Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace was an earnest supporter of the Stimson Proposal, a disarmament proposal submitted to the Truman administration by then Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson immediately after World War II. This proposal suggested direct dialogue with the Soviets over control of the newly-released atomic energy used against Japan in August 1945. Wallace, who had nurtured a deep scientific knowledge in his early life, was trusted in his Vice Presidency (1941–1945) for his scientific skills by not only President Franklin D. Roosevelt, but also scientific administrator Vannevar Bush. Because of this, Wallace’s postwar vision was similar to Stimson’s Proposal and the views of atomic scientists, who believed that basic scientific knowledge could not be contained because science had no national boundaries. Why was Wallace so thoroughly neglected by incumbent President Harry S. Truman and his fellow policy-makers? Wallace’s idea, basically encouraging a joint partnership with the Soviets, failed to find favor with Truman, his aides, and the American public. Their belief was that the US’s secret of atomic bomb was a national asset. This book illustrates that Wallace’s idea of international atomic controls with Soviet partnership – a position embraced by atomic scientists – could prevent a postwar nuclear proliferation. The failure of Wallace’s concept of postwar world order, a product of rejection by President Truman, has revealed an ideological conflict between democracy and nuclear weaponry. Amazingly, Wallace daringly made this historic attempt and kept to his vision, a commitment which led to his alienation and eventual ousting from Truman’s cabinet.

Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace was an earnest supporter of the Stimson Proposal, a disarmament proposal submitted to the Truman administration by then Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson immediately after World War II. This proposal suggested direct dialogue with the Soviets over control of the newly-released atomic energy used against Japan in August 1945. Wallace, who had nurtured a deep scientific knowledge in his early life, was trusted in his Vice Presidency (19411945) for his scientific skills by not only President Franklin D. Roosevelt, but also scientific administrator Vannevar Bush. Because of this, Wallaces postwar vision was similar to Stimsons Proposal and the views of atomic scientists, who believed that basic scientific knowledge could not be contained because science had no national boundaries. Why was Wallace so thoroughly neglected by incumbent President Harry S. Truman and his fellow policy-makers? Wallaces idea, basically encouraging a joint partnership with the Soviets, failed to find favor with Truman, his aides, and the American public. Their belief was that the USs secret of atomic bomb was a national asset. This book illustrates that Wallaces idea of international atomic controls with Soviet partnership a position embraced by atomic scientists could prevent a postwar nuclear proliferation. The failure of Wallaces concept of postwar world order, a product of rejection by President Truman, has revealed an ideological conflict between democracy and nuclear weaponry. Amazingly, Wallace daringly made this historic attempt and kept to his vision, a commitment which led to his alienation and eventual ousting from Trumans cabinet.

Against Aid presents a complex and diverse history of opposition to US foreign aid spending, explaining why critics challenged aid and how they had a significant impact on US foreign policy. Foreign aid was an integral part of US foreign policy during the Cold War. US leaders hoped aid spending could modernize other societies, create steadfast allies, and promote global stability, but there was always considerable opposition. Jeffrey F. Taffet skillfully examines aid’s opponents and shows how they questioned the assumptions that the United States needed to be globally engaged. He argues that aid’s opponents forced changes in US aid programs that dramatically reduced overall spending and limited support for dictatorships. Taffet also makes a larger argument, that in fighting aid, opponents were challenging essential views about the nation and its global role that transcended debates about how much to spend. They were arguing about the appropriate use of national power and the essence of the nation’s purpose. This book is essential reading for courses in American politics, international studies, and history of American foreign policy. Students will benefit from the broad, chronological scope and accessible narrative of the text.

A NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW EDITORS' CHOICE Following the trail of espionage and technological innovation, and making use of newly opened archives, Michael D. Gordin provides a new understanding of the origins of the nuclear arms race and fresh insight into the problem of proliferation. On August 29, 1949, the first Soviet test bomb, dubbed "First Lightning," exploded in the deserts of Kazakhstan. This surprising international event marked the beginning of an arms race that would ultimately lead to nuclear proliferation beyond the two superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States. With the use of newly opened archives, Michael D. Gordin follows a trail of espionage, secrecy, deception, political brinksmanship, and technical innovation to provide a fresh understanding of the nuclear arms race.

This is the opening volume in a comprehensive history of the global movement against the development, possession, and use of nuclear weapons.

The second volume in Hall's Presidential enclyclopedia series, this reference contains more than 300 biographical and topical articles by eminent historians, political scientists and economists on every aspect of Harry S. Truman's life and times.