In this book, a distinguished international group of legal theorists re-examine legal positivism as a prescriptive political theory and consider its implications for the constitutionally defined roles of legislatures and courts. The issues are illustrated with recent developments in Australian constitutional law.

Tom Campbell is well known for his distinctive contributions to legal and political philosophy over three decades. In emphasizing the moral and political importance of taking a positivist approach to law and rights, he has challenged current academic orthodoxies and made a powerful case for regaining and retaining democratic control over the content and development of human rights. This collection of his essays reaches back to his pioneering work on socialist rights in the 1980s and forward from his seminal book, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (1996). An introductory essay provides an historical overview of Professor Campbell's work and argues for the continuing importance of 'democratic positivism' at a time when it is again becoming clear that courts are ineffective protectors of human rights.

The book brings together 33 state-of-the-art chapters on the import and the pros and cons of legal positivism.

Pluralism proceeds from the observation that many associations in liberal democracies claim to possess, and attempt to exercise, a measure of legitimate authority over their members. They assert that this authority does not derive from the magnanimity of a liberal and tolerant state but is grounded, rather, on the common practices and aspirations of those individuals who choose to take part in a common endeavor. As an account of the authority of associations, pluralism is distinct from other attempts to accommodate groups like multiculturalism, subsidiarity, corporatism, and associational democracy. It is consistent with the explanation of legal authority proposed by contemporary legal positivists, and recommends that the formal normative systems of highly organized groups be accorded the status of fully legal norms when they encounter the laws of the state. In this book, Muniz-Fraticelli argues that political pluralism is a convincing political tradition that makes distinctive and radical claims regarding the sources of political authority and the relationship between associations and the state. Drawing on the intellectual tradition of the British political pluralists, as well as recent developments in legal philosophy and social ontology, the book argues that political pluralism makes distinctive and radical claims regarding the sources of political authority and the relationship between associations and the state.

In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in concern for the rule of law. Not only have there been a multitude of articles and books on the essence, nature, scope and limitation of the law, but citizens, elected officials, law enforcement officers and the judiciary have all been actively engaged in this debate. Thus, the concept of the rule of law is as multifaceted and contested as it’s ever been, and this book explores the essence of that concept, including its core principles, its rules, and the necessity of defining, or even redefining, the basic concept. Law, Liberty, and the Rule of Law offers timely and unique insights on numerous themes relevant to the rule of law. It discusses in detail the proper scope and limitations of adjudication and legislation, including the challenges not only of limiting legislative and executive power via judicial review but also of restraining active judicial lawmaking while simultaneously guaranteeing an independent judiciary interested in maintaining a balance of power. It also addresses the relationship not only between the rule of law, human rights and separation of powers but also the rule of law, constitutionalism and democracy.

Jeffrey Goldsworthy is a renowned constitutional scholar and legal theorist whose work on the powers of Parliament and the interpretation of constitutional and statute laws has helped shape debates on these topics across the English-speaking world. The importance of democratic constitutionalism is central to Professor Goldsworthy's work: it lies at the heart of his defence of Parliamentary supremacy and shapes his approach to both constitutional and statutory interpretation. In honour of Professor Goldsworthy's retirement, this collection provides new perspectives from a range of leading public law scholars and theorists on the legal and philosophical principles that govern the making and interpretation of laws in a constitutional democracy. It also addresses some of the challenges to democratic constitutionalism that have arisen in light of contemporary developments in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Adopting an evolutionary perspective, this Research Handbook presents novel and cutting-edge insights into the interdisciplinary field of legal evolution. Engaging with various scientific approaches, it provides a versatile analysis of legal evolution, examining the field as a whole as well as in the context of specific branches of law.

Many legal experts no longer share an unbounded trust in the potential of law to govern society efficiently and responsibly. They often experience the 'limits of the law', as they are confronted with striking inadequacies in their legal toolbox, with inner inconsistencies of the law, with problems of enforcement and obedience, and with undesired side-effects, and so on. The contributors to this book engage in the challenging task of making sense of this experience. Against the background of broader cultural transformations (such as globalisation, new technologies, individualism and cultural diversity), they revisit a wide range of areas of the law and map different types of limits in relation to some basic functions and characteristics of the law. Additionally, they offer a set of strategies to manage justifiably law's limits, such as dedramatising law's limits, conceptual refinement ('constructivism'), striking the right balance between different functions of the law, seeking for complementarity between law and other social practices.

Constitutionalising Secession proceeds from the question, 'What, if anything, does the law have to say about a secession crisis?' But rather than approaching secession through the optic of political or nationalist institutional accommodation, this book focuses on the underpinnings to a constitutional order as a law-making community, underpinnings laid bare by secession pressures. Relying on the corrosive effects of secession, it explores the deep structure of a constitutional order and the motive forces creating and sustaining that order. A core idea is that the normativity of law is best understood, through a constitutional optic, as an integrative, associative force. Constitutionalising Secession critically analyses conceptions of constitutional order implicit in the leading models of secession, and takes as a leading case-study the judicial and legislative response to secession in Canada. The book therefore develops a concept of constitutionalism and law-making - 'associative constitutionalism' - to describe their deep structure as a continuing, integrative process of association. This model of a dynamic process of value formation can address both the association and the disassociation of constitutional systems.

Judicial review by constitutional courts is often presented as a necessary supplement to democracy. This book questions its effectiveness and legitimacy. Drawing on the republican tradition, Richard Bellamy argues that the democratic mechanisms of open elections between competing parties and decision-making by majority rule offer superior and sufficient methods for upholding rights and the rule of law. The absence of popular accountability renders judicial review a form of arbitrary rule which lacks the incentive structure democracy provides to ensure rulers treat the ruled with equal concern and respect. Rights based judicial review undermines the constitutionality of democracy. Its counter-majoritarian bias promotes privileged against unprivileged minorities, while its legalism and focus on individual cases distort public debate. Rather than constraining democracy with written constitutions and greater judicial oversight, attention should be paid to improving democratic processes through such measures as reformed electoral systems and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny.