Good,No Highlights,No Markup,all pages are intact, Slight Shelfwear,may have the corners slightly dented, may have slight color changes/slightly damaged spine.

This text is the second of three volumes written by Colonel Glantz on the contribution of intelligence and deception operations to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It examines the area where intelligence and operations overlap; the nature of co-ordination between the two; and the support provided by intelligence to operational planning and execution (or the absence of such support). This is not a study of intelligence work as such, but of how intelligence can improve the chances of success on the battlefield by facilitating the more effective and economical use of troops.

Viktor Suvorov is a Soviet army officer who has defected to the West. Here is the full story of the Spetsnaz forces, the Soviet army's secret killer elite. This is the first comprehensive insight for the West into a Soviet "army within an army" whose existence has been known until recently only to a few highly placed people--most of whom would deny it. The spetsnaz Soviet special forces are one of the more shadowy and ruthless secret special forces in the world. Controlled by military intelligence (the GRU), spetsnaz units are recruited from the ranks of the toughest officers and men in the Soviet Army, the cutting edge of Soviety military might. In modern warfare their primary task is the destruction of enemy tactical nuclear weapons, but the training of anyone selected for spetsnaz prepares him or her for an unlimited range of tasks--from undercover activity as a member of a Soviet Olympic sports team to piloting a midget submarine. As an officer in the GRU, the author was directly involved in the control and planning of spetsnaz. In this revealing and sometimes shocking book, he talks about his own experience; about the military code of an armed force that kills its own wounded; about the weapons, strategy, and training. For anyone interested in the true military capability of the Soviet Union, this book is essential reading.

Leonard provides the first comprehensive history of the Red Army's Intelligence Directorate, known today as the GRU, from its inception during the Russian Civil War up to the rise of Nazi Germany in 1933. During these early years of Soviet Army intelligence, the GRU actively promoted Communism internationally through insurrection and partisan warfare. It became deeply involved in espionage in Western Europe, the United States, and Asia. Making extensive use of primary sources, many of which have only recently become available, Leonard completes a story that has until now been often inaccurate or simply confused.

Describes the author's recruitment and training inside the Aquarium, headquarters of the GRU, the Soviet Union's top-secret military intelligence organization.

Near and Distant Neighbours is the first ever substantiated and complete history of Soviet intelligence. Based on a mass of newly declassified Russian secret intelligence documentation, it reveals the true story of Soviet intelligence from its very beginnings in 1917 right through to the end of the Cold War. Covering both main branches of Soviet espionage - civilian and military - Jonathan Haslam charts the full range of the Soviet intelligence effort and the story of its development: in cryptography, disinformation, special forces, and counter-intelligence. In a tragic irony, an organization that so casually disposed of others critically depended upon the human factor. Due to their lack of expertise and technological know-how, from early on the Soviets were forced to rely heavily on secret agents instead of the more sophisticated code-breaking techniques of other intelligence agencies. But in this they were highly successful, recruiting spy rings such as the infamous 'Cambridge Five' in the 1930s. Had it not been for Soviet espionage against Britain's code-breaking effort during the Second World War, Stalin might never have won the victory that later enabled him to dominate half of Europe. Similarly, espionage directed at his allies enabled the Soviets to build an atomic bomb earlier than expected and to take calculated risks in post-war diplomacy, such as his audacious blockade of Berlin which led to the Berlin Airlift. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956 alienated many of the foreign 'friends' so valued by the Soviet intelligence services. It also made new recruitment of foreign agents much more difficult, as the USSR rapidly lost its glamour and ideological appeal to potential supporters in the West during the 1950s. However, the gap was finally bridged through exploiting greedy and disloyal Western intelligence officers, using blackmail and bribery - and with great success. In fact, it was the ultimate irony that the KGB and GRU had never been more effective than when the Soviet Union began to collapse from within.

The Soviet-German War of 1941–1945 was the most extensive intelligence/counterintelligence war in modern history, involving the capture, torture, deportation, execution, and “doubling” of tens of thousands of agents—most of them Soviet citizens. While Russian armies fought furiously to defeat the Wehrmacht, Stalin’s security services waged an equally ruthless secret war against Hitler’s spies, as well as against the Soviet population. For the first time, Robert Stephan now combines declassified U.S. intelligence documents, captured German records, and Russian sources, including a top-secret Soviet history of its intelligence and security services, to reveal the magnitude and scope of the brutal but sophisticated Soviet counterintelligence war against Nazi Germany. Employing as many as 150,000 trained agents across a 2,400-mile front, the Soviets neutralized the majority of the more than 40,000 German agents deployed against them. As Stephan shows, their combination of Soviet military deception operations and State Security’s defeat of the Abwehr’s human intelligence effort had devastating consequences for the German Army in every major battle against the Red army, including Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, the Belorussian offensive, and the Vistula-Oder operation. Simultaneously, Soviet State Security continued to penetrate the world’s major intelligence services including those of its allies, terrorize its own citizens to prevent spying, desertion, and real or perceived opposition to the regime, and run millions of informants, making the USSR a vast prison covering one sixth of the world’s surface. Stephan discusses all facets of the Soviet counterintelligence effort, including the major Soviet “radio games” used to mislead the Germans—operations Monastery, Berezino, and those that defeated Himmler’s Operation Zeppelin. He also gives the most comprehensive account to date of the Abwehr’s infamous agent “Max,” whose organization allegedly ran an entire network of agents inside the USSR, and reveals the reasons for Germany’s catastrophic under-estimation of Soviet forces by more than one million men during their 1944 summer offensive in Belorussia. Richly detailed and epic in scope, Stalin’s Secret War opens up a previously hidden dimension of World War II.

Intelligence was a major part of the Cold War, waged by both sides with an almost warlike intensity. Yet the question 'What difference did it all make?' remains unanswered. Did it help to contain the Cold War, or fuel it and keep it going? Did it make it hotter or colder? Did these large intelligence bureaucracies tell truth to power, or give their governments what they expected to hear? These questions have not previously been addressed systematically, and seven writers tackle them here on Cold War aspects that include intelligence as warning, threat assessment, assessing military balances, Third World activities, and providing reassurance. Their conclusions are as relevant to understanding what governments can expect from their big, secret organizations today as they are to those of historians analysing the Cold War motivations of East and West. This book is valuable not only for intelligence, international relations and Cold War specialists but also for all those concerned with intelligence's modern cost-effectiveness and accountability. This book was published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.