Contents RFranklin G. Mixon, Jr. - ErnestW. King - Matthew L. Lawing Modeling the Impact of Localism in U.S. Presidential Elections Alan A. Lockard Campaign Expenditures under Proportional Representation and Plurality Voting Athanassios Pitsoulis - Jens Peter Siebel Political and Economic Effects of Tax Competition and Deficits Dalibor Rohác? Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Problems Reviews

Contents Svetozar (Steve) Pejovich Socialism is Dead, Long Live Socialism Todd Sandler – Khusrav Gaibulloev Terrorism: Rationality, Externalities, and Policy Tom Means – Edward P. Stringham Unintended or intended consequences? The effect of below-market housing mandates on housing markets in California Matt E. Ryan The Evolution of Legislative Tenure in the United States Congress: 1789-2004 Alexander William Salter A Theory of the Dynamics of Entangled Political Economy with Application to the Federal Reserve Richard J. Cebula – Maggie Foley A Panel Data Study of the Effects of Economic Freedom, Regulatory Quality, and Taxation on the Growth Rate of Per Capita Real GDP M.A.G. van Meerhaeghe Mars, Mercurius, Athena. My first ninety years Symposium Domenico da Empoli Some Remarks on Preference Revelation for Public Goods Akira Yokoyama Constitutional Rules of Overlapping Taxation among Multi-tiered Governments Yong J. Yoon The Cost of Collectivizing Moral Goods Richard E. Wagner Public Finance without Taxation: Free-Riding as Institutional Artifact Reviews

Contents Louis M. Imbeau Testing the 'Veil of Ignorance'Hypothesis in Constitutional Choice: A "Walk-Talk" Approach Geneviève Tellier Explaining Growth of Public Revenue: An Empirical Investigation of Canadian Provinces Rachel L. Mathers The Spillover Benefits of AIDS Prevention Agnieszka Bielinska-Kwapisz What Determines Excise Tax Rates? Reviews

Contents Anthony De Jasay The Python That Eats Itself By The Tail Sergio Beraldo – Enrico Colombatto – Valerio Filoso – Marco Stimolo Growth in One (Short) Lesson Franklin G. Mixon Jr. The Allocation of Death in the Afghanistan War Remembering James Buchanan Richard E. Wagner – Francesco Forte – Domenico da Empoli Forum on public procurement, quality of expenditure and saving Emma Galli Introduction Sergio Santoro Reference Prices and Standard Costs in Public Procurement as Tools against Corruption Claudio De Rose Corruption in Public Procurement: How to Fight and Prevent It? Mario Lupo Contracts of Public Works: How to Guarantee Low Prices Without Reducing Quality Ilde Rizzo Efficiency and Integrity Issues in Public Procurement Performance Gabriella M. Racca The Risks of Emergencies in Public Procurement Gian Luigi Albano On the Problem of Quality Enforcement in Centralized Public Procurement Symposium Domenico da Empoli On Federalism and Government Size David Hebert – Richard E. Wagner Taxation as a Quasi-Market Process Richard E. Wagner – Akira Yohoyama Polycentrism, Federalism, and Liberty Yong J. Yoon – William F. Shughart II Stackelberg on the Danube River Reviews

Contenuto/Contents Wallace E. Oates On the Development of the Theory of Fiscal Federalism: An Essay in the History of (Recent) Economic Thought Yong J. Yoon An Analogy: Symmetric Tragedies and Calculus of Consent Richard J. Cebula An Empirical Analysis of Determinants of Recent Federal Personal Income Tax Evasion in the U.S. Michelle B. Matthews – William F. Shughart II – Taylor P. Stevenson Political Arithmetic: New Evidence on the ‘Small-State Bias' in Federal Spending King Banaian – Örn B. Bodvarsson – Anton D. Lowenberg Determinants of Immigration Policy: An Empirical Study of US Legislative Voting Caterina Astarita Income Inequality and Crime: An Empirical Analysis of the Italian Case Alice M. Crisp – Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. Lincoln's Wartime Incumbency Network: Vertical Trust, Informal Payments, and the U.S. Presidential Election of 1864 Mouna M'Rad – Slaheddine Hallara The Impact of French Privatization on Firms' Performance Yilin Hou – Jason S. Seligman Local Sales Tax and Revenue Volatility Massimo Di Matteo Towards a Social Philosophy for the Twenty First Century: Critical Reflections on an Unpublished Essay by Richard Goodwin Michele G. Giuranno The Logic of Party Coalitions with Political Activism

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved. Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This first volume covers voting and elections; interest group competition and rent seeking, including corruption and various normative approaches to evaluating policies and politics. Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.

Revised edition of the author's Public finance and public policy, 2009.

Public Finance and Public Choice provides a comprehensive analysis of the economics of the public sector, taking a diagrammatic approach to the subject. Particular emphasis is given to the public choice and behavioural economics schools of thought.

This book explores the role of constitutions in public finance, with a special focus on transitional context in Central and Eastern Europe. The main questions addressed are: How do formal constitutional provisions that matter for public finance come about? How do constitutions shape policy choices in public finance? Part l of the book puts forth an analytical framework for analysing how fiscal constitutional provisions come about and tests the conjectures with the case of constitution-making in Estonia in 1991-1992. Part II summarises, synthesises and criticises the emerging orthodoxy in positive constitutional public finance and examines whether it can explain the commitment to fiscal discipline in Estonia between 1992 and 2007. Part III examines theoretically and empirically how constitutions can shape public finance laws via constitutional review, auto-limitation and constitutional deliberations.