The rejection by Anglo-Saxon philosophers of much "continental philosophy" (from Hegel on down) is largely based on the perceived failure of continental thinkers to grapple with the tough questions of epistemology in general and skepticism in particular. Forster demonstrates that Hegel did not in fact ignore epistemology, but on the contrary he fought a tireless and subtle campaign to defeat the threat of skepticism. Forster's work should dispel once and for all the view that Hegel was naive or careless in epistemological matters. Forster begins by discussing Hegel's critical interpretation of the skeptical tradition, in particular his convincingly argued case for the superiority of ancient over modern skepticism. He goes on to show that the difficulties characteristic of ancient skepticism play a crucial and fascinating role in Hegel's philosophy of history. Hegel sees in the emergence of these difficulties an explanation of why the harmonious unified Greek culture collapsed and was replaced by the division and alienation characteristic of subsequent western culture. Finally, Forster examines the elaborate and ingenious system of defenses erected by Hegel to protect his philosophical thought against skeptical difficulties, as the core of a somewhat broader epistemological project. Along the way, Forster makes much that has hither to remained obscure in Hegel's texts intelligible for the first time. This book should cause a re-evaluation of Hegel, and German Idealism generally, and contribute to a re-evaluation of the skeptical tradition in philosophy.

“Hegel and scepticism” remains an intriguing topic directly concerning the logical and methodological core of Hegel’s system. A series of contributions is unfolding around a keynote paper by Klaus Vieweg, which tries to understand and restate the limits and the content of the relationship between Hegels philosophy and scepticism. Various Hegel readers with different concerns are dealing with Hegel’s strategy in a large range of theoretical areas.

A new translation directly from the original manuscript of Hegel's essay "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy. Presenting its various modifications and comparing the latest with the old". This edition contains an extensive afterword on Hegelian philosophy by the translator and a timeline of his life and works. This is Hegel's writings against Gottlob Ernst Schulze, an Anti-Kantian Skeptic who spent his life in both admiration and opposition to Kantian philosophy. Mr. Schulze claims to have discovered a "hereditary flaw" in philosophy that makes it impossible to gain speculative knowledge. Mr. Schulze, like Hegel's self-appointed enemy Feuerbach (a favorite of Marx), attempted to question and undermine the entire field of theoretical philosophy through his skepticism. He argues that speculative philosophy is often portrayed as if it were trying to uncover hidden things behind the shadowy outlines of ordinary experience using abstract concepts and notions.

Hegel opens the first book of his Science of Logic with the statement of a problem: “The beginning of philosophy must be either something mediated or something immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other, so either way of beginning finds its rebuttal.” Despite its significant placement, exactly what Hegel means in his expression of this problem and exactly what his solution to it is, remain unclear. In this book, Robb Dunphy provides a detailed engagement with Hegel’s “problem of beginning”, locating it within Hegel’s account of significant approaches to the topic of beginning in the history of Western philosophy, as well as making an extended case for the influence of Pyrrhonian Scepticism on the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. Dunphy’s discussion of the various putative solutions that Hegel might be thought to put forward contributes to debates concerning Hegel’s views on the methodology of logic, the relation between his Logic and his Phenomenology of Spirit, and differences between his Encyclopaedia presentation of logic and that of his greater Science of Logic. Hegel and the Problem of Beginning also functions as a critical commentary on Hegel’s essay, “With what must the beginning of the science be made?” which should be of interest to both researchers and students working on the opening of Hegel’s Logic.

In Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel's Theory of Judgement Ioannis Trisokkas offers a systematic analysis of the dialectic of the judgement in Hegel's Science of Logic in the context of the problem of Pyrrhonian scepticism.

Hegel's 'Science of Logic' is widely acknowledged as one of the greatest works of European philosophy. However, its contribution to arguably the most important philosophical problem, Pyrrhonian scepticism, has never been examined in any detail. Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel's Theory of Judgement fills a great lacuna in Hegel scholarship by convincingly proving that the dialectic of the judgement in Hegel's 'Science of Logic' successfully refutes this kind of scepticism. Although Ioannis Trisokkas has written the book primarily for those students of philosophy who already have an interest in Hegel's epistemology and philosophy of language and/or his 'Science of Logic', it will also appeal to those who investigate the problem of scepticism independently of the Hegel corpus.

In this thesis I explore Hegel's relationship to skepticism. Today this relationship remains largely unexplored, especially in the English-speaking world. I examine this relationship in an original way by turning my attention away from the epistemological issues and exploring how the skeptics' lived experience of freedom (ataraxia) finds expression in Hegel's systematic appropriation of skepticism. I show that this moment finds expression in Hegel's thought in a unique way that broadens our conception of Hegel's philosophy.

Forster's reading reveals the Phenomenology of Spirit as in fact an impressively coherent text containing a rich array of ideas of extraordinary philosophical originality and depth.

Skepticism is one of the most enduring and profound of philosophical problems. With its roots in Plato and the Sceptics to Descartes, Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein, skepticism presents a challenge that every philosopher must reckon with. In this outstanding collection philosophers engage with skepticism in five clear sections: the philosophical history of skepticism in Greek, Cartesian and Kantian thought; the nature and limits of certainty; the possibility of knowledge and related problems such as perception and the debates between objective knowledge and constructivism; the transcendental method as a response to skepticism and the challenge of naturalism; overcoming the skeptical challenge. Skepticism: Historical and Contemporary Inquiries is essential reading for students and scholars in epistemology and the history of philosophy and will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as religion and sociology.