Using historical analysis and survey, this study examines the sufficiency of U.S. field artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques to support the destruction of an encircled enemy. Focus is on identifying existing weaknesses by comparing applicable lessons learned from history with the practices spelled out in current manuals. The Allied attempt to encircle and reduce the German forces within the Falaise-Argentan pocket in central France during August 1944 and the Soviet Belorussian Offensive and subsequent encirclement and reduction of German forces during June 1944 are examined. The results of a survey completed by the V and VII U.S. Corps artillery commanders on the subject are also included. Among the shortfalls identified are: current attention is more focused on breaking out of an encirclement than on forming an encirclement; when encircling an enemy is addressed, discussion stops after the encirclement is formed and before reduction begins; field artillery procedures do not separately address this mission; friendly or enemy use of chemical or nuclear weapons has not been considered; the requirement to simultaneously support reduction and exploitation operations has not been addressed; there is a need for an artillery commander at echelons above corps. The study concludes that the process of reducing a large encircled enemy force is sufficiently different from other operations that it should be separately addressed. Although the “doing” of the component parts of the artillery aspect of this operation are doctrinally established, tying them together into a synergetic package requires innovative attention. Resulting field artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques derived are equally applicable in reducing an isolated enemy force that has broken through or been Inserted Into our rear area as they are in the reduction of an offensively encircled enemy.

Offers a candid view of a war that played a significant role in the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union. Presents analysis absolutely vital to Western policymakers, as well as to political, diplomatic, and military historians and anyone interested in Russian and Soviet history. Provides insights regarding current and future Russian struggles in ethnic conflicts both at and within their borders, struggles that could potentially destroy the Russian Federation.

Between the wars the French produced some of the largest, and certainly the fastest, destroyers in the world. Known as Contre-Torpilleurs, these striking and innovatory super-destroyers form the core of this book, but the more conventional Torpilleurs d'Escadre are also covered. This history combines the technical and service material published in French-language monographs over the past two decades with the authors' own research from primary sources. The structure of the book follows that of the highly successful French Cruisers, with Part I devoted to the design of each of the classes built after 1922. The text is accompanied by detailed data tables and illustrated by a comprehensive set of specially-drawn plans and schemas based on official documents, as well as carefully-selected photographs from French naval sources and from private collections. Coverage runs down to the Le Hardi class, the last pre-war design.. Part II deals with the historical side, covering the eventful careers of these ships before, during and after the war. This section is illustrated by maps specially drawn for the book, and by contemporary photographs. Like its highly successful predecessors, French Battleships and French Cruisers, this beautifully presented book blends technical and historical analysis to produce what must become the standard English-language reference work.