When General Alexander M. Haig Jr. returned to the White House on May 3, 1973, he found the Nixon administration in worse shape than he had imagined. President Richard Nixon, reelected in an overwhelming landslide just six months earlier, had accepted the resignations of his top aides—the chief of staff H. R. Haldeman and the domestic policy chief John Ehrlichman—just three days earlier. Haldeman and Ehrlichman had enforced the president’s will and protected him from his rivals and his worst instincts for four years. Without them, Nixon stood alone, backed by a staff that lacked gravitas and confidence as the Watergate scandal snowballed. Nixon needed a savior, someone who would lift his fortunes while keeping his White House from blowing apart. He hoped that savior would be his deputy national security adviser, Alexander Haig, whom he appointed chief of staff. But Haig’s goal was not to keep Nixon in office—it was to remove him. In Haig’s Coup, Ray Locker uses recently declassified documents to tell the true story of how Haig orchestrated Nixon’s demise, resignation, and subsequent pardon. A story of intrigues, cover-ups, and treachery, this incisive history shows how Haig engineered the “soft coup” that ended our long national nightmare and brought Watergate to an end.

How President Reagan successfully rebuilt the Western Alliance, particularly in relations with the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan.

This is the true story of betrayal at the nation's highest level. Unfolding with the suspenseful pace of a le Carre spy thriller, it reveals the personal motives and secret political goals that combined to cause the Watergate break-in and destroy Richard Nixon. Investigator Len Colodny and journalist Robert Gettlin relentlessly pursued the people who brought down the president. Their revelations shocked the world and forever changed our understanding of politics, of journalism, and of Washington behind closed doors. Dismantling decades of lies, Silent Coup tells the truth.

This book offers a fresh perspective on the impact of the US intervention in Lebanon in 1982 and the decision-making drivers that led the Reagan Administration into the Lebanese Civil War. Based on newly released archival materials from high level Washington officials such as President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, it argues that the failure of the Reagan Administration to accurately understand the complex political landscape of the Lebanese Civil War resulted in the US-led Multinational Force becoming militarily intertwined in the conflict. This book challenges the notion that Reagan deployed US Marines under the ideals of international peacekeeping, asserting that the US Administration hoped that the Multinational Force would create the political capital that Reagan needed to strengthen the US’ position both in the Middle East and globally. Ultimately, the peacemakers were forced to withdraw as they evolved into antagonists. A case study in the foreign policy doctrines of key Washington decision-makers throughout the 1980s, this project is perfect for any International Relations scholar or interested reader seeking to understand the links between the mistakes of the Reagan Administration and contemporary US interventions in the Middle East.

This comparative study explores the involvement of the United States in four successful military coups in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War. Focusing on military-to-military relations with the US in each country, the book offers insight into how external actors can impact the outcomes of coups, particularly through socialization via military training, education, and international organizations such as NATO. Drawing upon recently declassified government documents and a trove of unexplored interviews with high-ranking officials, Ömer Aslan also examines how coup plotters in both countries approached the issue of US reaction before, during, and after their coups. As armed forces have continued to make and unmake Turkish and Pakistani governments well into the twenty-first century, this volume offers original, probing analysis of the circumstances which make coups possible.