Financial stability is one of the key tenets of a central bank’s functions. Since the financial crisis of 2007-2009, an area of hot debate is the extent to which the central bank should be involved with prudential regulation. This book examines the macro and micro-prudential regulatory frameworks and systems of the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Canada and Germany. Drawing on the regulator frameworks of these regions, this book examines the central banks’ roles of crisis management, resolution and prudential regulation. Alison Lui compares the institutional structure of the new ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK to the Australian model, and the multi-regulatory US model and the single regulatory Canadian model. The book also discusses the extent the central bank in these countries, as well as the ECB, are involved with financial stability, and argues that the institutional architecture and geographical closeness of the Bank of England and Financial Policy Committee give rise to the fear that the UK central bank may become another single super-regulator, which may provide the Bank of England with too much power. As a multi-regional, comparative study on the importance and effectiveness of prudential regulation, this book will be of great use and interest to students and researchers in finance and bank law, economics and banking.

The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2010 exposed the existence of significant imperfections in the financial regulatory framework that encouraged excessive risk-taking and increased system vulnerabilities. The resulting high cost of the crisis in terms of lost aggregate income and wealth, and increased unemployment has reinforced the need to improve financial stability within and across countries via changes in traditional microprudential regulation, as well as the introduction of new macroprudential regulations. Amongst the questions raised are:

The post-2008 financial regulatory reforms do not fully appreciated the critical role of the supervisory model in attaining financial stability.

Virtually all large banks and other financial institutions in the UK and internationally are public limited liability companies whose shares are listed on one or several stock exchanges. As such, their corporate governance and, in particular, the incentives faced by their directors and senior managers are to a significant extent determined by corporate and securities law rules such as directors’ duties, directors’ liability in insolvency, takeover regulation, disclosure obligations, shareholder rights and rules on executive remuneration. At the same time, systemically important financial institutions in the UK are licensed, regulated and supervised by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). This book explores the relationship between, on the one hand, the broader corporate law, corporate governance and securities law framework and, on the other, the prudential regulatory framework. Although the book’s main focus is on UK law, much of the policy argumentation is relevant globally and therefore appropriate international comparisons are drawn, and analysis of EU law and regulation is included. The book argues that the corporate law regime, which focuses on shareholder empowerment and profit maximisation, operates as an antithesis to prudential regulatory objectives thus undermining the safety and soundness of banks and other financial institutions by encouraging risky behaviour that may be in the best interests of their shareholders, but is clearly not in the public interest.

Political and social forces exert pressure on our globalized economy in many forms, from formal and informal policies to financial theories and technical models. Our efforts to shape and direct these forces to preserve financial stability reveal much about the ways we perceive the financial economy. The Handbook of Safeguarding Global Financial Stability examines our political economy, particularly the ways in which these forces inhabit our institutions, strategies, and tactics. As economies expand and contract, these forces also determine the ways we supervise and regulate. This high-level examination of the global political economy includes articles about specific countries, crises, and international systems as well as broad articles about major concepts and trends. - Substantial articles by top scholars sets this volume apart from other information sources - Diverse international perspectives result in new opportunities for analysis and research - Rapidly developing subjects will interest readers well into the future

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.

The relationship between the observance of financial system standards and financial stability is complex owing to the multitude of macroeconomic and structural factors affecting stability. Therefore, assessments of standards in terms of technical criteria for compliance needs to be reinforced with additional information on other factors affecting risks in order to assess financial stability. Preliminary evidence from country data on observance of Basel Core Principles (BCPs) suggests that indicators of credit risk and bank soundness are primarily influenced by macroeconomic and macroprudential factors and that the direct influence of compliance with Basel Core Principles on credit risk and soundness is insignificant. BCP compliance could, however, influence risk and soundness indirectly through its influence on the impact of other macro variables.

This Report responds to the Government's initial proposals for radical change to economic policy-making and the way in which financial services are regulated in the United Kingdom. The Governor of the Bank of England's concern is that 'people are trying to get to an end point too quickly'. The Government's reforms are taking place at a time when major changes are being proposed internationally. It is important that the United Kingdom, with a particularly large share of the financial services activity of the EU, secures proper representation on the EU regulatory bodies. The Government has set up an Independent Commission on Banking, to look at competition in banking, with a remit which could include radical structural reforms, due to report in the autumn. The Government also proposes to give a Financial Policy Committee (FPC), based in the Bank of England, power to monitor the system to ensure financial stability, and to take action when that stability is threatened. The Government further proposes to establish a prudential regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority, as a subsidiary of the Bank of England. The Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA) will regulate the conduct of financial institutions. The financial crisis has resulted in a sharp increase in the direct costs of regulation. The indirect costs have doubtless increased further, although they remain difficult to quantify. Both are borne by the consumer. The Treasury Committee is concerned that the proposals say little about the cost of regulation, or about the non-bank sector. Regulatory changes should not be considered without proper evaluation of both their direct and indirect costs.

This comprehensive Research Handbook provides an in-depth analysis of the different financial law approaches, legal systems and trends throughout Asia. It considers how reforms following the crises have been critical for the development and growth of the region and explores a broad range of post-crisis financial regulatory issues. This timely book also examines how inconsistent and divergent approaches to financial market regulation are curtailing the region’s potential.