Explores the relationship between self-knowledge, individuality, and personal development by reconstructing Kant's account of personhood.

Der Band enthält zweiundzwanzig Texte von anerkannten Experten der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, die sich mit der Theorie der Apperzeption, mit der transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien und mit den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft aus sehr unterschiedlichen Perspektiven auseinandersetzen. Untersucht werden vor allem (1) die philosophischen Quellen der Kantischen Begriffe „Apperzeption" und „Selbstbewusstsein", (2) die historische Entwicklung der Lehre der Apperzeption und der Deduktion der Kategorien in der sogenannten vor-kritischen Phase, (3) Struktur und Inhalte sowohl der A- als auch der B-Deduktion der Kategorien, und schließlich (4) den (Kantischen, aber auch nicht Kantischen) Sinn der Begriffe der „Apperzeption" und des „Selbstbewusstseins".

Andrew Cooper presents the first systematic study of Kant's account of natural history. Cooper contends that Kant made a decisive contribution to one of the most explosive and understudied revolutions in the history of science: the addition of time to the frame in which explanations are required, sought, and justified in natural science. Through addressing a wide range of Kant's works, Cooper challenges the claim that Kant's theory of science denies a developmental conception of nature and argues instead that it establishes a method by which natural historians can genuinely dispute historical claims and potentially come to consensus. This method, Cooper argues, can be used to expose serious flaws in Kant's own historical reasoning, including the formation and defence of his racist views. The book will be valuable to philosophers seeking to discern both the power and limitations of Kant's theory of science, and to historians of science working on the fractured landscape of eighteenth-century Newtonianism.

Kant's Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant's conception of reason and its philosophical significance. Karl Schafer argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or "comprehension"). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and practical rationality, without reducing either to the other. In particular, it enables us to see why the activities of both theoretical and practical reason are governed by a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, while also seeing why reason is essentially autonomous. At the same time, Kant's Reason reads Kant as presenting a compelling picture of the role that reason, as a capacity or power, should play in a systematic approach to foundational philosophical questions. In doing so, it argues for an account of the fundamental norms that apply to rational beings that treats neither substantive reasons or values nor merely structural rationality as fundamental, but instead provides a robust conception of reason as a power or capacity for theoretical and practical understanding. The result is a form of rational constitutivism, which contrasts both with the forms of reasons fundamentalism that are currently fashionable and the forms of agency-first constitutivism that have dominated Kantian metaethics. In this sense, this volume aims to vindicate Kant's insistence that his philosophy represents nothing more or less than reason's implicit self-understanding coming to explicit and systematic self-consciousness.

In this book Daniel Smyth offers a comprehensive overview of Immanuel Kant's conception of intuition in all its species – divine, receptive, sensible, and human. Kant considers sense perception a paradigm of intuition, yet claims that we can represent infinities in intuition, despite the finitude of sense perception. Smyth examines this heterodox combination of commitments and argues that the various features Kant ascribes to intuition are meant to remedy specific cognitive shortcomings that arise from the discursivity of our intellect Intuition acting as the intellect's cognitive partner to make knowledge possible. He reconstructs Kant's conception of intuition and its role in his philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of mathematics, and shows that Kant's conception of sensibility is as innovative and revolutionary as his much-debated theory of the understanding.

It is striking that, although philosophers have theories about the values of truth, goodness and beauty, they do not provide an account of the value of "depth," which is also frequently referred to in our everyday evaluative discourse. In Depth, Melissa Zinkin provides one of the few philosophical accounts of depth. Moreover, she does this through a new interpretation of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. By showing that Kant was in fact arguing for this unique and important value, Zinkin shows how Kant is still relevant to contemporary philosophical discussions of value. Indeed, Kant's philosophy has much to offer anyone today who is critical of superficial or shallow thinking.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is a towering figure of modern Western philosophy, someone whose thought continues to exert an influence across all areas of the discipline. His work is characterized by both breadth and unity: he writes powerfully about mind, epistemology, metaphysics, logic, mathematics, natural science, ethics, politics, aesthetics, education, and more. And across those areas, his work is concerned with defending a view of human beings and their place in nature according to which our own reason enables us to discover and uphold the laws of nature and freedomthat is, to think for ourselves. The Oxford Handbook of Kant provides an up-to-date account of recent scholarship on Kant's philosophy, taking in all areas of his writings. It will be essential reading for students and researchers who want to think for themselves about the topics he wrote with such insight. The individual chapters to this Handbook each provide a scholarly analysis and assessment of some aspect of Kant's thought, and the collection ranges across all the areas to which Kant contributed. It collectively presents a picture of where the study of Kant's philosophy finds itself at this point in the twenty-first century.

The thought of Immanuel Kant is fundamental to understanding Western philosophy. Spanning epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and religion, the sheer scope and originality of Kant’s ideas have decisively shaped the history of modern philosophy. The Kantian Mind is an outstanding guide and reference source to Kant's thought and a major new publication in Kant scholarship. Comprising forty-five chapters by a stellar team of contributors, the collection is divided into four clear parts: Background to the Critical Philosophy Transcendental Philosophy (Critique and Doctrine) Posthumous Writings and Lectures Kant and Contemporary Kantians. In addition to coverage of Kant's main works, the volume contains chapters on a broad range of topics including Kant's views on logic, mathematics, the natural sciences, anthropology, religion, politics, and education. The concluding chapters cover the influence of Kant's thought on contemporary analytic and continental philosophy. Including suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter, The Kantian Mind is essential reading for all students and scholars of Kant and contemporary Kantian thought. It will also be extremely helpful to those in related humanities and social sciences disciplines such as religion, history, politics, and literature.

Explores the distinctive features of the Prolegomena, and casts Kant's critical philosophy in a new light.

Samantha Matherne defends a systematic interpretation of the philosopher Immanuel Kant's theory of imagination. To this end, she offers an account of what kind of mental capacity Kant takes imagination to be in general, as well as an account of the way in which we use this capacity in theoretical, aesthetic, and practical contexts. In contrast with more traditional theories of imagination, as a kind of fantasy that we exercise only in relation to objects that are not real or not present, Matherne argues that Kant theorizes imagination as something that we exercise just as much in relation to objects that are real and present. Thus she attributes to Kant a view of imagining as something that pervades our lives. In order to bring out this pervasiveness, Matherne explores Kant's account of how we exercise our imagination in perception, ordinary experience, the appreciation of beauty and sublimity, the production of art, the pursuit of happiness, and the pursuit of morality. However, she also argues that Kant's analysis of this wide range of phenomena is underwritten by a unified theory of what imagination is, as a remarkably flexible cognitive capacity that we can exercise in constrained and creative, playful and serious ways.