Michael Rosen discusses the philosophical issues involved in historical interpretation before presenting a novel and challenging solution to the problem of Hegel's openness to criticism. Contrary to received opinion, Hegel's philosophy does not, he argues, draw upon a universal and pre-suppositionless conception of rationality.

This book was written in 1968, and defended as a doctoral dissertation before the Philosophical Faculty at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) in 1969. It treats of the systematic views of Hegel which led him to give to the princi ple of non-contradiction, the principle of double negation, and the principle of excluded middle, meanings which are difficult to understand. The reader will look in vain for the philosophical position of the author. A few words about the intentions which motivated the author to study and clarify Hegel's thought are therefore not out of place. In the early sixties, when occupying myself with the history of Marxist philosophy, I discovered that the representatives of the logical-positivist tra dition were not alone in employing a principle of demarcation; that those of the dialectical Marxist tradition were also using such a principle ('self-move ment') as a foundation of a scientific philosophy and as a means to delimit unscientific ideas. I aimed at a clear conception of this principle in order to be able to judge whether, and to what extent, it accords with the foundations of the analytical method. In this endeavor I encountered two problems: (1) What is to be understood by 'analytical method' cannot be ascertained un equivocally.

The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic examines the epistemological import of Hegelian dialectic in the widest sense. In modern philosophy, German idealism, Hegel in particular, is said to have made significant innovative steps in redefining the meaning, scope and use of dialectic. Indeed, it is dialectic that makes up the very core of Hegel's position, yet it is an area of his thought that is widely neglected by the available literature despite the increased interest in Hegel's philosophy in recent years. This book brings together an international team of expert contributors in a long-overdue discussion of Hegelian dialectic. Twelve specially commissioned essays address the task of making sense and use of Hegel's dialectic, which is fundamental not only for historical and hermeneutic reasons, but also for pragmatic ones; a satisfactory response to this challenge has the power to clarify Hegel's legacy in the current debate. The essays situate the dialectic in the context of German idealism with a clear-sighted elucidation of the problems that Hegel's dialectic is called upon to solve.

This book undertakes a critical analysis of some central problems in Hegel scholarship. It is concerned with clarifying the theoretical underpinnings of paradox, the possible relationship of paradox to a dialectic logic, and the possibilities of systematization of dialectic and/or paradox. The author begins with a discussion of current attitudes toward paradox in mathematics, science, and logic, and then moves gradually toward a differentiation of philosophical paradox in the strict sense from literary, religious, and logic paradox. The relationship of dialect to paradox is elucidated by means of a phenomenological analysis of self-consciousness. Finally, possible approaches to the systematization of dialectic are considered. Analyzing and evaluating Hegel's dialectical-paradoxical system in particular, Dr. Kainz also addresses the question of viable alternatives to Hegel's approach. While paradox is generally considered by philosophers and logicians as something to be avoided, Kainz's study investigates the possibility that it is an important and even indispensable element of constructive thinking in philosophy as well as other disciplines. Paradox, Dialect, and System is this a contribution not only to Hegel scholarship but to philosophy itself. It will be of particular interest to this concerned with the differentiation of dialectical and nondialectical philosophical systems and with the prevalence of paradox in literature, religion, and contemporary physics.

This book explores the relationship between Hegel’s dialectics and formal logic. It examines the concept of dialectics, its meaning, and its use in contemporary thought. The volume opens the “old” debate about the formalization of Hegel’s dialectics and is motivated by the idea that asking about the connection between Hegel’s dialectics and formal logic is still relevant, for various reasons: Firstly, a new Hegel is circulating nowadays in the philosophical literature, with specific reference to Hegel’s dialectical logic and its relation to the history and philosophy of logic. Secondly, new research about the connection between contradictory logical systems and Hegel's dialectics is also being developed. Finally, there have been recent confirmations that the concept of dialectics is of general interest, and that the usual perplexities about the Hegelian triadic and fairly mechanic device of ‘yes, not, and not not’ are in remission. The chapters feature philosophically and historically motivated presentations of formal features of Hegel’s dialectics, critical considerations about the very idea of ‘formalizing dialectics’ and presentations of past attempts to formalize Hegel’s dialectics. The Formalization of Dialectics will be a key resource for scholars and researchers of the history and philosophy of logic and Hegel’s dialectics. It will also be of interest to anyone who wants to know more about the concept of dialectics, its meaning and its use in contemporary thought. This book was originally published as a special issue of History and Philosophy of Logic.

For a century now Marxists have been searching for a 'rational kernel' of Hegelian 'dialectics' inside the 'mystical shell' of the Hegelian system. As against this entire tradition, Rosenthal insists that Hegelian philosophy is mysticism all the way through. He argues that Marx's supposed `dialectic method' is simply a myth propagated by academics and proposes the provocative thesis that it is not, after all, Hegel's 'method' of which Marx made use in Capital but rather precisely Hegel's mysticism. The role of money in Marx and Hegel is examined in detail.

That there is a "Hegelian legacy" in Marx's writings is not in dispute. There is great controversy, however, over the extent to which this legacy should be affirmed or rejected. In fact, the Hegelian orientation toward Marx and toward social theory in general has been largely rejected for at least a decade. In Dialectical Social Theory and Its Critics, Tony Smith challenges this position and thereby reopens a debate of critical importance to Marx-Hegel studies that has significant implications for the nature of social theory in general. In Part I, Smith explores a number of aspects of the Hegelian legacy by means of a systematic dialectical reading, limiting himself to themes that have either been overlooked or dealt with unsatisfactorily in recent scholarship. In Part II, he examines a number of recent arguments against the Hegelian legacy in Marxism formulated from the neo-Kantian, analytical-Marxist, and postmodernist perspectives advanced by Lucio Colletti, Jon Elster and John Roemer, and Jean Baudrillard, respectively. Dialectical Social Theory and Its Critics is more than an exercise in the history of ideas. Its main aim and most significant accomplishment is to establish that dialectical social theory retains practical importance today and is, in fact, crucial to interdisciplinary attempts to construct a viable theory of the social world.