This volume considers forms of information manipulation and restriction in contemporary society. It explores whether and when manipulation of the conditions of inquiry without the consent of those manipulated is morally or epistemically justified. The contributors provide a wealth of examples of manipulation, and debate whether epistemic paternalism is distinct from other forms of paternalism debated in political theory. Special attention is given to medical practice, for science communication, and for research in science, technology, and society. Some of the contributors argue that unconsenting interference with people’s ability of inquire is consistent with, and others that it is inconsistent with, efforts to democratize knowledge and decision-making. These differences invite theoretical reflection regarding which goods are fundamental, whether there is a clear or only a moving boundary between informing and instructing, and whether manipulation of people’s epistemic conditions amounts to a type of intellectual injustice. The collection pays special attention to contemporary paternalistic practices in big data and scientific research, as the way in which the flow of information or knowledge might be curtailed by the manipulations of a small body of experts or algorithms.

Any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways faces a problem: While we acknowledge that others stand to benefit from intellectual advice, each and every one of us tends to consider ourselves an exception, on account of overconfidence. The solution? Accept a form of epistemic paternalism.

This is the first book dedicated to the topic of epistemic autonomy. It features original essays from leading scholars that promise to significantly shape future debates in this emerging area of epistemology. While the nature of and value of autonomy has long been discussed in ethics and social and political philosophy, it remains an underexplored area of epistemology. The essays in this collection take up several interesting questions and approaches related to epistemic autonomy. Topics include the nature of epistemic autonomy, whether epistemic paternalism can be justified, autonomy as an epistemic value and/or vice, and the relation of epistemic autonomy to social epistemology and epistemic injustice. Epistemic Autonomy will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy.

These essays by a major epistemologist reconfigure philosophical projects across a wide spectrum, from mind to metaphysics, from epistemology to social power. Several of Goldman's classic essays are included along with many newer writings. Together these trace and continue the development of the author's unique blend of naturalism and reliabilism.

While paternalism has been a long-standing philosophical issue, it has recently received renewed attention among scholars and the general public. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising twenty-seven chapters by a team of international contributors the handbook is divided into five parts: • What is Paternalism? • Paternalism and Ethical Theory • Paternalism and Political Philosophy • Paternalism without Coercion • Paternalism in Practice Within these sections central debates, issues and questions are examined, including: how should paternalism be defined or characterized? How is paternalism related to such moral notions as rights, well-being, and autonomy? When is paternalism morally objectionable? What are the legitimate limits of government benevolence? To what extent should medical practice be paternalistic? The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism is essential reading for students and researchers in applied ethics and political philosophy. The handbook will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as law, medicine, sociology and political science.

Epistemologists often work with idealized pictures of what inquirers are like, how they interact with each other, and the social institutions and environment in which they do the interacting. These idealizations might be appropriate for the more foundational issues in epistemology, such as the theory of knowledge. However they become problematic when epistemologists address applied and practical topics, such as public ignorance about important political and scientific issues, or our obligations and responsibilities as inquirers. A solution to a problem like public ignorance that might work in an ideal world could be disastrous in the real world. Ways of interacting that would yield epistemic benefits in an epistemically just world might not be so beneficial in an epistemically unjust world. Author Robin McKenna argues that, to avoid these problems, we need to make space for non-ideal epistemology-a way of doing epistemology that eschews the idealizations typical in much contemporary epistemology. However Non-Ideal Epistemology is not just an exercise in philosophical methodology. McKenna also develops distinctive approaches to a range of important topics in applied and social epistemology, such as what to do about science denial, whether we should try to be intellectually autonomous, and what our obligations are to other inquirers. The result is an illustration of why we need non-ideal epistemology and what it can do for us.

This book develops new ideas in feminist epistemology by exploring diverse and sometimes positive roles for ignorance. The author argues that epistemic values cannot simply be reduced to the value of increasing knowledge and that ignorance is not merely inescapable for epistemic agents, but, rather, is valuable. She shows that ignorance-friendly epistemology offers a better descriptive and normative account of human epistemic practices. --publisher.

Connecting Virtues examines the significant advances within the fast-growing field of virtue theory and shows how research has contributed to the current debates in moral philosophy, epistemology, and political philosophy. Includes groundbreaking chapters offering cutting-edge research on the topic of the virtues Provides insights into the application of the topic of virtue, such as the role of intellectual virtues, virtuous dispositions, and the value of some neglected virtues for political philosophy Examines the relevance of the virtues in the current debates in social epistemology, the epistemology of education, and civic education Features work from world-leading and internationally recognized philosophers working on the virtues today

This volume offers a new framework for understanding expertise. It proposes a reconceptualization of the traditional notion of expertise and calls for the development of a new contextual and action-oriented notion of expertise, which is attentive to axiological values, intellectual virtues, and moral qualities. Experts are usually called upon, especially during times of emergency, either as decision-makers or as advisors in formulating policies that often have a significant impact on society. And yet, for certain types of choices, there is a growing tension between experts’ recommendations and alternative views. The chapters in this volume critically assess the idea of whether possessing epistemic authority can automatically make someone’s assertions necessarily more grounded than others. They not only evaluate the epistemological implications of this idea but also reflect on its ethical, socio-cultural, and political consequences. The interdisciplinary framework advanced across the chapters seeks to overcome certain limitations that underlie current models of expertise by adopting more inclusive and representative decisions that can improve the perceived neutrality of experts’ decisions. Increasing neutrality means reducing cases in which an unidentified bias – be it a scientific one or not – puts any of the individuals involved in a specific public choice at a systematic disadvantage. Philosophy, Expertise, and the Myth of Neutrality will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of the social sciences, public policy, and sociology.

Intellectual Dependability is the first research monograph devoted to addressing the question of what it is to be an intellectually dependable person—the sort of person on whom one’s fellow inquirers can depend in their pursuit of epistemic goods. While neglected in recent scholarship, this question is an important one for both epistemology—how we should conceptualize the ideal inquirer—and education—how we can enable developing learners to grow toward this ideal. The book defends a virtue theory according to which being an intellectually dependable person is distinctively a matter of possessing a suite of neglected virtues called "the virtues of intellectual dependability" that are themselves distinctively concerned with promoting epistemic goods in others’ inquiries. After defending the existence and educational significance of these virtues as a group, the book turns toward the project of identifying and conceptualizing several specific instances of these virtues in detail. Virtues discussed include intellectual benevolence, intellectual transparency, communicative clarity, audience sensitivity, and epistemic guidance. In each case, an interdisciplinary treatment of the nature of the virtue and its relationship to other virtues, vices, and personality features is offered, drawing especially on relevant research in Philosophy and Psychology. The book concludes with a chapter devoted to identifying distinctive ways these virtues of intellectual dependability are manifested when it is inquiring communities, rather than individuals, that occupy the position of intellectual dependence. By directing attention to the ideal of intellectual dependability, the book marks a novel turn of scholarly interest explicitly toward a neglected dimension of the ideal inquirer that will inform both epistemological theorizing and educational practice.