In this book, Chattopadhyaya examines the epistemological and methodological implications of induction and probability. Opposed to foundationalism and the thesis of certainty of human knowledge, he has defended a qualified form of fallibilism and constructive kind of skepticism.

I begin by identifying David Hume's problem of induction. Hume argues that induction cannot be justified by a priori reasoning, because the failure of induction does not imply contradiction, or by a posteriori reasoning, because reasoning that the unobserved will resemble the observed based on observation would be circular. Hume concludes that induction cannot be justified by any reasoning. The principle that nature is uniform cannot be established without assuming that nature is uniform. But many paradigmatic instances of induction can be justified in terms of something weaker than the principle that nature is uniform, namely a form of reasoning I call "inference to lesser coincidence". This form of reasoning is meant to incorporate traditional formulations of the justification of induction expressed in terms of inference to the best explanation, statistical sampling, and Bayesian reasoning. My version of the argument is as follows: The conditional, time-invariant proposition that vast regularities in progress are likely to continue somewhat further is either true or false. If false, then the regularities we have observed are colossally coincidental. If true, they are far less coincidental. Therefore the proposition is probably true. If, in fact, vast regularities in progress are likely to continue, this has application to specific cases, such as the possibility that the Sun will rise again. I respond to three objections, which claim that time-restricted laws lessen the coincidence of observed regularities without making it likely that the Sun will rise again, that the "sample" of observed events might be biased, and that a zero prior probability assignment for dependence might be justified. I conclude by discussing the meaning of 'cause'.

Philosophical Skepticism provides a selection of texts drawn from the skeptical tradition of Western philosophy as well as texts written by opponents of skepticism. Taken together with the historical introduction by Landesman and Meeks, these texts clearly illustrate the profound influence that skeptical stances have had on the nature of philosophical inquiry. Draws a selection of texts from the skeptical tradition of Western philosophy as well as texts written by opponents of skepticism. Spans centuries of skeptical and anti-skeptical arguments, from Socrates to Rorty. Includes essays by Plato, Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard, Russell, Quine, Nagel, and many others. Provides a solid foundation for further study.

In the history of philosophical thought, few themes loom as large as skepticism. Skepticism has been the most visible and important part of debates about knowledge. Skepticism at its most basic questions our cognitive achievements, challenges our ability to obtain reliable knowledge; casting doubt on our attempts to seek and understand the truth about everything from ethics, to other minds, religious belief, and even the underlying structure of matter and reality. Since Descartes, the defense of knowledge against skepticism has been one of the primary tasks not just of epistemology but philosophy itself. The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism features twenty-six newly commissioned chapters by top figures in the field. Part One contains articles explaining important kinds of skeptical reasoning. Part Two focuses on responses to skeptical arguments. Part Three concentrates on important contemporary issues revolving around skepticism. As the first volume of its kind, the articles make significant contributions to the debate on skepticism.

In the early 1980s the late Charles B. Schmitt and I discussed the fact that so much new research and new interpretations were taking place concerning various areas of modem skepticism that we, as pioneers, ought to organize a conference where these new findings and outlooks could be presented and discussed. Charles and I had both visited the great library at Wolfenbiittel, and were most happy when the Herzog August Bibliothek agreed to host the first conference on the history of skepticism, in 1984 (published as Skepticism from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, ed. R. H. Popkin and Charles B. Schmitt [Wiesbaden, 1987, Wolfenbiitteler For schungen, vol. 35]) Charles and I projected a series of later conferences, the first of which would deal with skepticism and irreligion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Unfortunately, however, Charles died suddenly in 1986, while lecturing in Padua. Subsequent to his death Constance Blackwell, his companion of many years, established the Foundation for Intellectual History to support research and publica tion on topics in the history of ideas that continued Schmitt's interests. One of the first ventures was to arrange and fund the already planned conference on skepticism and irreligion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. After many difficulties and problems, the conference was sponsored and funded by the Foundation for Intel lectual History, one of its first public activities. It was held at the lovely facilities of the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in Wassenaar in 1990.

Reviews the epistemological ideas that inspired the classical economists: the methodological principles of Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Newton, Locke, Hume, Stewart, Herschel, and Whewell. The classical age of economics was marked by an intense interest in scientific methodology. It was, moreover, an age when science and philosophy were not yet distinct disciplines, and the educated were polymaths. The classical economists were acutely aware that suitable methods had to be developed before a body of knowledge could be deemed philosophical or scientific. They did not formulate their methodological views in a vacuum, but drew on a rich collection of philosophical ideas. Consequently, issues of methodology were at the heart of political economys rise as a science. The classical era of economics opened under Adam Smith with political economy understood as an integral part of a broader system of social philosophy; by the end, it had emerged via J. S. Mill as a "separate science", albeit one still inextricably tied to the other social sciences and to ethics. The Rise of Political Economy as a Science opens with a review of the epistemological ideas that inspired the classical economists: the methodological principles of Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Newton, Locke, Hume, Stewart, Herschel, and Whewell. These principles were influential not just in the development of political economy, but in the rise of social science in general. The author then examines science in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain, with a particular emphasis on the all-important concept of induction. Having laid the necessary groundwork, she proceeds to a history and analysis of the methodologies of four economist-philosophers—Adam Smith, Robert Malthus, David Ricardo, and J. S. Mill—selected for their historical importance as founders of economics and for their common Scottish intellectual lineage. Concluding remarks put classical methodology into a broader historical perspective.

Brian Skyrms presents a set of influential essays which deploy formal methods to address epistemological and metaphysical questions. The first part of the book focuses on quantity; the second on degrees of belief, belief revision, and coherence; the third on aspects of inductive reasoning.

Realism versus Realism defends the metaphysics of 'Internal Realism, ' a view authored by Hilary Putnam, and seeks to build on its basis an immanent realistic position to resolve two conflicts: the conflict between realism and some forms of anti-realism, especially relativism which involves constructivism and subjectivism; and also between two forms of realism itself, namely transcendent and immanent. Contra transcendent realism, author Chhanda Gupta rejects the absolute view of realities that (a) transcend our concept forming powers, (b) transcend our cognitive abilities, and (c) are said to have features by themselves, not as things appear to us. Contra relativism of the anti-realist stripe, Gupta defends conceptual relativity without letting it drift towards constructivism and subjectivism. This general theory of realism minus absolutism, and relativism minus subjectivism and constructivism, may be seen to have a relevance for our moral and social image of the world by showing how pluralism can avoid the ills of absolutism without ushering in intellectual and moral anarchy.

This book chronicles the way Keynes’s generous philosophy of practice evolved in consonance with the needs of his epoch. From a youngster reflecting on ethics and the classics, to becoming a leading voice in both wars in terms of political philosophy and international relations, to playing the role of innovator in both probability and economics, to taking a stance as an art appreciator, Keynes’s life and multidisciplinary contributions to humankind were permeated by his philosophical milieu. However, only a flexible, dynamic, and broad philosophy could have reflected and led the economic and political events in the world of the first part of the 20th Century, which is what Keynes managed to accomplish, and that is what the book suggests. This book captures the gist of Keynes’ evolutionary philosophy for our times. The book adds an evolutionary perspective to the existing literature on Keynes. As a case in point, the theoretical foundations of both macroeconomics and laissez faire are dissected. But the book also tells the story of how Keynes’s philosophy is adapted to a convulsed world, which is akin to ours, his legacy being gifted with multiple human considerations. The book offers an outline of Keynes’s philosophical stance—also compared with those of other European thinkers—at a moment when new ethical, epistemological, economic, and political perspectives are required, especially after the crisis of 2020. The conclusion is that Keynes ́s theoretical and practical insights were far ahead of his time.