Publisher Description

Based on recently declassified documents, this book provides the first examination of the Truman Administration’s decision to employ covert operations in the Cold War. Although covert operations were an integral part of America’s arsenal during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the majority of these operations were ill conceived, unrealistic and ultimately doomed to failure. In this volume, the author looks at three central questions: Why were these types of operations adopted? Why were they conducted in such a haphazard manner? And, why, once it became clear that they were not working, did the administration fail to abandon them? The book argues that the Truman Administration was unable to reconcile policy, strategy and operations successfully, and to agree on a consistent course of action for waging the Cold War. This ensured that they wasted time and effort, money and manpower on covert operations designed to challenge Soviet hegemony, which had little or no real chance of success. US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, Cold War history, intelligence and international history in general.

This book evolved from a panel entitled "Psychological Operations: East and West", presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Section on Military Studies, at the Naval Postgraduate School in the Fall of 1983. The panel focused on the use of propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy by the Soviet Union and its alli

Is it possible that a president and his administration would purposefully mislead the American public so that they could commit the United States to a war that is not theirs to fight? Anyone with even a remote memory of the phrase “weapons of mass destruction” probably finds such a question naive. On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Vietnam War, those with longer memories would consider the unquestioning acceptance of Saddam Hussein’s “gathering threat” even more naive. Providing historical context that highlights how the decision to use force is made, as well as how it is “sold,” Containment and Credibility explores how the half-truths and outright lies of both the Johnson and Nixon administrations brought us into a conflict that cost more than fifty thousand American lives over eight years. As we consider how best to confront the growing threat of ISIS, it is increasingly important for the public to understand how we were convinced to go to war in the past. In the 1960s, the domino theory warning of the spread of communism provided the rationale for war, followed by the deception of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and the resulting resolution that essentially gave LBJ a blank check. This book will show how this deception ultimately led to the unraveling of the Johnson presidency and will explore the credibility gap that led to the public political debate of that time. Containment and Credibility applies the lessons of the sixties to today’s similar debates regarding military involvement. Skyhorse Publishing, as well as our Arcade imprint, are proud to publish a broad range of books for readers interested in history--books about World War II, the Third Reich, Hitler and his henchmen, the JFK assassination, conspiracies, the American Civil War, the American Revolution, gladiators, Vikings, ancient Rome, medieval times, the old West, and much more. While not every title we publish becomes a New York Times bestseller or a national bestseller, we are committed to books on subjects that are sometimes overlooked and to authors whose work might not otherwise find a home.

From an array of intellectual reference points, Stephanson (history, Rutgers U.) has written a serious assessment of this complicated, often controversial, highly respected American policymaker. A work of general significance for a wide range of contemporary issues in foreign and domestic politics a

Presents a history and analysis of the Korean War, focusing on the contributions of the United Nations, diplomacy of the conflict, and its role in the Cold War.

The book tells the story of the theory and history of the mission command approach (decentralized command) and the attempts by different armies to adopt and reform according to this approach.

This book argues that the immediate analysis in the West of the Tito-Stalin split was misguided and that to consider the split as a 'defection' on the part of Yugoslavia is in itself misleading.