Under the title 'Information, Inference and Decision' this volume in the Theory and Decision Library presents some papers on issues from the borderland of statistical inference philosophy and epistemology, written by statisticians and decision theorists who belonged or are allied to the former Saarbriicken school of statistical decision theory. In the first part I make an attempt to outline an objective theory of inductive behaviour, on the basis of R. A. Fisher's statistical inference philosophy, on the one hand, and R. Carnap's inductive logic, on the other. A special problem arising in the context of the new theory, viz., the problem of vagueness of concepts (in particular in the social sciences) is treated separately by H. Skala and myself. B. Leiner has contributed some biographical and bibliographical notes on the objective theory of inductive behaviour. Part II is concerned with inference philosophy. D. A. S. Fraser, the founder of structural inference theory, characterizes and compares some inference philosophies, and discusses his own and the arguments of the critics of his structural theory. In my opinion, Fraser's structural infer ence theory is suited to complete Fisher's inference philosophy in some essential points, if not to replace it. An interesting task for future re search work is to establish the connection between Fraser's theory and Carnap's ideas in the framework of an objective theory of inductive behaviour.

This book grew out of previously published papers of mine composed over a period of years; they have been reworked (sometimes beyond recognition) so as to form a reasonably coherent whole. Part One treats of informative inference. I argue (Chapter 2) that the traditional principle of induction in its clearest formulation (that laws are confirmed by their positive cases) is clearly false. Other formulations in terms of the 'uniformity of nature' or the 'resemblance of the future to the past' seem to me hopelessly unclear. From a Bayesian point of view, 'learning from experience' goes by conditionalization (Bayes' rule). The traditional stum bling block for Bayesians has been to fmd objective probability inputs to conditionalize upon. Subjective Bayesians allow any probability inputs that do not violate the usual axioms of probability. Many subjectivists grant that this liberality seems prodigal but own themselves unable to think of additional constraints that might plausibly be imposed. To be sure, if we could agree on the correct probabilistic representation of 'ignorance' (or absence of pertinent data), then all probabilities obtained by applying Bayes' rule to an 'informationless' prior would be objective. But familiar contra dictions, like the Bertrand paradox, are thought to vitiate all attempts to objectify 'ignorance'. BuUding on the earlier work of Sir Harold Jeffreys, E. T. Jaynes, and the more recent work ofG. E. P. Box and G. E. Tiao, I have elected to bite this bullet. In Chapter 3, I develop and defend an objectivist Bayesian approach.

There are two competing pictures of science. One considers science as a system of inferences, whereas another looks at science as a system of actions. The essays included in this collection offer a view which intends to combine both pictures. This compromise is well illustrated by Szaniawski's analysis of statistical inferences. It is shown that traditional approaches to the foundations of statistics do not need to be regarded as conflicting with each other. Thus, statistical rules can be treated as rules of behaviour as well as rules of inference. Szaniawski's uniform approach relies on the concept of rationality, analyzed from the point of view of decision theory. Applications of formal tools to the problem of justice and division of goods shows that the concept of rationality has a wider significance. Audience: The book will be of interest to philosophers of science, logicians, ethicists and mathematicians.

Risk assessment has become a dominant public policy tool for making choices, based on limited resources, to protect public health and the environment. It has been instrumental to the mission of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as well as other federal agencies in evaluating public health concerns, informing regulatory and technological decisions, prioritizing research needs and funding, and in developing approaches for cost-benefit analysis. However, risk assessment is at a crossroads. Despite advances in the field, risk assessment faces a number of significant challenges including lengthy delays in making complex decisions; lack of data leading to significant uncertainty in risk assessments; and many chemicals in the marketplace that have not been evaluated and emerging agents requiring assessment. Science and Decisions makes practical scientific and technical recommendations to address these challenges. This book is a complement to the widely used 1983 National Academies book, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government (also known as the Red Book). The earlier book established a framework for the concepts and conduct of risk assessment that has been adopted by numerous expert committees, regulatory agencies, and public health institutions. The new book embeds these concepts within a broader framework for risk-based decision-making. Together, these are essential references for those working in the regulatory and public health fields.

The monograph is about a meta-theory of knowledge-production process and the logical pathway that connects the epistemic possibility to the epistemic reality. It examines the general conditions of paradigms for information processing and isolates the classical and fuzzy paradigms for comparative analysis. The sets of conditions that give rise to them are defined, stated and analyzed to abstract the corresponding sets of laws of thought. The fuzzy paradigm with its corresponding logic and mathematics is related to inexact symbolism for the defective information structure where the results of the knowledge production must satisfy the epistemic conditionality, composed of fuzzy conditionality and fuzzy-stochastic conditionality under the principle of logical duality with continuum. The classical paradigm with its corresponding logic and mathematics is related to exact symbolism for exact information structure where the vagueness component of the defectiveness is assumed away, and where the results of the knowledge production must satisfy no epistemic conditionality or at the maximum only the stochastic conditionality under the principle of logical dualism with excluded middle. It is argued that the epistemic path that links ontological space to the epistemological space is information. The ontological space is taken as the primary category of reality while the epistemological space is shone to be a derivative. Such information is universally defective and together with assumptions imposed guides the development of paradigms with their laws of thought, logic of reasoning, mathematics and computational techniques. The relational structure is seen in terms of logical trinity with a given example as matter-information-energy transformational trinity which is supported by the time trinity of past-present-future relationality. The book is written for professionals, researchers and students working in philosophy of science, decision-choice theories, economies, sciences, computer science, engineering, cognitive psychology and researchers working on, or interested in fuzzy paradigm, fuzzy logic, fuzzy decisions, and phenomena of vagueness and ambiguities, fuzzy mathematics, fuzzy-stochastic processes and theory of knowledge. It is further aimed at research institutions and libraries. The subject matter belongs to extensive research and development taking place on fuzzy phenomena and the debate between the fuzzy paradigm and the classical paradigm relative to informatics, synergetic science and complexity theory. The book will have a global appeal and across disciplines. Its strength, besides the contents, is the special effort that is undertaken to make it relevant and accessible to different areas of sciences and knowledge production.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the international symposium Formal Methods Europe, FME 2002, held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in July 2002. The 31 revised full papers presented together with three invited contributions were carefully reviewed and selected from 95 submissions. All current aspects of formal methods are addressed, from foundational and methodological issues to advanced application in various fields.

Includes the decisions and orders of the Board, a table of cases, and a cross reference index from the advance sheet numbers to the volume page numbers.

Winner of the 2016 De Groot Prize from the International Society for Bayesian AnalysisNow in its third edition, this classic book is widely considered the leading text on Bayesian methods, lauded for its accessible, practical approach to analyzing data and solving research problems. Bayesian Data Analysis, Third Edition continues to take an applied