Synthetic biology is a field of biotechnology that is rapidly growing in various applications, such as in medicine, environmental sustainability, and energy production. However these technologies also have unforeseen risks and applications to humans and the environment. This open access book presents discussions on risks and mitigation strategies for these technologies including biosecurity, or the potential of synthetic biology technologies and processes to be deliberately misused for nefarious purposes. The book presents strategies to prevent, mitigate, and recover from 'dual-use concern' biosecurity challenges that may be raised by individuals, rogue states, or non-state actors. Several key topics are explored including opportunities to develop more coherent and scalable approaches to govern biosecurity from a laboratory perspective up to the international scale and strategies to prevent potential health and environmental hazards posed by deliberate misuse of synthetic biology without stifling innovation. The book brings together the expertise of top scholars in synthetic biology and biotechnology risk assessment, management, and communication to discuss potential biosecurity governing strategies and offer perspectives for collaboration in oversight and future regulatory guidance.

The book considers the relationship between governance and participation, and the ways participation has been understood, framed and applied in the context of synthetic biology (SB) governance approaches. Based on fundamental questions about the scope, purpose, and responsibilities assigned to public participation activities, the authors conducted an literature review of policy reports and articles on SB governance. The authors identify key characteristics of synthetic biology, such as the complex interplay of research, engineering and IT expertise in the field, as well as the challenges these characteristics pose in designing governance frameworks. Drawing on insights from a literature review, the authors contest calls for “earlier” and “more” participation on the basis that such calls fail to consider the necessary structural adjustments and resources needed for such endeavors. The brief addresses ethical questions arising in synthetic biology that could be used for developing frameworks of governance in the ongoing COVID-19 crisis and the consequent innovations in vaccine research.

We are now entering the third decade of the 21st century, and, especially in the last years, the achievements made by scientists have been exceptional, leading to major advancements in the rapidly growing fields of bioengineering and biotechnology. This annual collection, which highlights article submissions from our Editorial Board members, looks to explore new insights, novel developments, current challenges, latest discoveries, recent advances, and future perspectives in the field of Biosafety & Biosecurity.

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Synthetic biology offers powerful remedies for some of the world’s most intractable problems, but these solutions are clouded by uncertainty and risk that few strategies are available to address. The incentives for continued development of this emerging technology are prodigious and obvious, and the public deserves assurances that all potential downsides are duly considered and minimized accordingly. Incorporating social science analysis within the innovation process may impose constraints, but its simultaneous support in making the end products more acceptable to society at large should be considered a worthy trade-off. Contributing authors in this volume represent diverse perspectives related to synthetic biology’s social sciences, and reflect on different areas of risk analysis and governance that have developed for the field. Such perspectives include leading scholarly discussion pertaining to risk assessment, governance, ethics, and communication. The chapters of this volume note that while the first twenty years of synthetic biology development have focused strongly on technological innovation and product development, the next twenty should emphasize the synergy between developers, policymakers, and publics to generate the most beneficial, well governed, and transparent technologies and products possible. Many chapters in this volume provide new data and approaches that demonstrate the feasibility for multi-stakeholder efforts involving policymakers, regulators, industrial developers, workers, experts, and societal representatives to share responsibilities in the production of effective and acceptable governance in the face of uncertain risk probabilities. A full consideration of such perspectives may prevent a world of draconian regulations based on an insufficient or incomplete understanding of the science that underpins synthetic biology, as well as any hesitancy or fear by the public to adopt its eventual products.

"Superconvergence is brilliant. I can't recommend it more strongly."―Sanjay Gupta MD, bestselling author, neurosurgeon, and Emmy-award winning chief medical correspondent (CNN) In Superconvergence, leading futurist and OneShared.World founder Jamie Metzl explores how artificial intelligence, genome sequencing, gene editing, and other revolutionary technologies are transforming our lives, world, and future. These accelerating and increasingly interconnected technologies have the potential to improve our health, feed billions of people, supercharge our economies, store essential information for millions of years, and save our planet, but they can also―if we are not careful―do immeasurable harm. The challenge we face is that while our ability to engineer the world around us is advancing exponentially, our processes for understanding the scope, scale, and implications of these changes, and for managing our godlike powers wisely, are only inching forward glacially. Luckily, in Jamie Metzl, we have a leading expert who integrates science, technology, history, politics, and international affairs to envision a future that most specialists, almost by definition, cannot see. In this bold and inspiring exploration of transformative human knowledge, Metzl gives us the definitive account of the technological precipice on which we stand and the map to where we go from here.

Scientific advances over the past several decades have accelerated the ability to engineer existing organisms and to potentially create novel ones not found in nature. Synthetic biology, which collectively refers to concepts, approaches, and tools that enable the modification or creation of biological organisms, is being pursued overwhelmingly for beneficial purposes ranging from reducing the burden of disease to improving agricultural yields to remediating pollution. Although the contributions synthetic biology can make in these and other areas hold great promise, it is also possible to imagine malicious uses that could threaten U.S. citizens and military personnel. Making informed decisions about how to address such concerns requires a realistic assessment of the capabilities that could be misused. Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology explores and envisions potential misuses of synthetic biology. This report develops a framework to guide an assessment of the security concerns related to advances in synthetic biology, assesses the levels of concern warranted for such advances, and identifies options that could help mitigate those concerns.

Skilled scientists are not immune to the appeal of terrorist groups, indeed recent studies indicate that engineers and medical doctors are over-represented within terrorist organizations. Also of particular concern with regard to the potential radicalization of scientists is the issue of the ‘lone wolf’; an individual who prepares and commits violence alone, outside of any command structure and without material assistance from any group. This book presents papers from the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) entitled ‘The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats’, held in Como, Italy, from 29 November to 2 December 2016. The aim of this ARW was to assess the risks surrounding the ability of radical terrorist groups to recruit highly skilled scientists. The ARW was unique in that it brought together acknowledged experts from the social science community and the scientific technical community to discuss their perspectives on the risk of radicalization of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) skilled scientists. Countering terrorist organizations requires a comprehensive approach characterized by international cooperation across the military, intelligence, policy-making and scientific communities. The book provides an overview of the situation, as well as recommendations for how such cooperation can be achieved, and will be of interest to all those involved in the counter-terrorism process