During the Cold War, deterrence theory was the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, popular wisdom dictated that terrorist organizations and radical fanatics could not be deterred—and governments shifted their attention to combating terrorism rather than deterring it. This book challenges that prevailing assumption and offers insight as to when and where terrorism can be deterred. It first identifies how and where theories of deterrence apply to counterterrorism, highlighting how traditional and less-traditional notions of deterrence can be applied to evolving terrorist threats. It then applies these theoretical propositions to real-world threats to establish the role deterrence has within a dynamic counterterrorism strategy—and to identify how metrics can be created for measuring the success of terrorism deterrence strategies. In sum, it provides a foundation for developing effective counterterrorism policies to help states contain or curtail the terrorism challenges they face.

This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state terrorist actor. Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state’s counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor’s grand strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition – which is the non-state organization’s strategy for victory. To escape the attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become critical educational moments. The case studies presented here uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy that sought to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security studies.

Experts explore the sources of contemporary terrorism, what terrorists want, and how the United States and other countries should respond. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, scholars and policy analysts in national security have turned their attention to terrorism, considering not only how to prevent future attacks but also the roots of the problem. This book offers some of the latest research in terrorism studies. The contributors examine the sources of contemporary terrorism, discussing the impact of globalization, the influence of religious beliefs, and the increasing dissatisfaction felt by the world's powerless. They consider the strategies and motivations of terrorists, offering contending perspectives on whether or not terrorists can be said to achieve their goals; explore different responses to the threat of terrorism, discussing such topics as how the United States can work more effectively with its allies; and contemplate the future of al-Qaida, asking if its networked structure is an asset or a liability. The essays in Contending with Terrorism address some of the central topics in the analysis of contemporary terrorism. They promise to guide future policy and inspire further research into one of most important security issues of the twenty-first century. Contributors Max Abrahms, Daniel Byman, Erica Chenoweth, Audrey Kurth Cronin, Renée de Nevers, Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Hillel Frisch, Calvert Jones, Andrew Kydd, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Elizabeth McClellan, Nicholas Miller, Assaf Moghadam, Michael Mousseau, Rysia Murphy, William Rose, Paul Staniland, Robert Trager, Barbara Walter, Dessislava Zagorcheva

Cold War-era strategic thinking was driven by the belief that individuals, organizations, and foreign states could be deterred from offensive action by the threat of reprisal. That assurance was shaken with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; suddenly, it seemed that no threat was powerful enough to deter individuals or organizations that valued political objectives over their own lives and the lives of their members. More than a decade later, new research and theory are bringing deterrence back into currency as a viable counterterrorism strategy. Alex S. Wilner updates deterrence theory for conflict in the twenty-first century, arguing for its value against challengers such as rogue states, cyber warriors, and transnational terrorist organizations. Deterring Rational Fanatics provides a full-scale discussion of deterrence theory concepts and controversies, assessing the utility of relying on the logic of deterrence and coercion to counter contemporary terrorism. In particular, targeted killings directed against the Taliban of Afghanistan provide a vivid illustration of the impact deterrence can have on militant behavior: precision strikes that eliminate militant leaders represent a significant cost to planning and participating in political violence, a cost that can coerce, manipulate, and alter behavior. Though deterrence theory is not a panacea for terrorism, insurgency, or militancy, it can serve as a strategic guide for state responses; as Wilner shows, terrorist violence can indeed be deterred.

This innovative new book aims to put society's fight against terrorism into a comprehensive crime prevention perspective with a clear, understandable theoretical foundation, developing a general model for the prevention of crime which is, in this book, applied to terrorism.

Essay from the year 2004 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 2+ (B+), University of Kent (Brussels School of International Studies), language: English, abstract: For more than four decades during the Cold War, deterrence has been a key element of US defence policy and it can even be argued that the strategy of nuclear deterrence thwarted a major military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA. With the end of superpower tensions and the end of the Cold War itself, the deterrence system became obsolete. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11 brought deterrence back on the political agenda. In its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction the USA calls for “new methods of deterrence” in order to meet the threats of global terrorism. The question arises whether deterrence, which seems to have worked in a traditional setting, where one state deters military action of another state, can work in a non-traditional confrontation between a state and an abstract opponent like terrorism? In order to establish whether deterrence can work against terrorism, this essay will firstly look at the theory of deterrence. What are the criteria that must be fulfilled for deterrence to be successful and why does it not work in all situations? Secondly, this essay identifies the main characteristics of the terrorist threat and establishes what the difficulties of deterrence in this specific asymmetric confrontation might be. The main difficulty seems to be the problem to execute appropriate action should deterrence fail, since the target is often unclear and the perpetrator of the terrorist action most likely dead. Special attention is given to the moral dilemma that derives from suggestions to execute retaliation actions against the families of suicide bombers in order to deter others from becoming suicide bombers as suggested by Steinberg. He argues that terrorism can indeed be deterred, if the concept was applied correctly, that is against terrorist leaders, who are “not so quick to give up their own lives” . Finally, this essay will conclude that although it might be possible to deter individual terrorist actions , terrorism itself cannot be deterred by military means. And if the aim is indeed to eradicate terrorism completely, like the rhetoric used in the war on terrorism seems to suggest, deterrence is certainly not the most effective strategy.

Papers presented at a conference at McGill University in Montraeal in May 2007.

"...explores the legality of the attacks against Al Qaeda and the Taliban under the jus ad bellum, that component of international law that governs when it is that a State may resort to force as an instrument of national policy"-- P. iii.