Papers presented at the Senior Policy Seminar on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Macroeconomic Management in Large Countires, held in New Delhi, February 26-28, 1991.

Suggests guidelines by which developing countries can successfully manage the rapid surge in government revenues that occurs during a commodity boom. The book addresses the problems associated with such booms, including long-term spending commitments, Dutch disease, and a slowdown in diversification.

November 1998 Shah concludes that, contrary to a common misconception, decentralized fiscal systems offer more potential for improved macroeconomic governance than do centralized fiscal systems, because they require greater clarity about the roles of various players and decisionmakers and-to ensure fair play-greater transparency in rules governing interactions. In analyzing the institutional environment for macroeconomic management, Shah discusses monetary policy, fiscal policy, and subnational borrowing. In analyzing the macroeconomic dimensions of securing an economic union, he discusses the regulatory environment, tax coordination, transfer payments and social insurance, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and regional equity. Finally, he discusses the challenges of globalization and draws lessons from experience about fiscal reform in developing countries: Among them: * Monetary policy is best entrusted to an independent central bank with a mandate for price stability. * Fiscal rules accompanied by gatekeeper intergovernmental councils or committees provide a useful framework for fiscal discipline and coordination of fiscal policy. * The integrity and independence of the financial sector contribute to fiscal prudence in the public sector. * To ensure fiscal discipline, governments at all levels must be made to face the financial consequences of their decisions. * Societal norms and consensus about the roles of various levels of government and limits to their authority are vital to the success of decentralized decisionmaking. * Tax decentralization is a prerequisite for subnational access to credit markets. * Higher-level institutional assistance may be needed to finance local capital projects. * An internal common market is best preserved by constitutional guarantees. * Intergovernmental transfers in developing countries undermine fiscal discipline and accountability while building transfer dependencies that cause a slow economic strangulation of fiscally disadvantaged regions. * Periodic review of jurisdictional assignments is essential to realign responsibilities with changing economic and political realities. * Finally, and contrary to a common misconception, decentralized fiscal systems offer more potential for improved macroeconomic governance than do centralized fiscal systems. This paper-a product of the Country and Regional Relations Division, Operations Evaluation Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to learn lessons of experience in improving public sector performance in developing countries. The author may be contacted at ashah@worldbank.org.

Over the past few decades, a clear trend has emerged worldwide toward the devolution of spending and, to a lesser extent, revenue-raising responsibilities to state and local levels of government. One view is that the decentralization of spending responsibilities can entail substantial gains in terms of distributed equity and macroeconomic management. The papers in this volume, edited by Teresa Ter-Minassian, examine the validity of these views in light of theoretical considerations, as well as the experience of a number of countries.

Contributors provide a fascinating account of how federal countries are confronting the traditional challenges of conflicts over division of fiscal powers while also coping with emerging challenges of globalization and citizen empowerment arising from the information revolution. They analyze how relationships and roles in different orders of government are being reshaped and show how local solutions inspired by global principles help strengthen government accountability and improve the quality of life for citizens.

The design of a federal system to deal with growth, stabilization, and regional and local development issues is the primary concern of this volume, edited by Anwar Shah. The book provides analytical tools to address issues arising from globalization, localization, and regional integration. It discusses tax harmonization issues associated with subnational value added tax administration. It provides a framework for fiscal discipline in a federal system. Lessons from international experiences from policies to deal with lagging regions are drawn. The book empirically examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on the overall size of the public sector. Finally, it draws lessons from industrial countries' experiences on local governance. This important new series represents a response to several independent evaluations in recent years that have argued that development practitioners and policy makers dealing with public sector reforms in developing countries and, indeed, anyone with a concern for effective public governance could benefit from a synthesis of newer perspectives on public sector reforms. This series distills current wisdom and presents tools of analysis for improving the efficiency, equity, and efficacy of the public sector. Leading public policy experts and practitioners have contributed to the series.

The literature on fiscal decentralisation in India is few and far between. The collection of papers in this volume written by scholars who have done scholarly works on the theme seeks to fill the gap relating to the state sub-state level fiscal decentralisation in India. While the first paper by Anwar Shah, an internationally known expert on fiscal federalism, provides a general backdrop relating to fiscal decentralisation and macro management, all other papers critically review the various dimensions of fiscal decentralisation emerging in India since the implementation of the 73rd/74th constitutional amendments by the state governments. Two papers focus exclusively on Kerala which has won world-wide acclaim for its innovative initiatives in decentralisation.

This book offers a step forward in finding out how the new decentralized institutional arrangements affect local economic development. In particular, it analyzes how local governments can use their increasing powers and responsibilities to improve productivity and quality of life in their territories.

Abstract: "An extensive literature on the relationship between decentralization (or localization) and corruption has developed in recent years. While some authors argue that there is a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption, others claim that decentralization in fact leads to a reduction in the level of corruption. This important policy question has not yet been laid to rest since previous empirical work simply uses eclectic regressions and lacks a conceptual framework to discover the root causes of corruption. Gurgur and Shah attempt to fill this void by presenting a framework in identifying the drivers of corruption both conceptually and empirically to isolate the role of centralized decisionmaking on corruption. The following results emerge: * For a sample of 30 countries (developing and industrial), corruption is caused by a lack of service orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal bureaucratic controls, and centralized decisionmaking. * Decentralization is found to have a negative impact on corruption, with the effect being stronger in unitary than in federal countries. This paper--a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division, World Bank Institute--is part of a larger effort in the institute to exchange ideas on the reform of public sector governance"--World Bank web site.

This collection of experiences of fiscal decentralisation across a wide range of OECD-Member and non-member economies reveals lessons which are equally of relevance to both groups of countries.