Conflicting budget priorities of the Pres. and Congress accentuate the tensions between the exec. and legis. branches inherent in the fed. budget process. Impoundment, whereby a Pres. withholds or delays the spending of funds appropriated by Congress, provides a mechanism for budgetary control during budget implementation in the exec. branch; but Congress retains oversight responsibilities. Many Pres. have called for an item veto, or expanded impoundment authority, to provide them with greater control over fed. spending. Contents of this report: Brief History of Impoundment: Controversies Increase; Impoundment Control Act of 1974; Alternative to an Item Veto; Evolution of Expanded Rescission Proposals; Line Item Veto Act of 1996.

This highly anticipated addition to the "Great Questions in Politics" series offers a provocative argument about the persistence of bad ideas in shaping American economic policy. The result of a collaboration between political scientist Bryan D. Jones and economist Walter Williams, The Politics of Bad Ideas is indispensable reading for any study of American government, public policy, or economic and budgetary analysis. The Politics of Bad Ideas examines why, over the last quarter century, bad economic ideas -- such as cutting taxes without cutting spending -- have become so influential in shaping government policies. Using in-depth research and trenchant political and economic analysis, the book explores why those bad ideas continue to survive despite overwhelming evidence that they in fact cause damage to the federal government's long-term fiscal stability and the American economy.