This book critically analyzes US political-military strategy by arguing that freedom of the seas discourse is fundamentally unfit for an era of maritime great power competition. The work conducts a genealogical intellectual history of freedom of the seas discourse in US foreign policy to show how the concept has evolved over time to facilitate American control over the global ocean space. It concludes that the contemporary discourse works to establish the high seas as an arena free from claims of sovereignty so that the United States, as the presumed unrivaled naval power, can intervene globally on behalf of its national interests. However, since sea control strategies depend on a preponderance of material force, as the United States wanes in relative material capability it becomes less able to support political-military strategies predicated on the assumption of global naval dominance. The book provides a timely commentary on the current geopolitical competition between the United States and China, and critiques the US approach toward China in the maritime domain in order to highlight potential avenues of foreign policy action that may enable the two countries to mitigate the risk of conflict. This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, maritime security, US foreign policy, and international relations.

Between 1945 and 1968, the possibility of Mutual Assured Destruction led to a host of odd realities, including the creation of an affable cartoon turtle named Bert who taught millions of school children that nuclear war was survivable if they simply learned how to “duck and cover.” Meanwhile, fear of Communism played out against the backdrop of potential Armageddon to provide justification for a variety of covert operations involving regime change, political assassination, and sometimes bizarre plot twists. United States Foreign Policy 1945-1968: The Bomb, Spies, Stories, and Lies takes a fresh look at this complex, often confusing, and frequently farcical period in American and world history.

From the end of WWII to the end of the Obama administration, development assistance in Africa has been viewed as an essential instrument of US foreign policy. Although many would characterise it as a form of aid aimed at enhancing the lives of those in the developing world, it can also be viewed as a tool for advancing US national security objectives. Using a theoretical framework based on 'power', United States Assistance Policy in Africa examines the American assistance discourse, its formation and justification in relation to historical contexts, and its operation on the African continent. Beginning with a problematisation of development as a concept that structures hierarchies between groups of people, the book highlights how cultural, political and economic conceptions influence the American assistance discourse. The book further highlights the relationship between American national security and its assistance policy in Africa during the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and the post-9/11 contexts. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of Development Studies, Political Science and International Relations with particular interest in US foreign policy, USAID and/or African Studies.

A History of the Manila Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) from its establishment in 1954 until its dissolution in 1977. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) has received meagre scholarly attention in comparison to other key events and global developments during the duration of the Cold War, due to its perceived failure early in its existence. However, there has been a renewed interest in the academic study of the organization. Some scholars have argued that SEATO was not an outright failure. New literatures have also shed in detail the workings of SEATO, such as operational-level contingency plans and counter-insurgency plans. This book aims to reconstruct a comprehensive life cycle of SEATO using declassified archival documents which were unavailable to scholars studying the organization from the 1950s through the 1980s and provide a nuanced assessment of it. In addition, in recent years, there is also an emerging interest in the possibility of a multilateral military alliance in Asia, for instance the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue morphing into an "Asian NATO". As such, it is therefore crucial to study how previous multilateral alliances in the context of Asia were formed, how they functioned, and subsequently dissolved. A groundbreaking reference on a key element of the United States’ Cold War strategy in Asia, which will be a valuable resource to scholars of twentieth century diplomatic history.

This volume examines the United States' efforts to lure Cambodia from neutrality to alliance during the Eisenhower presidency. William J. Rust conclusively demonstrates that, as with Laos in 1958 and 1960, covert intervention in the internal political affairs of neutral Cambodia proved to be a counterproductive tactic for advancing the United States' anticommunist goals.

This book is a study of the origins, development, and end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry in Iran from 1945 to 1962 and its influence on the political and economic development of the country. It traces the roots of this rivalry to the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941 during the Second World War that subsequently led to U.S. involvement in Iran in 1942 as part of the Allied war effort. While analyzing the superpower rivalry, the book also focuses on the development of U.S.-Iranian relations and U.S. policy toward Iran, whose primary goal was to keep Iran free from communism. The book traces the development of U.S.-Iranian relations and U.S. policy toward Iran through the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations and examines whether there were any elements of continuity among the three administrations in keeping Iran free from communism. The book also provides an in-depth analysis of the response of the Shah and the Iranian government to foreign-power rivalry in Iran.

This comparative study explores the involvement of the United States in four successful military coups in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War. Focusing on military-to-military relations with the US in each country, the book offers insight into how external actors can impact the outcomes of coups, particularly through socialization via military training, education, and international organizations such as NATO. Drawing upon recently declassified government documents and a trove of unexplored interviews with high-ranking officials, Ömer Aslan also examines how coup plotters in both countries approached the issue of US reaction before, during, and after their coups. As armed forces have continued to make and unmake Turkish and Pakistani governments well into the twenty-first century, this volume offers original, probing analysis of the circumstances which make coups possible.

For those interested in the assassination of JFK, the untold story of Indonesia, gold, JFK, Allen Dulles, the CIA, and secret military coups. Two of the most fascinating figures in history, John F. Kennedy, thirty-fifth president of the United States, and Allen Dulles, our nation’s longest-serving CIA director, often clashed over intelligence issues and national security. However, one such conflict has remained in the shadows until now. JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia takes reader to the vast archipelago 3350 miles wide where this secret showdown occurred. In 1936, an Allen Dulles-established company discovered the world's largest gold deposit in remote Netherlands New Guinea. In 1962, President Kennedy intervened, and Netherlands New Guinea was added to President Sukarno's Indonesia. Neither Sukarno nor JFK was aware of the gold, since Dulles had not informed Kennedy. Dulles planned a complicated and ruthless CIA regime-change strategy to seize control not only of Indonesia itself, but also of its vast resources, including the gold. This strategy included a push to start Malaysian Confrontation. Yet Kennedy's plan to visit Jakarta in early 1964 would have sunk Dulles' master plan, which included the destruction of the Indonesian communist party as a wedge to split Moscow and Beijing. Only an assassin's bullet put an end to Kennedy’s plan of peace. Did Allen Dulles arrange for JFK to be killed to save his plan and his gold? Was his coup for gold successful with JFK out of the picture? Using archival records as a basis, Greg Poulgrain adds word-of-mouth evidence from those people who were directly involved—such as Dean Rusk and others who worked with President Kennedy and Allen Dulles at the time; or the person who was with Michael Rockefeller when he mysteriously disappeared in West New Guinea during this whole affair.

With a rich comparative case-study approach that spans Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Building Militaries in Fragile States unearths provocative findings that suggest the traditional way of working with foreign militaries needs to be rethought.