Why does equality matter, as a social and political value, and what does it require? Relational egalitarians argue that it does not require that people receive equal distributive shares of some good, but that they relate as equals. Christian Schemmel here provides the first comprehensive development of a liberal conception of relational equality, one which understands relations of non-domination and egalitarian norms of social status as stringent demands of social justice. He first argues that expressing respect for the freedom and equality of individuals in social cooperation requires stringent protections against domination. Taking this as a starting point, he then develops a substantive, liberal conception of non-domination and argues that non-domination is a particularly important, but not the only, concern of social justice. From there, Schemmel develops an account of the wrongness of inegalitarian norms of social status which shows how status-induced foreclosure of important social opportunities is a social injustice in its own right, over and above the role of status inequality in enabling domination, and the threats it poses to individuals' self-respect. Finally, Schemmel articulates the implications of liberal relational egalitarianism for political, economic, and health justice, showing that it demands, in practice, far-reaching forms of equality in all three domains. With expert rigor and creativity, Justice and Egalitarian Relations brings together scholarship in a variety of related topics, from social justice and liberalism to distributive and social equality, republicanism, non-domination, and self-respect.

This book delivers the first comprehensive development of a liberal conception of relational equality as a demand of social justice. Liberal egalitarian theories holding that justice requires a form of distributive equality in goods such as resources have been dominant for much of the last 50 years. Recently they have been subject to critique by relational egalitarians, who hold that the value of equality does not primarily require that people receive equal shares of some good, but that they relate as social equals, unencumbered by hierarchies of power and social status.

Is equality valuable? This question dominates many discussions of social justice, which tend to center on whether certain forms of distributive equality are valuable, such as the equal distribution of primary social goods. But these discussions often neglect what is known as social or relational equality. Social equality suggests that equality is foremost about relationships and interactions between people, rather than being primarily about distribution. A number of philosophers have written about the significance of social equality, and it has also played an important role in real-life egalitarian movements, such as feminism and civil rights movements. However, as it has been relatively neglected in comparison to the debates about distributive equality, it requires much more theoretical attention. This volume brings together a collection of ten original essays which present new analyses of social and relational equality in philosophy and political theory. The essays analyze the nature of social equality, as well as its relationship to justice and politics.

In this book, Kevin Ip articulates and defends an egalitarian conception of global distributive justice grounded on the value of equality as a normative ideal of how human relations should be conducted. Arguing that relationships of equality, rather than those characterized by domination or exploitation, are a requirement for a just system, Ip spells out the real-world implications of this approach. Ip defends the ideal of equality against the diverse objections which have been brought to bear, and the responsibilities we bear in our aspirations towards global justice.

Civil wrongs occupy a significant place in private law. They are particularly prominent in tort law, but equally have a place in contract law, property and intellectual property law, unjust enrichment, fiduciary law, and in equity more broadly. Civil wrongs are also a preoccupation of leading general theories of private law, including corrective justice and civil recourse theories. According to these and other theories, the centrality of civil wrongs to civil liability shows that private law is fundamentally concerned with the expression and enforcement of norms of justice appropriate to interpersonal interaction and association. Others, sounding notes of caution or criticism, argue that a preoccupation with wrongs and remedies has meant neglect of other ways in which private law serves justice, and ways in which private law serves values other than justice. This volume comprises original papers written by a wide variety of legal theorists and philosophers exploring the nature of civil wrongs, their place in private law, and their relationship to other forms of wrongdoing.

Explores the nature of the ideal of relational equality and how it relates to distributive ideals of justice.

This is the fourth volume of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Since its revival in the 1970s political philosophy has been a vibrant field in philosophy, one that intersects with jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory. OSPP aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in political philosophy and these closely related subfields. This volume features eight papers that address a range of central topics and represent cutting edge work in the field. The three parts of the volume explore legitimacy, egalitarianism, and liberty and coercion.

Major scholars assess G. A. Cohen's contribution to the debate on the nature of egalitarian justice.

This volume analyzes Rainer Forst's theory of the right to justification from legal-philosophical and constitutional-theoretical perspectives. The contributions address issues such as the philosophical foundations of justification and constitutionalism, the justification of human rights, the requirements of social justice, and important elements of constitutional law. Forst responds to the contributions in a concluding chapter.

The Oxford Handbook of Global Justice explores an exciting area of refreshing, innovative new ideas for a changing world facing significant challenges.