In the last few years, the public enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC has been thoroughly transformed: the competition authorities of the EU Member States have become active enforcers within the European Competition Network, the European Commission has imposed more and higher fines than ever before, leniency has become a major instrument of cartel detection, and some Member States have introduced criminal penalties. The overall trend towards more and stronger enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC has also rekindled discussion on the old question of how to strike the right balance between efficient enforcement and adequate protection of the rights of the defence. This book brings together six essays which analyse from both a legal and an economic perspective the powers of investigation of the European Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States, and the corresponding procedural rights and guarantees, the use of settlements, the theory and practice of fines and of leniency, and the criminalization of European antitrust enforcement.

This is the thirteenth in a series on EU Competition Law and Policy produced under the auspices of the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence. The volume contains the written contributions of numerous competition policy experts, together with the transcripts of a roundtable debate which examined the subject of "settlements" between enforcers of competition law and defendant companies in cartel cases and in other types of antitrust cases. The Workshop participants included: -- senior judges from major jurisdictions (the European Union, Germany and the United States); -- senior enforcement officials and policy makers from the European Commission, from the national competition authorities of certain EU Member States and from the US Department of Justice and the US Federal Trade Commission; and -- renowned international international academics, legal practitioners and professional economists. In an intense, intimate environment, this group of experts debated a number of legal and economic issues pertaining to two broad lines of discussion: 1) settlements and plea agreements in cartel cases, including their links with leniency programs and with private enforcement; and 2) settlements in "commitment" cases decided under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 and under comparable procedures of national law.

Despite the growing importance of 'consumer welfare' in EU competition law debates, there remains a significant disconnect between rhetoric and reality, as consumers and their interests still play only an ancillary role in this area of law. Consumer Involvement in Private EU Competition Law Enforcement is the first monograph to exclusively address this highly topical and much debated subject, providing a timely and wide-ranging examination of the need for more active consumer participation in competition law. Written by an expert in the field, it sets out a comprehensive framework of policy implications and arguments for greater involvement, positioning the debate in the context of a broader EU law perspective. It outlines pragmatic approaches to remedial and procedural measures that would enable consumer empowerment. Finally, the book identifies key institutional and political obstacles to the adoption of effective measures, and suggests alternative routes to enhance the role of consumers in private competition law enforcement. The book's innovative approach, combining normative analysis and practical solutions, make it invaluable for academics, policy-makers, and practitioners in the field.

Abusive Practices in Competition Law tackles the difficult questions presented to competition lawyers and economists regarding abusive practices: where and when is the red line crossed in competitive advances? When is a company explicitly dominant? How do you handle those who hold superior bargaining power over others but are not classed as dominant?

The existence of a structured enforcement system is an inherent feature of national legal orders and one of the core elements of State sovereignty. The very limited power to issue sanctions has often been deemed a gap in the EC legal order. Over the years, the situation has progressively changed. The Union’s institutional setting is growing in complexity and a variety of agencies has been or is expected to be endowed with law enforcement responsibilities. In addition, the so-called competence creep has led the EU to play an increasingly prominent role in several areas of EU law enforcement, including the issuing of sanctions. This book examines these developments, focusing on both the general features of the EU legal order and the analysis of key-substantive areas, such as banking and monetary union, environmental law, and data protection. The work thus presents a general framework for understanding EU sanctioning based on structural features and general legal principles. Part I develops an analytical framework, tracking the most significant evolutive patterns of EU sanctioning powers. Part II adopts a more practical approach focusing on specific issues and policy areas. The book bridges a gap in existing literature and sheds new light on the relationship between the exercise of jus puniendi and the evolution of EU integration.

This book examines the theories and practice of how to control corporate behaviour through legal techniques. The principal theories examined are deterrence, economic rational acting, responsive regulation, and the findings of behavioural psychology. Leading examples of the various approaches are given in order to illustrate the models: private enforcement of law through litigation in the USA, public enforcement of competition law by the European Commission, and the recent reform of policies on public enforcement of regulatory law in the United Kingdom. Noting that behavioural psychology has as yet had only limited application in legal and regulatory theory, the book then analyses various European regulatory structures where behavioural techniques can be seen or could be applied. Sectors examined include financial services, civil aviation, pharmaceuticals, and workplace health & safety. Key findings are that 'enforcement' has to focus on identifying the causes of non-compliance, so as to be able to support improved performance, rather than be based on fear motivating complete compliance. Systems in which reporting is essential for safety only function with a no-blame culture. The book concludes by proposing an holistic model for maximising compliance within large organisations, combining public regulatory and criminal controls with internal corporate systems and external influences by stakeholders, held together by a unified core of ethical principles. Hence, the book proposes a new theory of ethical regulation. This title is included in Bloomsbury Professional's International Arbitration online service.

In enforcing EU competition law, the Commission employs a unique doctrine of parental antitrust liability: it imposes fines on the parent company of an infringing subsidiary in cases where the parent exercises decisive influence over the subsidiary's commercial policy. Critics of this contentious aspect of EU competition law believe that the doctrine is unfair, ineffective, obscure, disproportionate, contrary to due process, and based upon a dubious, if not extremely flimsy, justificatory foundation. Such criticism raises serious and unanswered questions about the legitimacy of the Commission's efforts to enforce competition law. Parental Liability in EU Competition Law: A Legitimacy-Focused Approach is the first monograph to be dedicated to this controversial topic. Written by Professor Peter Whelan, the book contends that, although the general concept of parental liability can be justified in principle, the current EU-level doctrine of parental antitrust liability in fact suffers from a distinct and problematic lack of legitimacy. More specifically, the said doctrine displays significant deficiencies with respect to effectiveness, fairness, and legality. Given this undesirable state of affairs, Parental Liability in EU Competition Law offers a fully-rationalised, reformulated approach to parental antitrust liability for EU competition law violations that is built around the notion of parental fault. That approach provides a solid normative account of how to impose parental antitrust liability in a manner that is theoretically robust, effective in practice, fair in substance, and legally sound.

The European Union (EU) leniency programme is a key weapon in the Commission’s fight against hard-core cartels. Much of the success of EU cartel enforcement depends on the continued effectiveness of the leniency policy and is especially critical in response to the growth of private enforcement. This book offers a comprehensive description of the development of the policy, along with a normative framework that promises to ensure the full legitimacy of the leniency programme: the Commission’s policy should pursue not only effectiveness but also fairness. It is the first work to extensively analyse the effectiveness and fairness in the EU leniency policy. Proceeding systematically from clarifying the concepts of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘fairness’ to addressing the tension between leniency and private actions for damages, the author discusses the nature of, and interrelations among, such aspects as the following: – the theoretical model of the EU fining policy; – the compatibility of the EU enforcement system with fundamental rights protection; – the gathering and evaluation of evidence at the preliminary investigation stage; – the severity and foreseeability of the EU cartel fines; – judicial review by the EU Courts in competition matters; – to what extent the current policy is effective and fair; and – reforms brought about by the 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices and the leniency-related amendments by the 2014 Antitrust Damages Directive. A key feature is the author’s presentation of a normative framework to test the effectiveness (deterrence) and substantive fairness (retribution) of the EU leniency policy. As a clear demonstration of how to forestall the danger of focusing on effectiveness of leniency at the expense of fairness, both in a substantive and in a procedural sense, this book is a major contribution to the literature of competition law. It will prove to be of great value to competition authorities, antitrust practitioners and interested academics not only in Europe but also throughout the world.

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Leniency has emerged as one of the main enforcement instruments used by competition authorities to combat cartels. Offering immunity from punishment is believed to destabilise already existing cartels and deter undertakings from entering into such arrangements. This book offers the first in-depth analysis of the scope of leniency in European Union (EU) competition law, considering three crucial ramifications – ensuring a leniency applicant can self-report with confidence, retaining the right to compensation of those who have suffered losses due to the cartel and furthering the objective of undistorted competition within the internal market. With thorough insight into the interaction between the Commission’s Leniency Notice and public and private enforcement, the author fully explains such aspects of the subject as the following: who is eligible for leniency; liability of an immunity recipient; the EU fining system; disclosure of leniency evidence; scope of public authorities reaching out to cartel infringers; the immunity recipient and follow-on damages claimants; the immunity recipient and subsequent leniency applicants; effect of the Damages Directive; and the European Economic Area dimension. The author offers cogent suggestions about how the shortcomings of the Commission’s leniency offer can be ameliorated and which regulatory steps should be taken to give the policy greater leverage. The author calls for increased harmonisation at national level in the EU and compares leniency practice in US antitrust law. As a comprehensive analysis of the practical application of current policy and procedure in EU cartel enforcement, the book clearly shows the ways in which the scope of leniency is manifest in the interaction between public and private enforcement, evaluating which interaction is most effective. Its practical character will be recognised and welcomed by competition law practitioners and policymakers, who will strengthen their grasp of leniency procedure and clearly discern implications for competition infringement cases.