This book, first published in 1982, addresses the problem of assessing the central and regional balance of power. The collection of essays by experts on the different countries looks at the miscalculations about the military power of foreign countries which have been made in the past and the difficulties which have to be overcome today before we can reach a correct estimate of the power of other states.

This book analyzes the use of strategic embargoes and economic sanctions in the postwar period, tracing their changing applications in the context of developments in the global distribution of power. Dr. Ellings uses two approaches: a case study of the ongoing strategic Western embargo against selected communist countries and a comparative study of

Intelligence services form an important but controversial part of the modern state. Drawing mainly on British and American examples, this book provides an analytic framework for understanding the "intelligence community" and assessing its value. Michael Herman, a former senior British Intelligence officer, describes the various components of intelligence; discusses what intelligence is for; considers issues of accuracy, evaluation and efficiency; and makes recommendations for the future of intelligence in the post-Cold War world.

The five volumes in the series entitled The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000 explore the history of the relationship between Britain and Japan from the first contacts of the early 1600s through to the end of the twentieth century. This volume presents 19 original essays by Japanese, British and other international historians and covers the evolving military relationship from the 19th century through to the end of the 20th century. The main focus is on the interwar period when both military establishments shifted from collaboration to conflict, as well as wartime issues such as the treatment of POWs seen from both sides, the Occupation of Japan and war crimes trials.

A new look at how Britain’s defence establishment learned to engage Japan’s armed forces as the Pacific War progressed. Douglas Ford reveals that, prior to Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia in December 1941, the British held a contemptuous view of Japanese military prowess. He shows that the situation was not helped by the high level of secrecy which surrounded Japan’s war planning, as well as the absence of prior engagements with the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army. The fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ in February 1942 dispelled the notion that the Japanese were incapable of challenging the West. British military officials acknowledged how their forces in the Far East were inadequate, and made a concerted effort to improve their strength and efficiency. However, because Britain’s forces were tied down in their operations in Europe, North Africa and the Mediterranean, they had to fight the Japanese with limited resources. Drawing upon the lessons obtained through Allied experiences in the Pacific theatres as well as their own encounters in Southeast Asia, the British used the available intelligence on the strategy, tactics and morale of Japan’s armed forces to make the best use of what they had, and by the closing stages of the war in 1944 to 1945, they were able to devise a war plan which paved the way for the successful war effort. This book will be of great interest to all students of the Second World War, intelligence studies, British military history and strategic studies in general.

This book highlights the impact and relevance of "strategic culture". Each section contains essays contrasting United States and Soviet perceptions on specific topics. Each section closes with a synthesizing commentary, to help readers to get a better sense of differences and similarities.

Leonard Leshuk begins this study by commenting on the unusual situation whereby a nation as seemingly weak and backward before World War II as the Soviet Union could, in the space of a few years, challenge the USA militarily on a global scale.