In this 2005 book, Ivan Arreguín-Toft examines the nature of asymmetric conflicts to explain how weaker powers can win.

How do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use. Using statistical and in-depth historical analyses of conflicts spanning two hundred years, in this 2005 book Ivan Arregúin-Toft shows that, independent of regime type and weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favors strong actors, while opposite strategic approaches favors the weak. This approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts allows us to makes sense of how the United States was able to win its war in Afghanistan (2002) in a few months, while the Soviet Union lost after a decade of brutal war (1979–89). Arreguín-Toft's strategic interaction theory has implications not only for international relations theory, but for policy makers grappling with interstate and civil wars, as well as terrorism.

Since the sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union, many scholars have argued that the balance of power theory is losing its relevance. This text examines this viewpoint, as well as looking at systematic factors that may hinder or favour the return of balance of power politics.

The asymmetric power of terrorism / Josef Schrofl and Samuel R. Schubert, 2005.

Part one: The Genealogy of "Disproportionate Counterattack" * Democracies Facing the Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare * The Genesis of a Doctrine * "Peace in Galilee" and the Making of a New Guerilla * How Tzahal Made the First Intifada Popular * Part Two: Dealing with the Second Intifada * Entrance into the Intifada Backfired * A Tougher Stance * Counter-Productive Virtuosity of Targeted Killings * Resilience of Israeli Democracy * Strategic Incoherence * Conclusion: The Only Enemy Capable of Undoing the Israeli Army ...