Jodi S. Finkel examines judicial reforms leading to increased judicial independence and authority in three Latin American countries: Argentina, Mexico, and Peru.

This book argues that explaining judicial independence-considered the fundamental question of comparative law and politics-requires a perspective that spans the democracy/autocracy divide. Rather than seeking separate explanations in each regime context, in The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy, Brad Epperly argues that political competition is a salient factor in determining levels of de facto judicial independence across regime type, and in autocracies a factor of far greater import. This is because a full "insurance" account of independence requires looking not only at the likelihood those in power might lose elections but also the variable risks associated with such an outcome, risks that are far higher for autocrats. First demonstrating that courts can and do provide insurance to former leaders, he then shows via exhaustive cross-national analyses that competition's effects are far higher in autocratic regimes, providing the first evidence for the causal nature of the relationship. Epperly argues that these findings differ from existing case study research because in democratic regimes, a lack of political competition means incumbents target the de jure independence of courts. This argument is illustrated via in-depth case study of the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the country's 2010 "constitutional coup," and then tested globally. Blending formal theory, observational and instrumental variables models, and elite interviews of leading Hungarian legal scholars and judges, Epperly offers a new framework for understanding judicial independence that integrates explanations of both de jure and de facto independence in both democratic and autocratic regimes.

Constitutional courts around the world play an increasingly central role in day-to-day democratic governance. Yet scholars have only recently begun to develop the interdisciplinary analysis needed to understand this shift in the relationship of constitutional law to politics. This edited volume brings together the leading scholars of constitutional law and politics to provide a comprehensive overview of judicial review, covering theories of its creation, mechanisms of its constraint, and its comparative applications, including theories of interpretation and doctrinal developments. This book serves as a single point of entry for legal scholars and practitioners interested in understanding the field of comparative judicial review in its broader political and social context.

Comparative Judicial Politics synthesizes the now extensive scholarly work on judicial politics from around the world, focusing on legal traditions, lawyers, judges, constitutional review, international and transnational courts, and the impact and legitimacy of courts. It offers typologies where relevant and intentionally raises questions to challenge readers’ preconceptions of “best” practices.

Provides a comparative analysis of the ideational dimension of judicial review and its potential contribution to democratic governance.

Constitutional law in Latin America embodies a mosaic of national histories, political experiments, and institutional transitions. No matter how distinctive these histories and transitions might be, there are still commonalities that transcend the mere geographical contiguity of these countries. This Handbook depicts the constitutional landscape of Latin America by shedding light on its most important differences and affinities, qualities and drawbacks, and by assessing its overall standing in the global enterprise of democratic constitutionalism. It engages with substantive and methodological conundrums of comparative constitutional law in the region, drawing meaningful comparisons between constitutional traditions. The volume is divided into two main parts. Part I focuses on exploring the constitutions for seventeen jurisdictions, offering a comprehensive country-by-country critique of the historical foundations, institutional architecture, and rights-based substantive identity of each constitution. Part II presents comparative analyses on the most controversial constitutional topics of the region, exploring central concepts in institutions and rights. The Oxford Handbook of Constitutional Law in Latin America is an essential resource for scholars and students of comparative constitutional law, and Latin American politics and history Written by leading experts, it comprehensively examines constitutions, controversies, institutions, and constitutional rights in Latin America.

Issues in Political Systems Research / 2011 Edition is a ScholarlyEditions™ eBook that delivers timely, authoritative, and comprehensive information about Political Systems Research. The editors have built Issues in Political Systems Research: 2011 Edition on the vast information databases of ScholarlyNews.™ You can expect the information about Political Systems Research in this eBook to be deeper than what you can access anywhere else, as well as consistently reliable, authoritative, informed, and relevant. The content of Issues in Political Systems Research: 2011 Edition has been produced by the world’s leading scientists, engineers, analysts, research institutions, and companies. All of the content is from peer-reviewed sources, and all of it is written, assembled, and edited by the editors at ScholarlyEditions™ and available exclusively from us. You now have a source you can cite with authority, confidence, and credibility. More information is available at http://www.ScholarlyEditions.com/.

This book argues that independent courts can defend democracy by encouraging political elites to more prudently exercise their powers.

Zusammenfassung: Her research makes an important methodological contribution to exploring legal culture and to comparative, ideational studies of judicial behavior. --Rachel Sieder, CIESAS, Mexico City. This rich sociolegal analysis is a welcome addition to the judicial and legal scholarship in Mexico and beyond. --Julio Ríos Figueroa, ITAM. This book explores the careers, professional trajectories and legal cultures of judges in the federal judiciary in Mexico. So far, there has been limited research on internal factors contributing to the understanding of judicial power dynamics in Mexico and other Latin American countries at large; this Work fills an important gap in the literature through its empirical investigation of internal legal cultures and judicial norms, offering new data, measurement strategies,and insights into the interactions between law, politics, norms, legal culture(s), as well as judicial behavior. Utilising an original survey, the chapters analyse judicial conceptualizations of role norms, legal cultures, proclivities for judicial activism, and judicial behavior. In so doing, this book contributes to understanding of underlying key internal factors of judicial activism or restraint, in turn moving forward the debate that seeks to explain judicial behavior reliant on internal and ideational perspectives. Complementing limited but existing studies of judicial politics in Mexico through its analysis of judges beyond those that sit at the Supreme Court, this book will be of particular interest to Latin-American judicial politics scholars due to its focus on the judicial power from internal perspectives as well as sub-national judges, filling a void in the literature vis-à-vis the study of courts in Latin America. This Work was originally written in Spanish, and the translation was done with the help of artificial intelligence. A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content. Azul A. Aguiar Aguilar is Professor of political science in the Department of Sociopolitical and Legal Studies at ITESO, the Jesuit University of Guadalajara, Mexico. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Florence, Italy. She teaches courses of political science, judicial politics and theories of democracy in undergraduate and graduate programs at ITESO and the University of Guadalajara. Her research interests include comparative judicial politics and democratization processes. Professor Aguiar has edited books and published several articles in peer review journals about democracy, courts, and justice-sector institutions. She has been distinguished as a member of the National Researchers System in Mexico

When can the Executive manipulate the composition of a Court? What political factors explain judicial instability on the bench? Using original field data from Argentina's National Supreme Court and all twenty-four Provincial Supreme Courts, Andrea Castagnola develops a novel theory to explain forced retirements of judges. She argues that in developing democracies the political benefits of manipulating the court outweigh the costs associated with doing so. The instability of the political context and its institutions causes politicians to focus primarily on short-term goals and to care mostly about winning elections. Consequently, judiciaries become a valuable tool for politicians to have under their control. Contrary to the predictions of strategic retirement theory, Castagnola demonstrates that there are various institutional and non-institutional mechanisms for induced retirement which politicians have used against justices, regardless of the amount of support their party has in Congress. The theoretical innovations contained herein shed much needed light on the existing literature on judicial politics and democratization. Even though the political manipulation of courts is a worldwide phenomenon, previous studies have shown that Argentina is the theory-generating case for studying manipulation of high courts.