In this book, contributors from both sides of the Atlantic examine several key themes in the increasingly important subject of counter-insurgency. It assesses the lessons that contemporary policy makers and military practitioners can draw from historical and more recent experience.

This two-volume history of counterinsurgency covers all the major and many of the lesser known examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict, addressing the various measures employed in the attempt to overcome the insurgency and examining the individuals and organizations responsible for everything from counterterrorism to infrastructure building. How and when should counterinsurgency be pursued as insurgency is growing in frequency and, conversely, while conventional warfare continues to decline as a means by which political rivals seek to impose their will upon each other? What lessons from the past should today's policymakers, strategists, military leaders, and soldiers in the field keep in mind while facing off against 21st-century insurgents? This two-volume set offers a comprehensive history of modern counterinsurgency, covering the key examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict. It identifies the political, military, social, and economic measures employed in attempting to overcome insurgency, examining the work of the individuals and organizations involved, demonstrating how success and failure dictated change from established policy, and carefully analyzing the results. Readers will gain valuable insight from the detailed assessments of the history of counterinsurgency that demonstrate which strategies have succeeded and which have failed—and why. After an introductory essay on the subject, each chapter provides historical background to the insurgency being addressed before focusing on the specific policies pursued and actions taken by the counterinsurgency force. Each section also provides an assessment of those operations, including in most cases an analysis of lessons learned and, where appropriate, their relevance to counterinsurgency operations today. The set's coverage spans modern counterinsurgencies from Europe to Asia to Africa since 1900 and includes the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan today. Its wide, international approach to the subject makes the set a prime resource for readers seeking specific information on a particular conflict or a better understanding of the general theories and practices of counterinsurgency.

The claim by the Ministry of Defence in 2001 that 'the experience of numerous small wars has provided the British Army with a unique insight into this demanding form of conflict' unravelled spectacularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. One important reason for that, David French suggests, was because contemporary British counter-insurgency doctrine was based upon a serious misreading of the past. Until now, many observers believed that during the wars of decolonisation in the two decades after 1945, the British had discovered how western liberal notions of right and wrong could be made compatible with the imperatives of waging war amongst the people, that force could be used effectively but with care, and that a more just and prosperous society could emerge from these struggles. By using only the minimum necessary force, and doing so with the utmost discrimination, the British were able to win by securing the 'hearts and minds' of the people. But this was a serious distortion of actual British practice on the ground. David French's main contention is that the British hid their use of naked force behind a carefully constructed veneer of legality. In reality, they commonly used wholesale coercion, including cordon and search operations, mass detention without trial, forcible population resettlement, and the creation of free-fire zones to intimidate and lock-down the civilian population. The British waged their counter-insurgency campaigns by being nasty, not nice, to the people. The British Way in Counter-Insurgency is a seminal reassessment of the historical foundation of British counter doctrine and practice.

The notion of counter-insurgency has become a dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This volume brings together international academics and practitioners to evaluate the broader theoretical and historical factors that underpin COIN, providing a critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking.

This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of British military experiences in the post-war era and endeavours to unpack their performance. During the twentieth century counter-insurgency assumed the status of one of the British military’s fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after the Second World War as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power many opportunities to deploy against an irregular enemy. However, this quantity of experience does not translate into quality. This book argues that the British, far from being exemplars of counter-insurgency, have in fact consistently proved to be slow learners in counter-insurgency warfare. This book presents an analysis of the most significant British counter-insurgency campaigns of the past 60 years: Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Arabia (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ (1969-79), and the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). Colonial history is used to contextualise the contemporary performance in Iraq and undermine the commonly held confidence in British counter-insurgency. Blending historical research with critical analysis, this book seeks to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse the British approach to counter-insurgency, as well as considering the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare. It will be of interest to students of counter-insurgency, military history, strategic studies, security studies, and IR in general.

The Maoist Insurgency has been born out of long periods of social discontent, economic hardships and state apathy towards the neglected masses. Anti-Maoist operations have to be based on a strong political will, aggressive anti-guerrilla tactics and economic and social development of affected areas to win back the confidence of the people. A common perception is that in these operations, the role of air power is normally overlooked. History differs and tells us that air power has been used extensively to quell past insurgencies. This book explores the nature of insurgencies and air power lessons from past insurgencies. After analysing the Maoist insurgency, the employment of air assets in supporting the security forces is examined.

This book contains some 600 entries on a range of topics from ancient Chinese warfare to late 20th-century intervention operations. Designed for a wide variety of users, it encompasses general reviews of aspects of military organization and science, as well as specific wars and conflicts. The book examines naval and air warfare, as well as significant individuals, including commanders, theorists, and war leaders. Each entry includes a listing of additional publications on the topic, accompanied by an article discussing these publications with reference to their particular emphases, strengths, and limitations.

During the Cold War - an era in which the term ‘asymmetric warfare’ was not well known - the issue of the laws and ethics of war seemed simple enough to most soldiers, being concerned mainly with leadership, management, and morale. Post-Cold War reality revealed a very different set of challenges, including a significantly wider moral dimension, particularly when forces, initially under UN leadership and later under the NATO flag, were deployed in different parts of the turbulent Balkans. Military observers, by now with legal advisers close by, watched events in the Balkans, East Timor and then in central and West Africa with professional interest, and some were involved there. A few years later, soldiers were subsequently caught as much by surprise by the events of 9/11, a graphic example of asymmetric warfare, as most of the rest of the world. The initial, post 9/11 response in Afghanistan and Iraq brought the notion of the fragile or collapsed state, and the blurring of the roles of military forces, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, non-state actors, and indigenous administrators and their uniformed organisations, and with them the moral dilemmas, to much wider notice. More recent conflicts have indeed shown the need for commanders and soldiers in all types of conflict to have a much better understanding of the complex moral and legal environments, and opened new debates about the principle of ‘winning hearts and minds’ in counter-insurgency and peace support operations. Moreover, technological superiority by the West has also produced mixed benefits in the field of military operations, and posed additional dilemmas, many of them moral. The trend towards defining human rights and ‘fundamental freedoms’ poses further questions for the soldier today. This collection of essays, written by a wide variety of practising experts and scholars, touches on all these issues. It links the medieval traditions of jus in bello, codified by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the Christian Church nearly eight centuries ago, to examination of modern challenges and moral dilemmas relating to the ethics and laws of conflict and crises of all types in the twenty-first century, and in a global context among people of many different faiths and beliefs, and none. It is an important collection for all those researching or practically involved in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Counterinsurgency is a complex phenomenon that needs complex answer. Any attempt at reductionism can be an invitation to disaster. Though it is very much a form of warfare, and can fit into the description given by Jomini as wars of opinion or Clausewitzian wars of resistance. The research for the present book was carried out under the sponsorship of Gen D K Palit and Chatrapati Shivaji fellowship of the USI. This book is a cumulative result of over two decades of study of counterinsurgency and peace process by the author. The book encompasses the study of tribal insurgency in Northeast India, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Communist or Naxalite revolt, South African uprising against Racist regime and troubles in Northern Ireland.

Unconventional war is an umbrella term which includes insurgencies, counter-insurgencies, terrorism and religious conflicts. Insurgencies and communal conflicts have become much more common in this region since 1947, and more people have died in South Asia due to unconventional wars than conventional warfare. The essays in this volume are organized in two sections. While the first section deals with insurgencies, counter-insurgencies and terrorism; the second section covers the religious aspects of the various intra-state conflicts which mar the multi-ethnic societies of South Asia.