Asset allocation decisions of international investors are at the core of capital flows. This paper explores the impact of these decisions on long-term government bond yields, using a quarterly investor base dataset for 22 advanced economies over 2004-2012. We find that a one percentage point increase in the share of government debt held by foreign investors can explain a 6-10 basis point reduction in long-term sovereign bond yields over the sample period. Accordingly, international flows to core advanced economy bond markets over 2008-12 are estimated to have reduced 10-year government bond yields by 40-65 basis points in Germany, 20-30 basis points in the U.K., and 35-60 basis points in the U.S. In contrast, foreign outflows are estimated to have raised 10-year government bond yields by 40-70 basis points in Italy and 110-180 basis points in Spain during the same period. Our results suggest that the divergence in long-term bond yields between core and periphery economies in the euro area may continue unless the “normalization” of macroeconomic determinants of bond yields is accompanied by a similar “normalization” of the foreign investor base.

Asset allocation decisions of international investors are at the core of capital flows. This paper explores the impact of these decisions on long-term government bond yields, using a quarterly investor base dataset for 22 advanced economies over 2004-2012. We find that a one percentage point increase in the share of government debt held by foreign investors can explain a 6-10 basis point reduction in long-term sovereign bond yields over the sample period. Accordingly, international flows to core advanced economy bond markets over 2008-12 are estimated to have reduced 10-year government bond yields by 40-65 basis points in Germany, 20-30 basis points in the U.K., and 35-60 basis points in the U.S. In contrast, foreign outflows are estimated to have raised 10-year government bond yields by 40-70 basis points in Italy and 110-180 basis points in Spain during the same period. Our results suggest that the divergence in long-term bond yields between core and periphery economies in the euro area may continue unless the “normalization” of macroeconomic determinants of bond yields is accompanied by a similar “normalization” of the foreign investor base.

Motivated by the recent increase in domestic banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign debt (i.e., home bias) in the European periphery, this paper analyzes implications of banks’ home bias for the sovereign’s debt sustainability. The main findings, based on a sample of advanced (AM) and emerging market (EM) economies, suggest that home bias generally reduces the cost of borrowing for AMs and EMs when debt levels are moderate to high. A worsening of market sentiments appears to dimish the favorable impact of home bias on cost of borrowing particularly for EMs. In addition, for AMs and EMs, higher home bias is associated with higher debt levels, and less responsive fiscal policy. The findings suggest that home bias indeed matters for debt sustainability: Home bias may provide fiscal breathing space, but delays in fiscal consolidation may actually delay problems until debt reaches dangerously high levels.

Articles in the June 2014 issue of the IMF Research Bulletin look at “The Rise and Fall of Current Account Deficits in the Euro Area Periphery and the Baltics” (Joong Shik Kang and Jay C. Shambaugh) and “The Two Sides of the Same Coin?: Rebalancing and Inclusive Growth in China” (Il Houng Lee, Murtaza Syed, and Xin Wang). The Q&A looks at “Seven Questions on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Low-Income Countries” (Andrew Berg, Luisa Charry, Rafael A. Portillo, and Jan Vleck). This issue of the Research Bulletin includes updated listings of IMF Working Papers, Staff Discussion Notes, and Recommended Readings from the IMF Bookstore. Readers can also find information on free access to a featured article from “IMF Economic Review.”

Greece: Selected Issues

Do government financial assets help improve public debt sustainability? To answer this question, we assemble a comprehensive dataset on government assets using multiple sources and covering 110 advanced and emerging market economies since the late 1980s. We then use this rich database to estimate the impact of assets on two key dimensions of debt sustainability: borrowing costs and the probability of debt distress. Government financial assets significantly reduce sovereign spreads and the probability of debt crises in emerging economies but not in advanced economies, and the effect varies with asset characteristics, notably liquidity. Government finacial assets also help discriminate countries across the distribution of sovereign spreads, thus signaling information about emerging economies’ creditworthiness.

Experience from the global financial crisis suggests that countries’ borrowing costs are not solely determined by macro and fiscal fundamentals. Factors such as ownership structures of government securities, among others, also play a significant role. This paper investigates the effect of “real money investors”—domestic nonbanks and national and foreign central banks—on bond yields for a sample of 45 advanced and emerging market economies. The results show that, while bond yields rise with the debt to GDP ratio, this increase is partly offset if this debt falls in the hands of real money investors. Nonetheless, for some countries there is the risk that such ownership structure could change over the long run, which would impose upward pressure on borrowing costs, especially where fiscal positions are weak.

Malaysia’s local currency debt market is one of the most liquid public debt markets in the world. In recent years, the growing share of nonresident holders of debt has been a source of concern for policymakers as a reason behind exchange rate volatility. The paper provides an overview of the recent developments in the conventional debt market. It builds an empirical two-stage model to estimate the main drivers of debt capital flows to Malaysia. Finally, it uses a GARCH model to test the hypothesis that nonresident flows are behind the observed exchange rate volatility. The results suggest that the public debt market in Malaysia responds adequately to both pull and push factors and find no firm evidence that nonresident flows cause volatility in the onshore foreign exchange market.

Recent events have shown that sovereigns, just like banks, can be subject to runs, highlighting the importance of the investor base for their liabilities. This paper proposes a methodology for compiling internationally comparable estimates of investor holdings of sovereign debt. Based on this methodology, it introduces a dataset for 24 major advanced economies that can be used to track US$42 trillion of sovereign debt holdings on a quarterly basis over 2004-11. While recent outflows from euro periphery countries have received wide attention, most sovereign borrowers have continued to increase reliance on foreign investors. This may have helped reduce borrowing costs, but it can imply higher refinancing risks going forward. Meanwhile, advanced economy banks’ exposure to their own government debt has begun to increase across the board after the global financial crisis, strengthening sovereign-bank linkages. In light of these risks, the paper proposes a framework—sovereign funding shock scenarios (FSS)—to conduct forward-looking analysis to assess sovereigns’ vulnerability to sudden investor outflows, which can be used along with standard debt sustainability analyses (DSA). It also introduces two risk indices—investor base risk index (IRI) and foreign investor position index (FIPI)—to assess sovereigns’ vulnerability to shifts in investor behavior.

Using a structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) model, this paper examines the size, geographical sources, and transmission channels of global and regional shocks to the Armenian economy. Results show that Armenian economic activity is strongly influenced by global demand shocks and changes in oil prices, yet relatively immune to financial volatility. Transmission takes place through the Russian and EU economies, remittances, and external borrowing. The role of exports and tourism is low. Russia is key in transforming the potentially negative impact of an increase in oil prices into a positive event, through stronger remittances and exports. Services and construction, which depend significantly on remittances and external borrowing, are the most affected by global and regional shocks.