“This unique, impressive study presents a history in microcosm of the entire Luftwaffe Fighter Corps . . . [a] spellbinding work.” —Library Journal Jagdgeschwader 26, the German elite fighter unit, was more feared by the Allies than any other Luftwaffe group. Based on extensive archival research in Europe, personal combat diaries and interviews with more than 50 surviving pilots, Caldwell has assembled a superb day-to-day chronicle of JG 26 operations, from its first air victory in 1939 to its final combat patrol in 1945. A microcosm of World War II exists in the rise and fall of this famous fighter wing. For the first two years of the war it was an even match between the Spitfires and Hurricanes of the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe’s Messerschmitts and Focke Wulfs; but the scales tipped in favor of the Allies in 1943 with the arrival of the Eighth US Air Force and its peerless P-51 Mustang. The book has been endorsed by the top fighter commanders of three air forces: the RAF (Johnnie Johnson), the USAAF (Hub Zemke), and the Luftwaffe (Adolf Galland) and is considered essential reading for anyone interested in the aerial war of 1941–45.

Peter Cornwell tells the story of the greatest air battle of the Second World War when six nations were locked in combat over north-western Europe for a traumatic six weeks in 1940. He describes the day-to-day events as the battle unfolds, and details the losses suffered by all six nations involved: Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Germany and, rather belatedly, Italy. As far as RAF fighter squadrons in France were concerned, it was an all-Hurricane show, yet it was the Blenheim and Battle crews who suffered the brunt of the casualties. Every aircraft lost or damaged through enemy action while operating in France is listed together with the fate of the crews. The RAF lost more than a thousand aircraft of all types over the Western Front during the six-week battle, the French Air Force 1,400, but Luftwaffe losses were even higher at over 1,800 aircraft.

This WWII combat history offers a detailed chronicle and analysis of an RAF Pathfinder Squadron’s ill-fated operation over Cologne. On December 23rd, 1944, an elite squadron of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command engaged in a courageous yet tragic daylight raid on the Gremberg railway yards in Cologne, Germany. One of the war’s most significant raids, it is scarcely mentioned in history books. Yet it was an operation in which its leader won the Victoria Cross, and a future VC fought a similarly heroic battle. It was also a harrowing ordeal in which ordinary men lost their lives doing extraordinary things. In Heroic Endeavour, aviation historian Sean Feast tells the story of this fateful raid from two different perspectives. In the first part, he presents a gripping narrative recreation of the events as they unfolded. In the second, he shares retrospective interviews with survivors from both sides, as well as an analysis of what went wrong and why.

Lt Col John J. Zentner’s The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Morale in Combat addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. More specifically, Colonel Zentner’s study seeks to identify and define those unique characteristics associated with leading airmen that sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses. Colonel Zentner defines aircrew morale as the enthusiasm and persistence with which an aviator flies combat missions. He then offers three historical case studies to establish a framework within which aircrew morale can be assessed. The first case study is of Maj Adolf Galland and Jagdgeschwader 26 during the Battle of Britain. The second case study considers Lt Col Joseph Laughlin and the 362d Fighter Group during the invasion of France in the summer of 1944. The third case study examines Col James R. McCarthy and the 43d Strategic Wing during Operation Linebacker II. Drawing heavily on the results of questionnaires and personal interviews, each case study is focused on the importance that aircrews ascribed to three general areas: individual needs, group cohesion, and unit esprit de corps. Colonel Zentner concludes that aircrew control over development of combat tactics was the single most important element affecting morale. This finding supports one of the fundamental truths about the employment of airpower, centralized control and decentralized execution that has become embedded in the airman’s culture. In each of the three cases studied by the author, morale generally improved when the wing commander either displayed a personal flair for tactical innovation or allowed his subordinates to become innovative. Conversely, morale declined when higher headquarters placed burdensome and unsound restrictions on aircrew tactics.

The story of the RAF, and in particular Fighter Command, during the Battle of Britain has been told many times. It is a tale of the gallant pilots of ‘The Few’, in their Hurricanes and Spitfires, with the nation’s back to the wall, fighting off the Luftwaffe’s airborne assault against enormous odds. But the story of Fighter Command’s operations immediately after the Battle of Britain is less well known. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Montague Trenchard commanded the Royal Flying Corps in the First World War. His policy then had been for his aircraft and men to be continually on the offensive, always over the German lines taking the fight to the enemy. After being promoted to command the RAF, Trenchard retired in 1930. In November 1940, Trenchard showed up again at the Air Ministry and proposed that the RAF should ‘Lean Towards France’ – that it should go on the offensive. The RAF would, claimed Trenchard, win the resulting battle of attrition. One of the main outcomes of the RAF’s new offensive stance was the introduction of the Circus sorties. These were attacks undertaken by a small force of bombers with a powerful fighter escort. They were intended to lure enemy fighters into the air so that they could be engaged by RAF fighters, the primary objective being the destruction of Luftwaffe fighters, followed by the protection of the bombers from attack. A further development of the Circus missions were Ramrods, Rhubarbs and Rodeos, all of which were variations on the same theme. A Ramrod was similar to a Circus, though in this instance the primary objective was the destruction of the target, the main role of the accompanying fighters being to protect the bombers from attack. A Rhubarb was a small-scale attack by fighters using cloud cover and/or surprise, the object of which was to destroy German aircraft in the air and/or striking at ground targets, while a Rodeo consisted of a fighter sweep over enemy territory with no bombers. Drawing on official documents and archive material, as well as accounts by many of those involved, James Starkey reveals just how Trenchard’s views won through and the RAF went on the offensive from late 1940 into 1941. Was it a failed strategy? If so, why was it not halted once the results began to be seen?

*Day-by-day account of a German fighter squadron, one of only two Luftwaffe units to spend the entire war in the West *Covers the Battle of France, the Battle of Britain, the Dieppe raid, and more *JG 26 was known as "The Abbeville Boys" and seen by the Allies as an elite squadron *Unit flew Messerschmitt Bf 109s and Focke-Wulf Fw 190s AUTHOR: Donald Caldwell has spent more than twenty -five years researching aviation history. ILLUSTRATIONS: 75 b/w photographs