This book critically examines the role of think tanks as foreign policy actors. It looks at the origins and development of foreign policy think tanks in India and their changing relevance and position as agents within the policy-making process. The book uses a comparative framework and explores the research discourse of prominent Indian think tanks, particularly on the India–Pakistan dispute, and offers unique insights and perspectives on their research design and methodology. It draws attention to the policy discourse of think tanks during the Composite Dialogue peace process between India and Pakistan and the subsequent support from the government which further expanded their role. One of the first books to offer empirical analyses into the role of these organisations in India, this book highlights the relevance of and the crucial role that these institutions have played as non-state policy actors. Insightful and topical, this book will be of interest to researchers focused on international relations, foreign policy analysis and South Asian politics. It would also be a good resource for students interested in a theoretical understanding of foreign policy institutions in general and Indian foreign policy in particular.

For years, the centre of India’s foreign policy was Pakistan. Love it or hate it. This was the country that the external affairs ministry had to break its head over most of the times. You can’t brush off four wars (1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999), two conflicts (Rann of Kutch and Siachen), militancy in Kashmir that claimed tens of thousands of lives and terrorist attacks all over India. Pakistan and India literally split on an ideological basis, due to the notion of the two-nation theory, and that Muslims cannot live as a minority in Hindu India. Dispute over Kashmir emphasises this divide, and it is still brought up even to this day. India has had to fight 4 wars with Pakistan, and since 1980’s, when Soviets started to get involved in Afghanistan, USA and Pakistan started anti-Soviet terrorism, and Pakistan had the bright idea to use it against India, further worsening relations between the two nations, especially when military coup has meant that the war-hungry military has been in power, and this led to the 1965 war and the Kargil War. The foreign policy of Narendra Modi concerns the policy initiatives made towards other states by the current Modi government after he assumed office as Prime Minister of India on 26 May 2014. The Ministry of External Affairs, headed by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj (the first woman to hold the office since Indira Gandhi), is responsible for carrying out the foreign policy of India. Although the book has involved considerable empirical research, it is not simply fact-finding enterprise. It is also a prescriptive and analytical study intended to create and influence opinion regarding the essentials of policy-making process that would minimize the chances of non-rationality in Indian Foreign Policy.

Pakistan has over the decades become a hotbed for the terrorist ideology often referred to as Jihadism. This book investigates the underlying principles of Pakistan’s foreign policy from 1947 until the present day, and explains the rise of Jihadism as an offshoot of Pakistan’s security concerns. The book goes on to discuss that from its inception as a separate state, Pakistan’s foreign policy focused on ‘seeking parity’ with India and ‘escaping’ from an Indian South Asian identity. The desire to achieve parity with its much larger neighbour led Pakistan to seek the assistance and support of allies. The author analyses the relationship Pakistan has with Afghanistan, United States, China and the Muslim world, and looks at how these relationships are based on the desire that military, economic and diplomatic aid from these countries would bolster Pakistan’s meagre resources in countering Indian economic and military strength. The book presents an interesting contribution to South Asian Studies, as well as studies on International Relations and Foreign Policy.

This report presents three alternative scenarios for India's future over the next 10 years, and its impact on Indo-U.S. relations. It integrates political, economic, and security analysis in assessing India's prospects, and draws on the results of a simulation based on a hypothetical India-Pakistan crisis set in 2009. The scenario for the simulation foreshadows in many respects the crisis that followed the bombing of the Indian parliament in December 2001.

This book analyses Pakistan’s foreign policy and external relations with a focus on contemporary developments, including the impact of the new government of Prime Minister Imran Khan, the powerful military, and the "middle power" status. Structured in two parts – Foundation and Operationalization – the book provides a broad overview of Pakistan’s foreign policy and addresses specific foreign policy choices. Contributor's explore issues such as Pakistan’s middle power status from a theoretical perspective, Imran Khan's foreign policy, Pakistan's relations with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the EU, and Pakistan's evolving Indian Ocean strategy. Based on in-depth interviews with Pakistani scholars, politicians, and diplomats, the book offers a timely perspective on Pakistan’s foreign policy. The book will be of interest to academics working on Pakistan, South Asian Politics, Security and Conflict Studies, International Relations and Foreign Policy, and Asian Studies.

In May 1998, in reaction to India’s nuclear weapons tests, Pakistan tested six nuclear weapons. Following this, the country opted for a policy of minimum deterrence, and within a year Pakistan had altered its policy stance by adding the modifier of minimum ‘credible’ deterrence. This book looks at how this seemingly innocuous shift seriously impacted on Pakistan’s nuclear policy direction and whether the concept of minimum has lost its significance in the South Asian region’s changed/changing strategic environment. After providing a brief historical background exploring why and how Pakistan carried out the nuclear development program, the book questions why Pakistan could not sustain the minimum deterrence that it had conceptualized in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 test. It examines the conceptual theoretical framework of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to question whether Pakistan’s nuclear policy remained consistent with this, as well as to discover the rudimentary factors that are responsible for the inconsistencies with regard to minimum deterrence conceived in this study. The book goes on to look at the policy options that Pakistan had after acquiring the nuclear capability, and what the rationale was for selecting minimum deterrence. The book not only highlights Pakistan deterrent force building, but also analyzes closely Pakistan’s doctrinal posture of first use option. Furthermore, it examines the policy towards arms control and disarmament, and discusses whether these individual policy orientations are consistent with the minimum deterrence. Conceptually providing a deeper understanding of Pakistan’s post-1998 nuclear policy, this book critically examines whether the minimum deterrence conceived could be sustained both at the theoretical and operational levels. It will be a useful contribution in the field of Nuclear Policy, Security Studies, Asian Politics, Proliferation/Non-Proliferation Studies, and Peace Studies. This book will be of interest to policy makers, scholars, and students of nuclear policy, nuclear proliferation and arms control related research.

In this report the Foreign Affairs Committee calls on the British Government to use its influence to persuade the US to engage more fully, and swiftly, with the process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan if the US wishes to disengage its forces there. Although the current international emphasis favours intense military pressure, aimed at defeating the insurgency, it is clear that military pressure alone is not enough to bring security and stability to Afghanistan. The evidence presented to the Committee has suggested that the current full-scale and highly-intensive ISAF counter-insurgency campaign is not succeeding. The Committee question the fundamental assumption that success in Afghanistan can be 'bought' through a strategy of 'clear, hold and build'. The distinction between al-Qaeda and the Taliban is crucial to generating appropriate policy responses in Afghanistan. The Committee says that despite the significant resources that have been invested in Afghanistan, and the enduring, wholehearted and admirable commitment and sacrifices of British personnel, the UK has not yet achieved its stated goals. There is also evidence that the core foreign policy justification for the UK's continued presence in Afghanistan, namely that it is necessary in the interests of UK national security, may have been achieved some time ago, given the apparently limited strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The security rationale behind the UK Government's decision to announce the 2015 deadline for the unconditional withdrawal of UK combat forces remains unclear and there are a number of potential risks inherent in such an approach.

Russian Federation has been recognized with the strategy called as “Putin Doctrine” at the beginning of the 21st century. Accordingly, the West is no longer a reliable partner of Russia. The sovereignty of the post-Soviet countries is under the protection of Russia. Russian World and Russian Orthodoxy have become strong. Today, the term “Russia’s Way” has become almost acceptable throughout the world. Therefore, Russia began to be recognized as a society and state that has not accepted or want to accept the philosophy of “the way of common reason”. In both domestic and foreign policy, there is no effective force that can oppose this ‘special’ situation to Russia. Russian poet and diplomat Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev says in his famous quatrain: Russia can’t be understood with the mind alone, No ordinary yardstick can span her greatness: She stands alone, unique – In Russia, one can only believe. This aphorism is the most common phrase that describes Russia. According to Tyutchev, if we want to understand Russia, it is necessary to “believe it”. To understand the role of the “savior” that the Russians have assigned to them since history, it is necessary to know their history, foreign policy and security doctrines. When you read this book I’m sure you can find answers to some of these questions. In this book, the change and transformation of Russia in Putin Period and the general reasons of these policies are explained. In addition to this book, I would also recommend you to read our book “Is Russia & Turkey Eurasian Pact Possible?” In addition to the general reader, this book has been prepared to provide guidance to experts, diplomats and students working in the field of “Security Studies”, “Political Science and International Relations” and “History”. I wish you a good reading.