In this selection of Gilbert Harman's shorter writings in moral philosophy, the essays are divided into four sections, focusing on moral relativism, values and valuing, character traits and virtue ethics, and ways of explaining aspects of morality.

Explaining Value is a selection of the best of Gilbert Harman's shorter writings in moral philosophy. The thirteen essays, originally published between 1967 and 1999, are divided into four sections, which focus in turn on moral relativism, values and valuing, character traits and virtue ethics, and ways of explaining aspects of morality. An indication of the breadth of interest of the book can be given by mentioning a few of the compelling questions which Harman discusses: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Why do many people think it is morally permissible to treat animals in ways we would not treat people? What is it to value something and what is it to value something intrinsically? How much of morality can or should be explained in terms of human flourishing, or the possession of virtuous character traits? How do people come to be moral? Harman's distinctive approach to moral philosophy has provoked much interest; this volume offers a fascinating conspectus of his most important work in the area.

Reasons and Recognition brings together fourteen new papers on an array of topics from the many areas to which philosopher Thomas Scanlon has made path-breaking contributions, each of which develops a distinctive and independent position while critically engaging with central themes from Scanlon's own work in the area.

In a globalized world with globalizing IPRs where culturally assumed norms must be re-examined, this work has an urgent and important contribution to make. Taking the main features of internationally mandated IPRs as a starting point it explores the mo

Imagine a human society, perhaps in pre-history, in which people were generally of a psychological kind with us, had the use of natural language to communicate with one another, but did not have any properly moral concepts in which to exhort one another to meet certain standards and to lodge related claims and complaints. According to The Birth of Ethics, the members of that society would have faced a set of pressures, and made a series of adjustments in response, sufficient to put them within reach of ethical concepts. Without any planning, they would have more or less inevitably evolved a way of using such concepts to articulate desirable patterns of behavior and to hold themselves and one another responsible to those standards. Sooner or later, they would have entered ethical space. While this central claim is developed as a thesis in conjectural history or genealogy, the aim of the exercise is philosophical. Assuming that it explains the emergence of concepts and practices that are more or less equivalent to ours, the story offers us an account of the nature and role of morality. It directs us to the function that ethics plays in human life and alerts us to the character in virtue of which it can serve that function. The emerging view of morality has implications for the standard range of questions in meta-ethics and moral psychology, and enables us to understand why there are divisions in normative ethics like that between consequentialist and Kantian approaches.

This is a provocative contribution to contemporary ethical theory challenging foundational conceptions of character.

This collection offers a synoptic view of current philosophical debates concerning the relationship between facts and values, bringing together a wide spectrum of contributors committed to testing the validity of this dichotomy, exploring alternatives, and assessing their implications. The assumption that facts and values inhabit distinct, unbridgeable conceptual and experiential domains has long dominated scientific and philosophical discourse, but this separation has been seriously called into question from a number of corners. The original essays here collected offer a diversity of responses to fact-value dichotomy, including contributions from Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam who are rightly credited with revitalizing philosophical interest in this alleged opposition. Both they, and many of our contributors, are in agreement that the relationship between epistemic developments and evaluative attitudes cannot be framed as a conflict between descriptive and normative understanding. Each chapter demonstrates how and why contrapositions between science and ethics, between facts and values, and between objective and subjective are false dichotomies. Values cannot simply be separated from reason. Facts and Values will therefore prove essential reading for analytic and continental philosophers alike, for theorists of ethics and meta-ethics, and for philosophers of economics and law.

John Mikhail explores whether moral psychology is usefully modelled on aspects of Universal Grammar.

Normative ethical theories generally purport to be explanatory—to tell us not just what is good, or what conduct is right, but why. Drawing on both historical and contemporary approaches, Mark Schroeder offers a distinctive picture of how such explanations must work, and of the specific commitments that they incur. According to Schroeder, explanatory moral theories can be perfectly general only if they are reductive, offering accounts of what it is for something to be good, right, or what someone ought to do. So ambitious, highly general normative ethical theorizing is continuous with metaethical inquiry. Moreover, he argues that such explanatory theories face a special challenge in accounting for reasons or obligations that are universally shared, and develops an autonomy-based strategy for meeting this challenge, in the case of requirements of rationality. Explaining the Reasons We Share pulls together over a decade of work by one of the leading figures in contemporary metaethics. One new and ten previously published papers weave together treatments of reasons, reduction, supervenience, instrumental rationality, and legislation, to paint a sharp contrast between two plausible but competing pictures of the nature and limits of moral explanation—one from Cudworth and one indebted to Kant. A substantive new introduction provides a map to reading these essays as a unified argument, and qualifies their conclusions in light of Schroeder's current views. Along with its sister volume, Expressing Our Attitudes, this volume advances the theme that metaethical inquiry is continuous with other areas of philosophy.

Over the course of the last 15 years, Constantine Sandis has advanced our understanding of the role that action plays in shaping our moral thought. In this collection of his best essays in the philosophy of action, Sandis brings together updated versions of his writings, accompanied by a new introduction. Read collectively they demonstrate the breadth of his interests and ability to relate to broader issues within the culture, connecting debates in philosophical psychology about motivation, negligence, and moral responsibility with Greek tragedy, social psychology and literature. Along this path from action to ethics, Sandis engages with Hegel, Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Ricoeur, Davidson, and Dretske, together with contemporary authors such as Jennifer Hornsby and Jonathan Dancy. As he responds to each thinker and theme, he develops his own philosophical position, the key thesis of which is that philosophy of action without ethics is empty, ethics without philosophy of action is blind.