Economic theory of the last fifty years has been dominated by the paradigm of General Equilibrium Theory, based on the scientific work of Walras-Pareto-Cassel-Wald-Hicks-Arrow-De breu-McKenzie. Some of its grounding assumptions are: all prices are fully flexible; an auctioneer appropriately manipulates all prices according to the law of supply and demand; every con sumer has only one budget constraint; all agents are perfectly informed; no actions are taken by agents before a vector of prices has been found such that all markets clear. Indeed, when all markets clear every agent can implement her/his chosen (opti mal) action and nobody is urged to change his/her decisions. Under these assumptions it is generally said that in a (one pe riod, competitive) general equilibrium model there is no place for money. The present monograph takes general equilibrium as the ba sis on which to build the model presented. But its first aim is to completely dispense with the Walrasian auctioneer by giving firms the task of choosing their output price~ period after period.

Is it desirable that central banks be more transparent in the communication of sensible information when agents have diverse private information? In practice, there exists some consensus about the benefits of acting in this way. However, other studies warn that increasing the precision of public information may raise the volatility of some aggregate variables - in particular, the price level - due to the disproportionate influence that it exerts on agents' decisions, and that this, in turn, will have negative effects on welfare. This paper studies the welfare effects of varying levels of transparency in a model of price-setting under monopolistic competition and imperfect common knowledge. Our results indicate that more precise public information never leads to a reduction of welfare in this framework. We find that the beneficial effects of decreased imperfect common knowledge due to a more precise common signal always compensates the potential rise in aggregate volatility. Moreover, we show that, in contrast to what has previously been assumed, the variability of the aggregate price level has no detrimental welfare effects in this model.

Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling is a relatively new field in economics, however, it is rapidly becoming one of the most useful tools for policy evaluation. This book applies CGE modelling to some of the most urgent international economic policy problems, including the Kyoto Protocol, pension reform, and income taxation, and also analyses the methodological issues that arise.

This thesis was stimulated throughout the time of my participation in a research project on Dynamic Macroeconomics, supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The starting point was the central question of how to integrate price setting firms in a dynamic disequilibrium model. Almost all recent literature on imperfect competition in macroeconomics applies the objective demand approach by assuming that firms know the true demand curve they are faced with. While this approach can be ap plied in temporary monetary equilibrium models, it proves inadequate for formulating price adjustment in a dynamic disequilibrium model, where it has to be replaced by the concept of subjective demand. Based on this distinction, the thesis starts out with a comparison of the concepts of subjective and objective demand in an abstract framework and surveys the literature on general equilibrium theory with imperfect competition. The objective demand approach is criticized not only on the grounds of its strong rationality requirements and existence problems, but also by the observation that it cannot be applied successfully to characterize determinate rational expectations equilibria in intertemporal macroeco nomics. Finally, price setting firms using subjective demand functions are integrated in a dynamic disequilibrium model in order to study mo nopolistic and oligopolistic price adjustment.

In this book, Jean-Pascal Benassy attempts to integrate into a single unified framework dynamic macroeconomic models reflecting such diverse lines of thought as general equilibrium theory, imperfect competition, Keynesian theory, and rational expectations. He begins with a simple microeconomic synthesis of imperfect competition and nonclearing markets in general equilibrium under rational expectations. He then applies this framework to a large number of dynamic macroeconomic models, covering such topics as persistent unemployment, endogenous growth, and optimal fiscal-monetary policies. The macroeconomic methodology he uses is similar in spirit to that of the popular real business cycles theory, but the scope is much wider. All of the models are solved "by hand," making the underlying economic mechanisms particularly clear.

A theoretical analysis of international trade and industrial policy, developing and using new models of trade with imperfect competition. Modeling of imperfect competition within international trade has been difficult until recent breakthroughs in this area, which have provided a more realistic view of the world economy. The book builds on the advances provided by such tools as game theory and the theory of monopolistic competition. The first section covers broad and basic trade issues which arise under imperfect competition. Section two examines implications for trade policy covering issues such as strategic trade policy in static and dynamic settings. Section three deals with various structural issues, such as optimal choice of trade liberalizing policies, the formation of trade blocks, and open dualistic economy with externalities.

Bridges the gap between applied and theoretical general equilibrium models.