Government Secrecy presents the best that has been thought and written on the subject, including history and philosophy, theory and practice, justification and critique. Through readings, which range from Georg Simmel on secrecy and Max Weber on bureaucracy and secret-keeping, to post-9/11 concerns regarding freedom of information and presidential secrecy, it enables readers to explore the issues and questions that surround the government's right to keep necessary secrets—or not. This collection, and the diverse perspectives it represents, will engage students and other interested parties in a discussion of the benefits—and dangers—of government secrecy. The collection is designed to generate questions regarding historical accuracy of government information, information ethics, professional neutrality, ownership of information, public right to information, national security, and transparency. The essays explore the criteria and conditions for government secret-keeping, as well as contributing to public and academic discussion of the role of secrets in democracies.

Considers legislation to require Federal departments and agencies to publish unclassified information and regulations. a. Justice Dept study "Is a Congressional Committee Entitled To Demand and Receive Information and Papers from the President and the Heads of Departments Which They Deem Confidential, in the Public Interest?" (p. 63-146). b. "Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers" by Herman Wolkinson, Federal Bar Association, published in the Federal Bar Journals of Apr., July, and Oct., 1949 (p. 147-270). c. "Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights Survey of Withholding of Information from Congress" memos and summary analysis prepared by subcom staff (p. 287-428). d. "Congressional Power of Investigation" Committee Print No. 83-99, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress Feb. 9, 1954 (p. 447-513). Includes the following documents.

Secrets and Leaks examines the complex relationships among executive power, national security, and secrecy. State secrecy is vital for national security, but it can also be used to conceal wrongdoing. How then can we ensure that this power is used responsibly? Typically, the onus is put on lawmakers and judges, who are expected to oversee the executive. Yet because these actors lack access to the relevant information and the ability to determine the harm likely to be caused by its disclosure, they often defer to the executive's claims about the need for secrecy. As a result, potential abuses are more often exposed by unauthorized disclosures published in the press. But should such disclosures, which violate the law, be condoned? Drawing on several cases, Rahul Sagar argues that though whistleblowing can be morally justified, the fear of retaliation usually prompts officials to act anonymously--that is, to "leak" information. As a result, it becomes difficult for the public to discern when an unauthorized disclosure is intended to further partisan interests. Because such disclosures are the only credible means of checking the executive, Sagar writes, they must be tolerated. However, the public should treat such disclosures skeptically and subject irresponsible journalism to concerted criticism.

Forty years ago, a majority of Americans were highly engaged in issues of war and peace. Whether to go to war or keep out of conflicts was a vital question at the heart of the country's vibrant, if fractious, democracy. But American political consciousness has drifted. In the last decade, America has gone to war in Iraq and Afghanistan, while pursuing a new kind of warfare in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Pakistan. National security issues have increasingly faded from the political agenda, due in part to the growth of government secrecy. In lucid and chilling detail, journalist and lawyer Scott Horton shows how secrecy has changed the way America functions. Executive decisions about war and peace are increasingly made by autonomous, self-directing, and unaccountable national security elites. Secrecy is justified as part of a bargain under which the state promises to keep the people safe from its enemies, but in fact allows excesses, mistakes, and crimes to go unchecked. Bureaucracies use secrets to conceal their mistakes and advance their power in government, invariable at the expense of the rights of the people. Never before have the American people had so little information concerning the wars waged in their name, nor has Congress exercised so little oversight over the war effort. American democracy is in deep trouble. Lords of Secrecy explores the most important national security debates of our time, including the legal and moral issues surrounding the turn to private security contractors, the sweeping surveillance methods of intelligence agencies, and the use of robotic weapons such as drones. Horton looks at the legal edifice upon which these decisions are based and discusses approaches to rolling back the flood of secrets that is engulfing America today. Whistleblowers, but also Congress, the public, and the media, play a vital role in this process. As the ancient Greeks recognized, too much secrecy changes the nature of the state itself, transforming a democracy into something else. Horton reminds us that dealing with the country's national security concerns is both a right and a responsibility of a free citizenry, something that has always sat at the heart of any democracy that earns the name.

Secrecy and the Media is the first book to examine the development of the D-Notice system, which regulates the UK media's publication of British national security secrets. It is based on official documents, many of which have not previously been available to a general audience, as well as on media sources. From Victorian times, British governments have consistently seen the need, in the public interest, to prevent the media publishing secret information which would endanger national security. The UK media have meanwhile continuously resisted official attempts to impose any form of censorship, arguing that a free press is in the public interest. Both sides have normally seen the pitfalls of attempting to resolve this sometimes acrimonious conflict of interests by litigation, and have together evolved a system of editorial self-regulation, assisted by day-to-day independent expert advice, known colloquially as the D-Notice System. The book traces the development of this system from nineteenth-century colonial campaigns, through two world wars, to modern operations and counter-terrorism in the post-Cold War era, up to the beginning of the Labour government in 1997. Examples are drawn from media, political and official sources (some not yet open), and cover not only defence issues (including Special Forces), but also the activities of the secret intelligence services MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. These cases relate principally to the UK, but also to American and other allies’ interests. The story of how this sometimes controversial institution now operates in the modern world will be essential reading for those in the media and government departments, and for academics and students in the fields of security, defence and intelligence, as well as being an accessible exposé for the general reader. Nicholas Wilkinson served in the Royal Navy 1959-98, and from 1999 to 2004 he ran the independent Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee. He was a Press Complaints Commissioner from 2005 to 2008, and is a Cabinet Office Historian.

Richard Norton-Taylor reveals the secrets of his forty-year career as a journalist covering the world of spies and their masters in Whitehall. Early in his career, Norton-Taylor successfully campaigned against official secrecy, gaining a reputation inside the Whitehall establishment and the outside world alike for his relentless determination to expose wrongdoing and incompetence. His special targets have always been the security and intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Defence, institutions that often hide behind the cloak of national security to protect themselves from embarrassment and being held to account. Encouraged by his trusted contacts in intelligence agencies and Whitehall departments, Norton-Taylor was among the first of the few journalists consistently to attack the planned invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequently covered for the Guardian the devastating evidence of every witness to the Chilcot inquiry. He also enjoyed unique access to a wide array of defence sources, giving him a rare insight into the disputes among top military commanders as they struggled to fight wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with under-resourced and ill-equipped troops. Described by a former senior Intelligence official as a 'long-term thorn in the side of the intelligence establishment', and winner of numerous awards for his journalism, Norton-Taylor is one of the most respected defence and security journalists of his generation. Provocative, and rich in anecdotes, The State of Secrecy is an illuminating, critical and, at times, provocative account of the author's experiences investigating the secret world.

Today, the Internet has become a source of information that no country or company can forgo. It is not only used to communicate or entertain, but most importantly to operate utilities and public services such as banking or air traffic. As the reliance on computer networks across societies and economies keeps growing, so do security risks in cyberspace - referred to as "cybersecurity." Cybersecurity means protecting information and control systems from those who seek to compromise them. It also involves actors, both malicious or protective, policies and their societal consequences. This collection of essays provides a better understanding of the risks, perceptions, and myths that surround cybersecurity by looking at it from three different levels of analysis: the sovereign state, the infrastructure and stakeholders of the Internet, and the individual. The essays explore such issues as information ownership, censorship, cyberwars, cyberterrorism, privacy, and rebellion, bringing together expert knowledge from computer science and the social sciences with case studies. It reviews existing policies and practices and discusses the threats and benefits of living in an increasingly networked world. This authoritative analysis of one of the most controversial and compelling security debates of the twenty-first century will appeal to scholars and practitioners interested in security, international relations and policymaking.

“A trenchant summation” and analysis of the legal rationales behind the US drone policy of targeted killing of suspected terrorists, including US citizens (Publishers Weekly, starred review). In the long response to 9/11, the US government initiated a deeply controversial policy of “targeted killing”—the extrajudicial execution of suspected terrorists and militants, typically via drones. A remarkable effort was made to legitimize this practice; one that most human rights experts agree is illegal and that the United States has historically condemned. In The Drone Memos, civil rights lawyer Jameel Jaffer presents and assesses the legal memos and policy documents that enabled the Obama administration to put this program into action. In a lucid and provocative introduction, Jaffer, who led the ACLU legal team that secured the release of many of the documents, evaluates the drone memos in light of domestic and international law. He connects the documents’ legal abstractions to the real-world violence they allow, and makes the case that we are trading core principles of democracy and human rights for the illusion of security. “A careful study of a secretive counterterrorism infrastructure capable of sustaining endless, orderless war, this book is profoundly necessary.” —Katrina vanden Heuvel, editor and publisher of The Nation

From the early 1990s, allegations that servicemen had been duped into taking part in trials with toxic agents at top-secret Allied research facilities throughout the twentieth century featured with ever greater frequency in the media. In Britain, a whole army of over 21,000 soldiers had participated in secret experiments between 1939 and 1989. Some remembered their stay as harmless, but there were many for whom the experience had been all but pleasant, sometimes harmful, and in isolated cases deadly. Secret Science traces, for the first time, the history of chemical and biological weapons research by the former Allied powers, particularly in Britain, the United States, and Canada. It charts the ethical trajectory and culture of military science, from its initial development in response to Germany's first use of chemical weapons in the First World War to the ongoing attempts by the international community to ban these types of weapons once and for all. It asks whether Allied and especially British warfare trials were ethical, safe, and justified within the prevailing conditions and values of the time. By doing so, it helps to explain the complex dynamics in top-secret Allied research establishments: the desire and ability of the chemical and biological warfare corps, largely comprised of military officials, scientists, and expert civil servants, to construct and identify a never-ending stream of national security threats which served as flexible justification strategies for the allocation of enormous resources to conducting experimental research with some of the most deadly agents known to man. Secret Science offers a nuanced, non-judgemental analysis of the contributions made by servicemen, scientists, and civil servants to military research in Britain and elsewhere, not as passive, helpless victims 'without voices', or as laboratory and desk perpetrators 'without a conscience', but as history's actors and agents of their own destiny. As such it also makes an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on the history and culture of memory.