The doctrine of judicial recusal enables - and may require - a judge who is lawfully appointed to hear and determine a case to stand down from that case, leaving its disposition to another colleague or colleagues. The subject is one of considerable import and moment, not only to 'insiders' in the judiciary, but also to litigants and their lawyers. Understanding the principles which guide recusal is also to understand the fundamentals of judging in the common law tradition. The subject is therefore of considerable interest both at practical and theoretical levels, for it tells us most of what we need to know about what it means "to be a judge" and what the discharge of that constitutional duty entails. Unsurprisingly therefore, the subject has attracted controversy, and some of the most savage criticisms ever directed at particular judges. The book commences with an introduction which is followed by an analysis of the essential features of the law, the legal principles (common-law origins, the law today in the USA, UK and Commonwealth) and the difficulties which currently arise in the cases and by operation of statute. The third part looks at process, including waiver, necessity, appellate review, and final appeals. Three specific problem areas (judicial misconduct in court, prior viewpoints, and unconcious bias) are then discussed. The book ends with the author's reflections on future developments and possible reforms of recusal law.

Deirdre Dwyer examines how a court can decide when to accept an expert's opinion, focusing on English civil justice.

Introduces citizens to solutions for reforming the American campaign finance system.

Since at least the time of Justinian--under statutes, codes of judicial ethics, and the common law—judges have been expected to recuse themselves from cases in which they might have a stake. The same holds true for the justices of the US Supreme Court. For instance, there were calls for Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan, both of whom had officiated at gay weddings,to recuse themselves from the recent marriage equity case, Obergefell v. Hodges. Even a case like this, where no justice bowed out, reveals what a tricky ethical issue recusal can be. but as Louis J. Virelli demonstrates in this provocative work, recusal at the Supreme Court also presents questions of constitutional power. Disqualifying the High Court shows that our current understanding of how and when justices should recuse themselves is at odds with our constitutional design. Viewing recusal through a constitutional lens, Virelli reveals new and compelling information about how justices should decide recusal questions and, in turn, how our government should function more broadly. Along the way he traces the roots and development of federal recusal law in America from as early as the Roman Empire up to the present day. The Supreme Court's unique place at the top of the judicial branch protests the justices from some forms of congressional interference. Virelli argues that constitutional law, in particular the separation of powers, prohibits Congress from regulating the recusal practices of the Supreme Court. Instead those decisions must be left to the justices themselves, grounded in the principles of due process--assuring parties fair treatment by the judicial system--and balanced against the justices' rights to free speech. Along with the clarity it brings to this highly controversial issue, Virelli's work also offers insight into constitutional problems presented by separation of powers. It will inform our evolving understanding of theory and practice in the American judicial system.

How does the American judiciary impact the development of legal and social policies in the United States? How are the state and federal court systems constructed? This book answers these questions and many others regarding politics, the U.S. courts, and society. This single-volume work provides a comprehensive and contemporary treatment of the historical development of state and federal courts that clearly documents how they have evolved into significant political institutions. It addresses vital and highly relevant subjects such as the constitutional origins of courts, the nature of judicial selection and service, and the organization of courts and their administration. The book explains civil and criminal legal proceedings, the political impact of judicial rulings, and the restraints placed upon the exercise of judicial powers. Readers will come away with an understanding of the key principles of constitutional interpretation and judicial review as well as judicial independence, what factors affect access to courts, the underlying politics of state judicial campaigns, and the confirmation of presidential appointments to the federal bench. The book covers historical and contemporary court perspectives on major issues, such as same-sex marriage, the Affordable Care Act, campaign financing, gun rights, free speech and religious freedom, racial discrimination, affirmative action, criminal procedure and punishments, property rights, and voting rights.

Offering an original legal definition of shaming, this incisive book argues for greater attention to shaming by legal scholars and practitioners. Suggesting nuanced procedures to regulate shaming in diverse areas of law, it seeks to make shaming by legal entities legitimate and effective, and to use legal mechanisms to limit inappropriate shaming in non-legal contexts.

Current important events in legal ethics, with up-to-the-minute research, are explored by Tulane students and a legal ethics professor in his Foreword. Purchase of this book benefits Tulane PILF, a nonprofit student group which funds public interest and indigent client representations. Topics include social networking and ads; judicial bias and Caperton; ancillary businesses; and negotiations.

An independent and impartial judiciary is fundamental to the existence and operation of a liberal democracy. Focussing on Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States, this comparative 2011 study explores four major issues affecting the judicial institution. These issues relate to the appointment and discipline of judges; judges and freedom of speech; the performance of non-judicial functions by judges; and judicial bias and recusal, and each is set within the context of the importance of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary. The essays highlight important episodes or controversies affecting members of the judiciary to illustrate relevant principles.

An elected judiciary is virtually unique to the American experience and creates a paradox in a representative democracy. Elected judges take an oath to uphold the law impartially, which calls upon them to swear off the influence of the very constituencies they must cultivate in order to attain and retain judicial office. This paradox has given rise to perennially shrill and unproductive binary arguments over the merits and demerits of elected and appointed judiciaries, which this project seeks to transcend and reimagine. In Who Is to Judge?, judicial politics expert Charles Gardner Geyh exposes and explains the overstatements of both sides in the judicial selection debate. When those exaggerations are understood as such, it becomes possible to search for common ground and its limits. Ultimately, this search leads Geyh to conclude that, while appointive systems are a preferable default, no one system of selection is best for all jurisdictions at all times.