A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.

This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements.

A comprehensive and self-contained exposition of the applications of optimal control and differential game theory to industrial organisation and trade.

With this book, distinguished and notable contributors wish to honor Professor Charles S. Tapiero’s scientific achievements. Although it covers only a few of the directions Professor Tapiero has taken in his work, it presents important modern developments in theory and in diverse applications, as studied by his colleagues and followers, further advancing the topics Tapiero has been investigating. The book is divided into three parts featuring original contributions covering the following areas: general modeling and analysis; applications to marketing, economy and finance; and applications to operations and manufacturing. Professor Tapiero is among the most active researchers in control theory; in the late sixties, he started to enthusiastically promote optimal control theory along with differential games, successfully applying it to diverse problems ranging from classical operations research models to finance, risk and insurance, marketing, transportation and operations management, conflict management and game theory, engineering, regional and urban sciences, environmental economics, and organizational behavior. Over the years, Professor Tapiero has produced over 300 papers and communications and 14 books, which have had a major impact on modern theoretical and applied research. Notable among his numerous pioneering scientific contributions are the use of graph theory in the behavioral sciences, the modeling of advertising as a random walk, the resolution of stochastic zero-sum differential games, the modeling of quality control as a stochastic competitive game, and the development of impulsive control methods in management. Charles Tapiero’s creativity applies both in formulating original issues, modeling complex phenomena and solving complex mathematical problems.

Game theory has proven useful to represent and conceptualize problems of conflict and cooperation in a formal way, and to predict the outcome of such situations. Differential games are dynamic games that are particularly designed to study systems where observations and decisions are made in real time. The book conveys to the reader the state of the art of research in marketing applications of differential game theory. This research started about 25 years ago and the literature has now reached an extent and a maturity that makes it natural to take stock. The book deals with differential games in advertising, pricing, and marketing channels, as well as with marketing-production and pricing-advertising interfaces. It provides also a tutorial on main concepts in differential games.

The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century, the theory of the firm and the theory of industrial organization developed parallel and complementary views on managerial firms. This book offers a comprehensive exposition of this debate. In its survey of strategic delegation in oligopoly games, An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms is able to offer a reinterpretation of a range of standard results in the light of the fact that the control of firms is generally not in the hand of its owners. The theoretical models are supported by a wealth of real-world examples, in order to provide a study of strategic delegation that is far more in-depth than has previously been found in the literature on industrial organization. In this volume, analysis is extended in several directions to cover applications concerning the role of: managerial firms in mixed market; collusion and mergers; divisionalization and vertical relations; technical progress; product differentiation; international trade; environmental issues; and the intertemporal growth of firms. This book is of great interest to those who study industrial economics, organizational studies and industrial studies.

Industrial production and consumption patterns rely heavily on the intensive use of both renewable and non-renewable resources and the consequences for the environment can be serious. Following a long period of time where the profit incentives of firms have prevailed over preservation of the environment and the world’s natural resources, a new consensus has emerged concerning the need to regulate firm behaviour, aimed at ensuring the sustainability of the economic system in the long run. This book offers an exhaustive overview of current economic debate about these topics, taking modern oligopoly theory as a benchmark. The first part of the book covers static models dealing with incentives for green research and development, Pigovian taxation, cartels, environmental quality and international trade, as well as the role of corporate social responsibility, public firms and consumer environmental awareness as endogenous regulatory instruments. Then, the author moves on to examine the role of time while drawing from optimal control and differential game theory. This opens the way to the discussion of fair discount rates to ensure the welfare of future generations, as well as the long run sustainability of production and consumption patterns.

This timely and much-needed Handbook reconsiders an old topic from a fresh perspective, raising a number of new, interesting and worthwhile issues in the wake of ten years of globalization. This comprehensive analysis illustrates that old-style industrial policies whereby the government directly intervened in markets, and was often the producer itself, are no longer relevant. Structural changes occurring in economies summarized in the term globalization are triggering the definition and implementation of new industrial policies. The contributors, leading experts in their field, unite to evaluate this shift of over a decade ago. Employing various empirical and methodological approaches with a strong theoretical underpinning, this world-wide study of the state-of-the-art of industrial policy issues is an invaluable reference tool. It has been enthusiastically received by a wide-ranging audience including scholars, researchers and policy makers with an interest in industrial economics and policy, business studies and policies for growth, competitiveness and development.

This book systematically studies the stochastic non-cooperative differential game theory of generalized linear Markov jump systems and its application in the field of finance and insurance. The book is an in-depth research book of the continuous time and discrete time linear quadratic stochastic differential game, in order to establish a relatively complete framework of dynamic non-cooperative differential game theory. It uses the method of dynamic programming principle and Riccati equation, and derives it into all kinds of existence conditions and calculating method of the equilibrium strategies of dynamic non-cooperative differential game. Based on the game theory method, this book studies the corresponding robust control problem, especially the existence condition and design method of the optimal robust control strategy. The book discusses the theoretical results and its applications in the risk control, option pricing, and the optimal investment problem in the field of finance and insurance, enriching the achievements of differential game research. This book can be used as a reference book for non-cooperative differential game study, for graduate students majored in economic management, science and engineering of institutions of higher learning.

Optimal control and differential games continue to attract strong interest from researchers interested in dynamical problems and models in management science. This volume explores the application of these methodologies to new as well as to classical decision problems in management sciences and economics. In Part I, optimal control and dynamical systems approaches are used to analyze problems in areas such as monetary policy, pollution control, relationship marketing, drug control, debt financing, and ethical behavior. In Part II differential games are applied to problems such as oligopolistic competition, common resource management, spillovers in foreign direct investments, marketing channels, incentive strategies, and the computation of Markov perfect Nash equilibria. Optimal Control and Differential Games is an excellent reference for researchers and graduate students covering a wide range of emerging and revisited problems in management science.