Patterns of explanation in biology have long been recognized as different from those deployed in other scientific disciplines, especially that of physics. Celebrating the diversity of interpretative models found in biology, this volume details their varying types as well as explaining their relationships to one another. It covers the key differentials with other sciences in the nature of explanation, such as the existence in biology of varieties unheard of in the physical sciences, such as teleological, evolutionary and even functional explanations. Offering a wealth of fresh analysis of the phenomenon, chapters examine aspects ranging from the role of mathematics in explaining cell development to the complexities thrown up by evolutionary-developmental biology, where explanation is altered by multidisciplinarity itself. They cover major domains such as ecology and systems biology, as well as contemporary trends, such as the mechanistic explanations spawned by progress in molecular biology. With contributions from researchers of many different nationalities, the book provides a many-angled perspective on a revealing feature of the discipline of biology.

This book investigates the nature and relevance of conjunctive explanations in the context of science and religion. It explores questions concerning how scientific and religious explanations for features of the world or phenomena within it relate to each other and whether they might work together in mutually enriching ways. The chapters address topics including the relationship between Darwinian and teleological explanations, non-reductive explanations of mind and consciousness, and explanations of Christian faith and religious experience, while others explore theological and philosophical issues concerning the nature and feasibility of conjunctive explanations. Overall, the contributions help to provide conceptual clarity on how scientific and religious explanations might or might not work together conjunctively as well as exploring how these ideas relate to specific topics in science and religion more generally.

Perhaps because of it implications for our understanding of human nature, recent philosophy of biology has seen what might be the most dramatic work in the philosophies of the ?special? sciences. This drama has centered on evolutionary theory, and in the second edition of this textbook, Elliott Sober introduces the reader to the most important issues of these developments. With a rare combination of technical sophistication and clarity of expression, Sober engages both the higher level of theory and the direct implications for such controversial issues as creationism, teleology, nature versus nurture, and sociobiology. Above all, the reader will gain from this book a firm grasp of the structure of evolutionary theory, the evidence for it, and the scope of its explanatory significance.

The central thesis of this book is that the semantic conception is a logical methodologically and heuristically richer and more accurate account of scientific theorizing, and in particular of theorizing in evolutionary biology, than the more widely adhered to syntactic conception. In this book, the author outlines both the conceptions indicating the significant problems with the syntactic conception; explains and criticizes two influential syntactic-conception accounts of the structure of evolutionary theorizing. Thompson also argues that the semantic conception provides a richer and more accurate understanding than the syntactic conception of sociobiological explanation, of the testability of sociobiology, and of the role of culture and cognition in evolutionary explanations of human behavior.

This book originated as a Festschrift to mark the publication of Volume 50 of the journal `Acta Biotheoretica' in 2002 and the journal’s 70th anniversary in 2005. In it, eleven previously unpublished research papers have been collected that reflect the entire scope of topics on which `Acta Biotheoretica' publishes. `Acta Biotheoretica' is a journal on theoretical biology, published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, that has its roots in the Dutch tradition of theoretical biology. From the perspective of this tradition, theoretical biology is understood as encompassing a broad spectrum of disciplines ranging from mathematical biology to philosophy of biology. To reflect the Dutch roots of the journal, all papers have been invited from authors that work in The Netherlands. This book is aimed at an audience of theoretical and mathematical biologists, philosophers of biology and philosophers of science, and biologists in general.

Philosophy of Experimental Biology explores some central philosophical issues concerning scientific research in experimental biology, including genetics, biochemistry, molecular biology, developmental biology, neurobiology, and microbiology. It seeks to make sense of the explanatory strategies, concepts, ways of reasoning, approaches to discovery and problem solving, tools, models and experimental systems deployed by scientific life science researchers and also integrates developments in historical scholarship, in particular the New Experimentalism. It concludes that historical explanations of scientific change that are based on local laboratory practice need to be supplemented with an account of the epistemic norms and standards that are operative in science. This book should be of interest to philosophers and historians of science as well as to scientists.

Essential themes in the development of the life sciences during the nineteenth century.

This collection brings together a set of new papers that advance the debate concerning the nature of explanation in mind and brain science, and help to clarify the prospects for bonafide integration across these fields. Long a topic of debate among philosophers and scientists alike, there is growing appreciation that understanding the complex relationship between the psychological sciences and the neurosciences, especially how their respective explanatory frameworks interrelate, is of fundamental importance for achieving progress across these scientific domains. Traditional philosophical discussions tend to construe the relationship between them in stark terms - either they are related in terms of complete independence (i.e., autonomy) or complete dependence (i.e., reduction), leaving little room for more interesting relations such as that of mutually beneficial interaction or integration. A unifying thread across the diverse set of contributions to this volume is the rejection of the assumption that no stable middle ground exists between these two extremes, and common embrace of the idea that these sciences are partially dependent on or constrained by one another. By addressing whether the explanatory patterns employed across these domains are similar or different in kind, and to what extent they inform and constrain each another, this volume helps to deepen our understanding of the prospects for successfully integrating mind and brain science.

Preface p. ix Chapter 1 Biology and Its Philosophy p. 2 1.1 The Rise of Logical Positivism p. 2 1.2 The Consequences for Philosophy p. 4 1.3 Problems of Falsifiability p. 6 1.4 Philosophy of Science Without Positivism p. 8 1.5 Speculation and Science p. 10 Introduction to the Literature p. 11 Chapter 2 Autonomy and Provincialism p. 13 2.1 Philosophical Agendas versus Biological Agendas p. 13 2.2 Motives for Provincialism and Autonomy p. 18 2.3 Biological Philosophies p. 21 2.4 Tertium Datur? p. 25 2.5 The Issues in Dispute p. 30 2.6 Steps in the Argument p. 34 Introduction to the Literature p. 35 Chapter 3 Teleology and the Roots of Autonomy p. 37 3.1 Functional Explanations in Molecular Biology p. 39 3.2 The Search for Functions p. 43 3.3 Functional Laws p. 47 3.4 Directively Organized Systems p. 52 3.5 The Autonomy of Teleological Laws p. 59 3.6 The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Functional Explanation p. 62 3.7 Functional Explanation Will Always Be with Us p. 65 Introduction to the Literature p. 67 Chapter 4 Reductionism and the Temptation of Provincialism p. 69 4.1 Motives for Reductionism p. 69 4.2 A Triumph of Reductionism p. 73 4.3 Reductionism and Recombinant DNA p. 84 4.4 Antireductionism and Molecular Genetics p. 88 4.5 Mendel's Genes and Benzer's Cistrons p. 93 4.6 Reduction Obstructed p. 97 4.7 Qualifying Reductionism p. 106 4.8 The Supervenience of Mendelian Genetics p. 11 4.9 Levels of Organization p. 117 Introduction to the Literature p. 119 Chapter 5 The Structure of Evolutionary Theory p. 121 5.1 Is There an Evolutionary Theory? p. 122 5.2 The Charge of Tautology p. 126 5.3 Population Genetics and Evolution p. 130 5.4 Williams's Axiomatization of Evolutionary Theory p. 136 5.5 Adequacy of the Axiomatization p. 144 Introduction to the Literature p. 152 Chapter 6 Fitness p. 154 6.1 Fitness Is Measured by Its Effects p. 154 6.2 Fitness As a Statistical Propensity p. 160 6.3 The Supervenience of Fitness p. 164 6.4 The Evidence for Evolution p. 169 6.5 The Scientific Context of Evolutionary Theory p. 174 Introduction to the Literature p. 179 Chapter 7 Species p. 180 7.1 Operationalism and Theory in Taxonomy p. 182 7.2 Essentialism--For and Against p. 187 7.3 The Biological Species Notion p. 191 7.4 Evolutionary and Ecological Species p. 197 7.5 Species Are Not Natural Kinds p. 201 7.6 Species As Individuals p. 204 7.7 The Theoretical Hierarchy of Biology p. 212 7.8 The Statistical Character of Evolutionary Theory p. 216 7.9 Universal Theories and Case Studies p. 219 Introduction to the Literature p. 225 Chapter 8 New Problems of Functionalism p. 226 8.1 Functionalism in Molecular Biology p. 228 8.2 The Panglossian Paradigm p. 235 8.3 Aptations, Exaptations, and Adaptations p. 243 8.4 Information and Action Among the Macromolecules p. 246 8.5 Metaphors and Molecules p. 255 Bibliography p. 266 Index p. 273.