This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.

Behavioural game theory is the most important recent development of standard game theory, and its applications regard several fields of research, ranging from economic theory to sociology and political science. Behavioural game theory aims to provide a behavioural and psychological approach to game theory modelling, in order to identify more robust equilibrium outcomes and more realistic behavioural assumptions. This book explores the key topics in detail, covering issues such as players' heterogeneity, social preferences, reciprocity, learning and information, and punishment in public good games. It provides a state-of-the-art analysis of the progress and methodology of behavioural game theory, as well as exploring the interdisciplinary aspects of the subject, and is an extremely valuable resource for academics and scholars with an interest in the area. Book jacket.

This volume contains sixteen original articles documenting recent progress in understanding strategic behaviour. In their variety they reflect an entire spectrum of coexisting approaches: from orthodox game theory via behavioural game theory, bounded rationality and economic psychology to experimental economics. There are plenty of new models and insights but the book also illustrates the boundaries of what we know today and explains the frontiers of tomorrow. The articles were written in honour of Werner Güth.

Two MIT economists show how game theory—the ultimate theory of rationality—explains irrational behavior We like to think of ourselves as rational. This idea is the foundation for classical economic analysis of human behavior, including the awesome achievements of game theory. But as behavioral economics shows, most behavior doesn’t seem rational at all—which, unfortunately, to cast doubt on game theory’s real-world credibility. In Hidden Games, Moshe Hoffman and Erez Yoeli find a surprising middle ground between the hyperrationality of classical economics and the hyper-irrationality of behavioral economics. They call it hidden games. Reviving game theory, Hoffman and Yoeli use it to explain our most puzzling behavior, from the mechanics of Stockholm syndrome and internalized misogyny to why we help strangers and have a sense of fairness. Fun and powerfully insightful, Hidden Games is an eye-opening argument for using game theory to explain all the irrational things we think, feel, and do.

This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.

How do interacting decision-makers make strategic choices? If they’re rational and can somehow predict each other’s behavior, they may find themselves in a Nash equilibrium. However, humans display pervasive and systematic departures from rationality. They often do not conform to the predictions of the Nash equilibrium, or its various refinements. This has led to the growth of behavioral game theory, which accounts for how people actually make strategic decisions by incorporating social preferences, bounded rationality (for example, limited iterated reasoning), and learning from experience. This book brings together new advances in the field of behavioral game theory that help us understand how people actually make strategic decisions in game-theoretic situations.

I would like to use this preface to thank some persons and institutions which have been important during the various stages of writing this book. First of all, I am grateful to Kluwer Academic Publishers for giving me the opportunity to write this book. I started writing the book in 1998 while I was working at the Departament d'Economia i d'Historia Economica at Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, and continued the writing job from september 1998 to september 2000 at the Departamento de Economfa at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. The book has been completed while I was visiting the Department of Quantitative Economics at the University of Maastricht from october 2000 to august 2001. I wish to thank these three departments for their hospitality. The book has improved substantially by comments and critique from the following persons who have read parts of the manuscript: Geir Asheim, Eric van Damme, Janos Flesch, Mari-Angeles de Frutos, Diego Moreno, Hans Peters, Antonio Romero and Dries Vermeulen. I should also mention my discussions with Peter Wakker about the decision-theoretic foundations of noncooperative game theory, which have had an important impact on various parts of the book. Finally, I wish to express my warmest gratitude to my parents, my brother and my sister, and, last but not least, to Cati, to whom I dedicate this book.

When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.

The papers collected in this volume relate to game theory. They aim at the elaboration and discussion of basic con cepts, at the analysis of specific applied models and at the evaluation of experimental evidence. A game is a mathematical model of a situation where several actors with different goals are engaged in strategic inter action. Game theory explores the nature and the consequence. s of rational behavior in games. With respect to several papers in this volume, it seems to be appropriate to comment on later developments. A list of some important references is given at the end of the intro duction. References already included in the collected pa pers are not repeated here. In casual conversation colleagues sometimes observe that the author on the one hand goes to extremes in the elabora tion of the consequences of Bayesian rationality and on the other hand strongly emphasizes the limited rationality of actual decision behavior. This seeming discrepancy is also expressed in the collection presented here. The author thinks that a sharp distinction should be made between nor ~ative and descriptive game theory. This position of "methodological dualism" has been expressed in a comment to Aumann's paper "What is game theory trying to accomplish?" (Aumann, 1985, Selten 1985) Normative game theory has the important task to explore the nature and the consequences of idealized full rationality in strategic interaction. This requires a thorough discuss ion of first principles. Empirical arguments are irrelevant here.

Comprises lectures given at Tel Aviv University and Oxford University in 1990.