Nearly all philosophers refer to Kant when debating the concept of dignity, and many approve of Kant’s conception, unaware of the tensions between Kant’s conception and the modern idea of dignity intimately connected to the idea of human rights. What exactly is Kant's conception of dignity? Is there a connecting tie between dignity and the legal sphere of human rights at all? Does Kant’s concept refer to a superior status human beings seem to own in comparison to non-rational beings? Or does it refer to an absolute value? The contributions of this volume are organised in five broader topics. In the first section tensions within the Kantian conception of dignity are discussed (C. Horn, D. Birnbacher, G. Schönrich). The second group of articles illuminates the intimate connections between dignity and human rights (R. Mosayebi, M. Kettner). The third group discusses the prevailing moral conception of dignity (S. Yamatsuta, S. Shell, O. Sensen). The fourth group focuses on the relation of dignity and end in itself (T. Hill, D. Sturma, A. Wood). The central theme of the fifth group of contributions are the social, political, and cultural dimensions of dignity (Y. Kato, K. Ameriks, K. Flikschuh, T. Saito).

A clear and original perspective on Kantian ethics that focuses on the dignity, vulnerability and perfectibility of human rational agency.

Immanuel Kant is often considered to be the source of the contemporary idea of human dignity, but his conception of human dignity and its relation to human value and to the requirement to respect others have not been widely understood. Kant on Human Dignity offers the first in-depth study in English of this subject. Based on a comprehensive analysis of all the passages in which Kant uses the term ‘dignity’, as well as an analysis of the most prominent arguments for a value of human beings in the Kant literature, the book carefully examines different ways of construing the relationship between dignity, value and respect for others. It takes seriously Kant’s Copernican Revolution in moral philosophy: Kant argues that moral imperatives cannot be based on any values without yielding heteronomy. Instead it is imperatives of reason that determine what is valuable. The requirement to respect all human beings is one such imperative. Respect for human beings does not follow from human dignity—for this would violate autonomy—but is an unconditional command of reason. Following this train of thought yields a unified account of Kant’s moral philosophy.

Kantian Dignity and its Difficulties defends Kant's doctrine that all human beings have a moral capacity that gives them unconditional dignity. It explains how the reception of this influential doctrine was marred by serious misunderstandings, and how Kant himself fell prey to prejudices inconsistent with the doctrine. The works of J.G. Herder and Richard Price are discussed as providing an important supplement for, and parallel to, what is best in Kant. Thomas Mann's work is then discussed as a paradigmatic example of a transition from a chauvinist reading--influenced by the terrible but highly popular interpretation of Kant by Houston Stewart Chamberlain--to an enlightened understanding of Kant's philosophy, one heavily influenced by Walt Whitman and Novalis. This book is a combination of philosophical argument and historical analysis. The first chapter critically discusses a number of contemporary interpretations. It defends Kant's concept of dignity as rooted in a basic capacity of reason for morality, and therefore as an unconditional, all-or-nothing, and inviolable feature of all human beings, one that deserves universal respect. A systematic analysis based on close textual study defends Kant's position from interpretations that misconstrue it by overemphasizing mere rationality, contingent talents, or achievements. The next four chapters build on this systematic account by explaining how Kant's notion of dignity was further clarified, or seriously misunderstood or neglected, in a variety of significant international contexts: the Baltics (Herder and Prussia's relation to the east), Berlin (the rise of Fascism), Philadelphia (the Declaration of Independence), London (Richard Price and reactions to the American and French Revolutions), and Washington (reactions to World War I and II, discussed in three chapters on Thomas Mann). The book argues that Kant showed no interest in the "expanding blaze" of the American Revolution, and that, in addition to other prejudices, he had an elitist attitude that harmed his own cause. Tragically, it was the shock of German Fascism that forced Mann to emigrate and become the most influential public advocate of what is best in Kant's philosophy. Mann's "Democracy will win" campaign connected Kant's doctrine of dignity with the enlightened principles of American democracy.

Seminar paper from the year 2020 in the subject Philosophy - Philosophy of the present, grade: 1,0, University of Frankfurt (Main), language: English, abstract: In “Humanity without Dignity” Andrea Sangiovanni argues that we should abandon the idea of dignity as a basis of our commitment to moral equality and human rights. Sangiovanni considers two versions of the Kantian conception of dignity - the regress reading and the address reading - and argues that both of them fail to meet his desiderata. My argument, therefore, proceeds in four steps, each of which seeks to show that the Kantian conception of dignity can in fact meet Sangiovannis desiderata. In section 2.1., I will argue that Sangiovanni misrepresents not only Kant’s own regress arguments, but also those of his scholars, and that his arguments therefore do not apply. Though my arguments are in this sense rather negative for large parts, I will try to deliver a positive argument by showing that Sangiovanni in fact has to concede that the regress argument can meet the rationale desideratum. In section 2.2., I contend that Sangiovanni does not sufficiently accommodate the idea of transcendental freedom - that is, the idea that we have to presuppose from a practical point of view that we are free and hence can act morally. As I will try to show, this also shows why the regress reading can meet the equality desideratum. Following this, we turn to the address reading of the Kantian conception of dignity. Here, I will argue that address Kantians can coherently claim that we are owed a justification for however anyone interacts with us, and hence can meet the rationale desideratum (section 3.1.). Finally, I will contend that the address reading can – as opposed to Sangiovanni’s argument - rule out most cases of slavery (section 3.2.).

In this work, originally published in 1986, Victor Seidler explores the different notions of respect, equality and dependency in Kant’s moral writings. He illuminates central tensions and contradictions not only within Kant’s moral philosophy, but within the thinking and feeling about human dignity and social inequality which we take very much for granted within a liberal moral culture. In challenging our assumption of the autonomy of morality, Seidler also questions our understanding of what it means for someone to live as a person in his or her own right. The autonomy of individuals cannot be assumed but has to be reasserted against relationships of subordination. This involves a break with a rationalist morality, so that respect for others involves respect for emotions, feelings, desires and needs, and establishes a fuller autonomy as a basis for freedom and justice.

The debate between moral realism and antirealism plays an important role in contemporary metaethics as well as in the interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy. This volume aims to clarify whether, and in what sense, Kant is a moral realist, an antirealist, or something in-between. Based on an explication of the key metaethical terms, internationally recognized Kant scholars discuss the question of how Kant’s moral philosophy should be understood in this regard. All camps in the metaethical field have their inhabitants: Some contributors read Kant’s philosophy in terms of a more or less robust moral realism, objectivism, or idealism, and some of them take it to be a version of constructivism, constitutionism, or brute antirealism. In any case, all authors introduce and defend their terminology in a clear manner and argue thoughtfully and refreshingly for their positions. With contributions of Stefano Bacin, Jochen Bojanowski, Christoph Horn, Patrick Kain, Lara Ostaric, Fred Rauscher, Oliver Sensen, Elke Schmidt, Dieter Schönecker, and Melissa Zinkin.

Nearly all philosophers refer to Kant when debating the concept of dignity, and many approve of Kant’s conception, unaware of the tensions between Kant’s conception and the modern idea of dignity intimately connected to the idea of human rights. What exactly is Kant's conception of dignity? Is there a connecting tie between dignity and the legal sphere of human rights at all? Does Kant’s concept refer to a superior status human beings seem to own in comparison to non-rational beings? Or does it refer to an absolute value? The contributions of this volume are organised in five broader topics. In the first section tensions within the Kantian conception of dignity are discussed (C. Horn, D. Birnbacher, G. Schönrich). The second group of articles illuminates the intimate connections between dignity and human rights (R. Mosayebi, M. Kettner). The third group discusses the prevailing moral conception of dignity (S. Yamatsuta, S. Shell, O. Sensen). The fourth group focuses on the relation of dignity and end in itself (T. Hill, D. Sturma, A. Wood). The central theme of the fifth group of contributions are the social, political, and cultural dimensions of dignity (Y. Kato, K. Ameriks, K. Flikschuh, T. Saito).

Immanuel Kant was one of the most significant philosophers of the modern age. Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism, Second Edition contains a chronology, an introduction, appendixes, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 500 cross-referenced entries on key terms of Kant’s philosophy, Kant’s major works and cover his most important predecessors and successors, concentrating especially on the relation of these thinkers to Kant himself. This book is an excellent resource for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Immanuel Kant.

Authors from all over the world unite in an effort to cultivate dialogue between Asian and Western philosophy. The papers forge a new, East-West comparative path on the whole range of issues in Kant studies. The concept of personhood, crucial for both traditions, serves as a springboard to address issues such as knowledge acquisition and education, ethics and self-identity, religious/political community building, and cross-cultural understanding. Edited by Stephen Palmquist, founder of the Hong Kong Philosophy Café and well known for both his Kant expertise and his devotion to fostering philosophical dialogue, the book presents selected and reworked papers from the first ever Kant Congress in Hong Kong, held in May 2009. Among others the contributors are Patricia Kitcher (New York City, USA), Günther Wohlfahrt (Wuppertal, Germany), Cheng Chung-ying (Hawaii, USA), Sammy Xie Xia-ling (Shanghai, China), Lau Chong-fuk (Hong Kong), Anita Ho (Vancouver/Kelowna, Canada), Ellen Zhang (Hong Kong), Pong Wen-berng (Taipei, Taiwan), Simon Xie Shengjian (Melbourne, Australia), Makoto Suzuki (Aichi, Japan), Kiyoshi Himi (Mie, Japan), Park Chan-Goo (Seoul, South Korea), Chong Chaeh-yun (Seoul, South Korea), Mohammad Raayat Jahromi (Tehran, Iran), Mohsen Abhari Javadi (Qom, Iran), Soraj Hongladarom (Bangkok, Thailand), Ruchira Majumdar (Kolkata, India), A.T. Nuyen (Singapore), Stephen Palmquist (Hong Kong), Christian Wenzel (Taipei, Taiwan), Mario Wenning (Macau).