 Edition on the vast information databases of ScholarlyNews.™ You can expect the information about Global Security Research and Practice in this eBook to be deeper than what you can access anywhere else, as well as consistently reliable, authoritative, informed, and relevant. The content of Issues in Global Security Research and Practice: 2011 Edition has been produced by the world’s leading scientists, engineers, analysts, research institutions, and companies. All of the content is from peer-reviewed sources, and all of it is written, assembled, and edited by the editors at ScholarlyEditions™ and available exclusively from us. You now have a source you can cite with authority, confidence, and credibility. More information is available at http://www.ScholarlyEditions.com/.