This book develops model theory independently of any concrete logical system or structure, within the abstract category-theoretic framework of the so called ‘institution theory’. The development includes most of the important methods and concepts of conventional concrete model theory at the abstract institution-independent level. Consequently it is easily applicable to a rather large diverse collection of logics from the mathematical and computer science practice.

We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not.

2) How has organization theory developed over time, and what structure has the field taken? What assumptions does knowledge produced in organization theory incorporate, and what forms do its knowledge claims take as they are put forward for public adoption? 3) How have certain well-known controversies in organization theory, such as for example, the structure/agency dilemma, the study of organizational culture, the different modes of explanation, the micro/macro controversy, and the differnet explanations produced by organizational economists and sociologists, been dealt with? 4) How, and in what ways, is knowledge generated in organization theory related to action? What features must organization theory knowledge have in order to be actionable, and of relevance to the world 'out there'? How have ethical concerns been taken into account in organization theory? 5) What is the future of organization theory? What direction should the field take? What must change in the way research is conducted and key theoretical terms are conceptualized so that organization theory enhances its capacity to generate valid and relevant knowledge?

For over forty years, Theories of Human Communication has facilitated the understanding of the theories that define the discipline of communication. The authors present a comprehensive summary of major communication theories, current research, extensions, and applications in a thoughtfully organized and engaging style. Part I of the extensively updated twelfth edition sets the stage for how to think about and study communication. The first chapter establishes the foundations of communication theory. The next chapter reviews four frameworks for organizing the theories and their contributions to the nature of inquiry. Part II covers theories centered around the communicator, message, medium, and communication with the nonhuman. Part III addresses theories related to communication contexts—relationship, group, organization, health, culture, and society. “From the Source” contributions from theorists provide insight into the inspirations, motivations, and goals behind the theories. Online instructor’s resource materials include sample syllabi, key terms, exam questions, and text graphics. The theories include those important for their continuing influence in the field as well as emerging theories that encourage thinking about issues in new ways. For a reasonable price, readers are able to explore the patterns, trends, trajectories, and intricacies of the landscape of communication theory and will have an invaluable resource for future reference.

"Employee-organization relationship" is an overarching term that describes the relationship between the employee and the organization. It encompasses psychological contracts, perceived organizational support, and the employment relationship. Remarkable progress has been made in the last 30 years in the study of EOR. This volume, by a stellar list of international contributors, offers perspectives on EOR that will be of interest to scholars, practitioners and graduate students in IO psychology, business and human resource management.

The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition.

"Bromley argues that standard economic accounts see institutions as mere constraints on otherwise autonomous individual action. Some approaches to institutional economics - particularly the "new" institutional economics - suggest that economic institutions emerge spontaneously from the voluntary interaction of economic agents as they go about pursuing their best advantage. He suggests that this approach misses the central fact that economic institutions are the explicit and intended result of authoritative agents - legislators, judges, administrative officers, heads of states, village leaders - who volitionally decide upon working rules and entitlement regimes whose very purpose is to induce behaviors (and hence plausible outcomes) that constitute the sufficient reasons for the institutional arrangements they create."--BOOK JACKET.