In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology—and ignore the security risk—in a desperate search for hard currency. Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In Exporting the Bomb, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of "rogue" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

"Examines the history and effectiveness of US efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons"--

This book examines the evolution of international nuclear non-proliferation trade controls over time. The book argues that the international nuclear export controls have developed in a sub-optimal way as a result of a non-proliferation collective action problem. This has resulted in competition among suppliers, owing to the absence of an overarching effective system of control. While efforts have been undertaken to address this collective action problem and strengthen controls over time, these measures have been inherently limited, it is argued here, because of the same structural factors and vested interests that led to the creation of the problem in the first place. This study examines international controls from the beginning of the nuclear age and early efforts to control the atom, up to more recent times and the challenge posed by Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions. Drawing on a rich body of original archival research and interviews, the book demonstrates that the collective action problem has restrained cooperation in preventing nuclear proliferation and that gaps persist in the international nuclear trade control regime. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation and arms control, security studies, and International Relations.