Despatches in this volume include Air Operations in Burma and Bay of Bengal 1 January to 22 May 1942 by General Wavell, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia November 1943 to May 1944, by Air Chief Marshal Sir R.E.C. Peirse, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia from June 1944 to May 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, and the despatch on air operations in South East Asia between May 1945 and September 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park.??This unique collection of original documents will prove to be an invaluable resource for historians, students and all those interested in what was one of the most significant periods in British military history.

Officers led and men followed; all were expected to do their duty without thought of reward. Enlisted men rarely penetrated the officer ranks and promotion owed more to money than merit. Then came the Crimean War.The incompetence and ineffectiveness of the senior officers contrasted sharply with the bravery of the lower ranks. Fuelled by the reports from the first-ever war correspondents which were read by an increasingly literate public, the mumblings of discontent rapidly grew into a national outcry. Questions were asked in Parliament, answers were demanded by the press why were the heroes of the Alma, Inkerman and the Charge of the Light Brigade not being recognised? Something had be done.That something was the introduction of an award that would be of such prestige it would be sought by all men from the private to the Field Marshal. It would be the highest possible award for valour in the face of the enemy and it bore the name of the Queen for whom the men fought.This is the story of how the first Victoria Crosses were attained in the heat of the most deadly conflict of the nineteenth century. It is also an examination of how the definition of courage, as recognised by the awarding of VCs, evolved, from saving the regimental colours at the Alma to saving a comrade in the No Mans Land before Sevastopol.

After a long series of crushing defeats by the apparently unstoppable Japanese air and ground forces, the eventual fight back and victory in Burma was achieved as a result of the exercise of unprecedented combined services cooperation and operations. Crucial to this was the AlliesÕ supremacy in the air coupled with their ground/air support strategy. Using veteransÕ firsthand accounts, Air Battle For Burma reveals the decisive nature of Allied air power in inflicting the first major defeat on the Japanese Army in the Second World War. Newly equipped Spitfire fighter squadrons made the crucial difference at the turning point battles of the Admin Box, Imphal and Kohima in 1944. Air superiority allowed Allied air forces to deploy and supply Allied ground troops on the front line and raids deep into enemy territory with relative impunity; revolutionary tactics never before attempted on such a scale. By covering both the strategic and tactical angles, through these previously unpublished personal accounts, this fine book is a fitting and overdue tribute to Allied air forcesÕ contribution to victory in Burma.

This is the first book to provide a comprehensive overview of the land war during the Second World War in South-East Asia and the South and South-West Pacific. The extensive existing literature focuses on particular armies – Japanese, British, American, Australian or Indian – and/or on particular theatres – the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Malaya or Burma. This book, on the contrary, argues that warfare in all the theatres was very similar, especially the difficulties of the undeveloped terrain, and that there was considerable interchange of ideas between the allied armies which enabled the spread of best practice among them. The book considers tactics, training, technology and logistics, assesses the changing state of the combat effectiveness of the different armies, and traces the course of the war from the Japanese Blitzkrieg of 1941, through the later stalemate, and the hard fought Allied fightback. Although the book concentrates on ground forces, due attention is also given to air forces and amphibious operations. One important argument put forward by the author is that the defeat of the Japanese was not inevitable and that it was brought about by chance and considerable tactical ingenuity on the part of US and British imperial forces.

Some sixty years after the Far Eastern War ended, this innovative new collection brings together five distinguished UK-based scholars and five from Japan to reappraise their respective country's leadership in the Malaya and Burma campaigns. This leadership is analyzed on various levels, ranging from the grand strategic to operational. The Japanese contributors examine the reasons for their forces, brilliant advances in 1941-42, whereas the British writers have to account for the disastrous defeat, characterized by the poor leadership of senior commanders such as Bennett and Percival. Between 1943 and 1945, the tables were turned dramatically, so the failure of Japanese command decisions then comes under critical scrutiny and the British have to explain how defeat was transformed into victory. Above all, this volume should stimulate interest in different methods and styles of military leadership in view of the contrasting approaches of the British and Japanese in the Second World War.

Papers: the strategic approach to home defense; information warfare: chaos on the electronic superhighway; east versus west: military views of information warfare; dealing with Internet intruders in emergency mode: an IBM perspective; hackers: national resources or cyber-criminals?; creating smart nations through national information strategies: intelligence and security issues; convergence of military and commercial vulnerabilities; societal impact of information warfare; security management: safety in cyberspace; industrial espionage: an update, etc.